Waltz

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume X, Number 3 April 1958

Price $6.00 per year

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems of international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.
Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *International Index to Periodicals*, and abstracts of its articles appear in *International Political Science Abstracts*.

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WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. April 1958. Vol. X, No. 3. Entered as Second Class matter in the Post Office at Princeton, New Jersey, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press. Subscriptions $6.00 per year (two years $10.00); single copies $2.00. Foreign postage 25 cents additional per year.

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WORLD POLITICS

VOL. X • APRIL 1958 • No. 3

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TEN THEORIES IN SEARCH OF REALITY

The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences*

By DANIEL BELL

SURELY, more has been written about the Russian Revolution and the ensuing forty years of Soviet rule than about any comparable episode in human history. The bibliography of items on the French Revolution occupies, it is said, one wall of the Bibliothèque Nationale. A complete bibliography on the Soviet Union—which is yet to be compiled and may never be because of the geometric rate at which it multiplies—would probably make that earlier cenotaph to scholarship shrink the way in which the earlier tombs diminished before the great complex at Karnak.

And yet how little of this awesome output has stood the test of so short a span of time! If hell, as Thomas Hobbes once said, is truth seen too late, the road to hell must now be paved twice over with the thousands of books claiming to discover the "truth" about Russia—while the tortures of the damned are reserved for those, diplomats especially, who committed the fates of millions in the confident belief that they could predict correctly the way in which the Soviet rulers would respond.[1]

In the last ten years there has been, presumably, a new sophistication, and an extraordinary amount of research and writing on Soviet society, particularly in the United States. Some of this research has come from Russian defectors; most of it has been done in special institutes set up by government or foundation research grants in an effort to obtain reliable knowledge about Soviet behavior. We have seen, too, the entry of new disciplines—anthropology, sociology, and psychiatry—into the study of political phenomena. In some instances these newer approaches have claimed to provide a total understanding of Soviet

* This article is a revision of a paper presented at a conference on "Changes in Soviet Society," held at Oxford, June 24-29, 1957, under the joint auspices of St. Antony's College, Oxford, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

[1] *Pace* President Roosevelt, who wrote on the flyleaf of his personal copy of Joseph E. Davies' *Mission to Moscow*: "This book will last." Richard H. Ullman, "The Davies Mission and United States-Soviet Relations, 1937-1941," *World Politics*, IX, No. 2 (January 1957), p. 220.

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behavior; in others, to supplement existing explanations. So thick and heavy is this research that an outside observer, seeking to push his way through the marshes, often finds himself mired (as that wonderful Russian onomatopoetic evocation has it) in *splosh*. And one is bogged down further by the fact that much of this newer research is couched in a special jargon which owes allegiance to other modes of discourse than the common tongue. (As R. P. Blackmur has said of the "New Criticism," the terminology rigidifies in the course of time and the "normal pathology of a skill becomes a method, and the method a methodology.")

In this article, the writer has attempted a description and, in representative cases, a detailed assessment of these methodologies. This is not a "national estimate" of Russian capabilities and weaknesses, social, military, or economic, such as is made by the National Security Council. Nor is it a "survey" of empirical research. The writer has sought to distinguish ten approaches in social theory, each of which, despite some shading or overlap, represents a coherent judgment of Soviet behavior. It is hoped that by "reading" each against the other, some sense of the crucial differences, analytical or methodological, may emerge. Beyond that, such a reading may aid in the formulation of the two judgments which are essential in any stock-taking—namely: (1) Which theories or approaches have "stood up" in explaining events, and which have not? (2) If one were a policy-maker, which research would one underwrite in the future, and why?

I. Enter Pirandello

Hegel once said that what was reasonable was real. Each of the theories to be discussed seems reasonable, yet not wholly real. Something may be wrong with Hegel, the theories, or both. The reader will have to be the judge.

A. Characterological Theories

(1) *Anthropological*. Beginning with the work of Ruth Benedict, and taken up by Linton and Kardiner, Margaret Mead, and Clyde Kluckhohn, contemporary anthropologists have developed the concept of "culture and personality." The argument is that members of a given culture share certain common, sufficiently distinct ways of handling emotional drives and regulating social conduct which form a unique life style that differs, often markedly, from the life style of other cultural groups. The "norms" of the group specify how an individual must manage the key tensions generated in social living (i.e., attitudes

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to authority, frustration of impulses, aggression, etc.) and how the social controls against violations of those norms (i.e., mechanisms of guilt and shame, disposal of repressed hate, etc.) operate.

Margaret Mead,[2] Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman,[3] and Henry V. Dicks[4] have sought to apply these "culture and personality" concepts to Russian behavior. Gorer, particularly, has gained a certain notoriety for what skeptics have dubbed "diaperology." Together with the late John Rickman, a respected British psychiatrist who had lived in Russia during World War I, Gorer argued that the maternal practice of tightly swaddling the Russian infant produces a privation-gratification cycle. This predisposes the "Great Russian" national character to pendulum swings of submissiveness and violent eruption, of apathy and diffuse persecutory anxiety, of "oral" greed and abstinence.[5] This accounts, too, for the willingness of the Russian adult to submit to brutal authority.

Dicks's work is more specific. A British psychiatrist at the Tavistock Institute (he set up the War Office Selections Boards), Dicks's generalizations are based, principally, on long interviews with Russian defectors. The outstanding trait of Russian personality, says Dicks, is its ambivalence. On one side is the omnivorousness, the tendency to rush at things and to "swallow them whole," the need for quick and full gratification, the spells of manic omnipotence, the anarchic demand for abolition of all bounds and limitations. On the other, the melancholy closeness and suspicion, the anxious and sullen submissiveness, the "moral masochism and grudging idealization of a strong and arbitrary authority which is thought of as the only safeguard against the excesses of Russian nature." Authority, thus, if it is to be *authority*, must be hard, deprivational, arbitrary, and capricious; if the *vlast* were weak, nobody would obey it.

Against the traditional untidiness, lack of system, and formlessness of the Russian masses is the contrasting behavior of the elite. It has to be puritanical, in full control of all sentimentality and self-indulgence, and strong enough to renounce the gratifications which "traditional"

[2] Margaret Mead, *Soviet Attitudes to Authority*, New York, 1951.

[3] Geoffrey Gorer and John Rickman, *The People of Great Russia*, London, 1949.

[4] Henry V. Dicks, "Observations on Contemporary Russian Behavior," in *Human Relations*, v, No. 2 (1952), pp. 111-75.

[5] A dichotomy, like an atom once split, can seemingly be multiplied indefinitely. Thus Dinko Tomasic, in his study of *The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), finds that Russian national character is a bisect of two contrasting influences, that of the "power-seeking and self-oriented nomadic horsemen of the Eurasian steppes" and of the "anarchic and group-oriented [Slavic] tillers of the land." One can also point to antinomies, such as Gordon Wasson's discovery that Russians are mycophiles and Anglo-Saxons are mycophobes.

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Russian character seeks. At important points there are congruities. The people expect and the elite satisfies the image of authority as severe, arbitrary, and fickle. The system, further, permits the most authoritarian fraction of the population "to act out their introjected bad-object relations"—i.e., to step into the shoes of a hated, yet, deep down, secretly identified-with father figure (Tsar, landlord, etc.). "By this hypothesis," says Dicks, "I would explain the rise in Soviet Russia of a rigid, gold-braided, intensely status-conscious and anxious bureaucracy, which is winning in the struggle against the very tendency originally successfully attacked by the new system and its founders during the Revolution."[6]

But this very transformation of goals, on a conscious or an unconscious level, provides the "salient" divergence between the Soviet system and the traditional Russian culture-pattern. For the elite, faced with the need of quickly producing a new type of technological and managerial personality, "is using the impetus of its own imperfectly assimilated and conflict-laden goal-drives to force and mould the people into a new cultural norm." Since the greater the pressure, the more intensive the inner conflicts, the elite "projects its own compulsive and sadistic authoritarian dominance needs on to foreign outgroups." Thus it creates a psychological situation of "encirclement" and attributes all failures to the work of the external enemy. "It is difficult to estimate," says Dicks, "how much of this paranoid behavior is the result of conscious design and how much is the effect of an inner compulsion due to cultural-psychological forces into which the top leaders have little insight. In this respect, I can only refer to the amazing discovery of the psychiatric pictures presented by a comparable power clique whom we were able to study: Hitler's entourage. We had assumed a cynical and cold-blooded exploitation of this paranoid dynamic by people like Goebbels and Himmler—and we found they were its victims."[7]

The acceleration of industrialization, says Dicks, will increase the tensions between the elite and the people. The coercions are "resented and stored up against the regime," the deprivations in the name of some ultimate and impersonal good are interpreted as "withdrawal of love and nurturance." But such unconscious rage also leads to a sense of guilt for having defied authority, and this becomes projected onto the elite (i.e., it creates a feeling, at all levels, that the elite is angry at the masses and wants to punish them), leading to an increase in the atmosphere of "persecutory anxiety and diffuse fear (*strakh*)." The guilt thus also reduces a tendency to strike out at, or oppose, the regime.

(2) *Psychoanalytic.* An attempt to analyze not Russian but Bolshe-

[6] Dicks, *op.cit.*, p. 171. [7] *Ibid.*

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vik character structure, particularly as exemplified in the Politburo, has been made by Nathan Leites in his RAND study, underwritten by the U.S. Air Force.[8] But Leites' work goes beyond the mere codification of behavior in operational terms. In guarded, almost esoteric fashion, Leites undertakes a psychoanalytic explanation which is fairly breathtaking in its attempt. Bolshevik elite behavior is seen in contrast to that of the nineteenth-century intelligentsia. The latter were moody, nervous, soul-searching, brooding, introspective. "The Bolshevik" is rigid, suspicious, unyielding, ever-aggressive. This character is stamped in the primal image of Lenin, and is derived, psychoanalytically speaking, as a "reaction-formation" to fears of death and latent homosexual impulses. (Since Leites' massive work—639 pages—is the most ambitious attempt yet to read an "operational code" of Bolshevik behavior, particularly in international strategy, a more detailed exposition of the theory is undertaken in Section III below.)

B. SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES

(3) *The Social System.* This socio-psychological theory, developed at Harvard in the Russian Research Center, and expressed most concisely in the recent book by Raymond Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn,[9] seeks to identify the functionally relevant "operating characteristics" of the Soviet system—e.g., the overcommitment of resources to particular objectives; "storming"; the refusal to allow independent concentration of power—and the effect of these behavior patterns on the various social groups. In this fashion, the authors seek to locate the points of strain in the Soviet system. (Because it is the summary volume of the largest single research project on Soviet behavior, it is discussed in greater detail in Section IV below.)

(4) *Ideal Types.* This approach, exemplified largely in the writings of Barrington Moore, Jr., at Harvard[10] (though it has influenced the thinking of W. W. Rostow at M.I.T. and Henry Dicks at Tavistock), sets up a number of models for the organization of power in a society, and seeks to establish how far any society, and the Russian in particular, can go in its commitment to one or another of these forms.

According to Moore, power and position in a society are held in one of a combination of three ways: (a) *traditional*: power and position are transmitted through the family or kinship system, from father to son;

[8] Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism,* Glencoe, Ill., 1954.

[9] Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works,* Cambridge, Mass., 1956.

[10] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Terror and Progress—USSR,* Cambridge, Mass., 1954, and *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power,* Cambridge, Mass., 1950.

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(b) *rational-technical*: power and position are attained by an individual on the basis of skill and technical ability, regardless of the status of one's parent; (c) *political*: power and position are awarded on the basis of loyalty to a political leader, party, or clique.

The use of any one criterion limits the range of workable alternatives for the solution of other problems. Rationality emphasizes that technical competence should be the criterion for employment. But the nature of power struggles demands that jobs should go to the faithful, to the commissar rather than the manager, while purges, the most drastic expression of politics, remind individuals that obedience is the first law of the Soviet system. Meanwhile, traditionalism is still the "natural" mode of the peasantry, and, *sub rosa*, within large sections of Soviet industry, for family and informal ties have become a necessary means of protection against arbitrary orders.

The political criterion of power in Russia (e.g., the commissars in the army, the control functions of the party in relation to industry) has been employed too ruthlessly, says Moore, at the expense, even, of sacrificing large classes of technicians and experienced army officers (the *Yezhovschina*). The power of the dictator to intervene arbitrarily at any point in the administrative hierarchy creates a level of insecurity which an ongoing system may find difficult to maintain. The choice now, Moore feels, lies between "creeping rationality" or traditionalism, or some combination of both.

Since the Soviet Union is intent on industrialization, the rationalizing elements are likely to become more deeply embedded in the society: this would mean that technical criteria would replace political decisions, jobs would be allocated according to skill, career expectations would have a higher degree of stability, family privileges could be passed on to the children. In turn, the power and prestige of the industrial manager, the engineer, and the technician would rise, and the share in power and prestige held by the "control" apparatus—the party and the secret police—would decline.

An alternative evolution in a traditionalist direction, which Moore finds politically "somewhat more plausible," would mean that the party and military elements would retain control, but arbitrary intervention would diminish as personal cliques and machines within the bureaucracy become the focal point of loyalties. Such a development would also imply a rise in local autonomy and a resistance to innovation and change.

Plausible as these alternatives seem, if there is any sense to Khrushchev's vast "decentralization" scheme, it would seem to mean the reas-

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sertion of a political criterion, rather than economic rationality, in the handling of economic affairs. Genuine economic decentralization, as Richard Lowenthal points out,[11] would leave the party as a parasitic appendix to the economy. Despite the absorption of managers into the party, the division of function between managers and party whips has been a source of conflict; and this was utilized by Malenkov, speaking for the managerial group. What Khrushchev, whose strength has been in the party secretariats, has now done is to create a union of function, whereby the party secretaries, at the Republic and regional levels, will be responsible for the economic performance of the plan. As Lowenthal concludes: "It is the 'irrational' Khrushchev with his party bosses, and not the 'rational' Malenkov with his managers and economic administration, who has won the latest round; and the reason is to be found precisely in the logic of self-preservation of the party regime. . . ."[12] If Moore is correct, such logic may yet lead to economic crises; but that remains to be seen.

C. POLITICAL THEORIES

(5) *Marxist.* Expressed most directly by Isaac Deutscher, this approach sketches a theory of Soviet development based on the proposition that the level of productive power always acts as a constraint on the possibilities of action. It argues that the Stalinist dictatorship was a historically "necessary" stage, therefore, in overcoming the resistance of the masses to industrialization, but that once this social stage has been achieved, the dictatorial apparatus will "come into social conflict" with the requirements of the new, higher stage of economic development.[13]

As developed by Deutscher—agreement can be found in the writings of E. H. Carr—the year 1920 represented the crossroads of the revolution:[14] the working class was exhausted, demoralized, shrunken to half its size, anxious for relaxation; in a free election, the Bolsheviks would have been ousted; only the iron will of the Bolshevik leadership saved the revolution, at the expense of putting down democracy in the party (i.e., suppressing the Workers' Opposition faction, the "levelers or Utopian dreamers"). The result was an anomaly, a workers' revolution without working-class support. The rationale for this paradox was "historical necessity"—i.e., that nationalized property represented a higher stage

[11] "The Permanent Revolution Is on Again," *Commentary*, XXIV, No. 2 (August 1957), pp. 105-12.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 109.
[13] Isaac Deutscher, *Russia: What Next?*, London, 1953.
[14] Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921*, New York, 1954.

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of social development and therefore had to be defended, even against the workers.

The theory, *sans* Stalinist apologetics, had its origin in Trotsky's *The New Course* (1923) and later *The Revolution Betrayed* (1937). There Trotsky argued that in the growth of bureaucracy Russia faced a crisis: either the release of productive forces from the heavy hand of bureaucracy, or a "Thermidor," a return to some capitalist form, state or otherwise. Deutscher, at this point, feels otherwise. The backwardness of the peasant masses and their reluctance to make the sacrifice for industrialization, he says, required the harsh measures and iron discipline of Stalinism. But with the progress that was achieved in the 1930's, says Deutscher, the Stalinist terrorism and "primitive magic" had outlived their "usefulness" and were coming into conflict with the "new needs of Soviet society." Industrialization, he believes, "tends to awaken the democratic aspirations of the masses," while the "phenomenal growth of Soviet wealth . . . tends to soften class privileges, and the orthodoxy, the iron curtain and the elaborate mythology of Stalinism tend to become socially useless. . . . Stalinism is untenable in this expanding society at its present level of productive forces."[15]

This theme, with a greater emphasis on the working class as a "political power of a magnitude hitherto unknown in Russian history," has been expanded by Deutscher in a recent publication.[16] The post-Stalin reforms, he notes, are reforms from "above," intended largely to provide some security for the bureaucracy. But the working class, particularly the skilled elements in engineering (which employs about one-third of Russia's industrial manpower), is now displaying long-suppressed egalitarian aspirations. This is evident in the revision of the old "progressive" piece-rate system, the narrowing of wage differentials, the introduction of a new pension scheme, and the abolition of all tuition fees in education.

This egalitarian drive—which is reinforced by the formal ideology that the workers are the ruling power in the country—says Deutscher, must come into conflict with the bureaucracy, which will seek to maintain its privileges and to preserve the status quo. And such an impending conflict must create a problem for a regime. With the power of the secret police diminished, there is only the army as the guardian of the order. But the army, rather than keeping order for the benefit of the party, sooner or later will do so on its own account. "In other

[15] *Russia: What Next?*, pp. 123, 125.

[16] Isaac Deutscher, "Russia in Transition," *Universities and Left Review*, 1, No. 1 (Spring 1957), pp. 4-12.

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words," concludes Deutscher, "the strains and stresses caused by a stormy revival of mass movements lacking leadership and clear political purpose, may lead to the establishment of a dictatorship of the Bonapartist type. All the more so as the military could hardly view with indifference a situation in which they must see a threat to Russia's positions of power and to all the strategic gains she won in the last war."[17]

It is highly debatable whether industrialization leads to a striving for *freedom* (even though it may lead to a demand by workers for a greater distributive share of wealth), or whether the expansion of wealth tends to diminish class privileges. *Relative* scarcities in the Soviet Union are bound to exist for a long period, however "phenomenal" the growth of Russian productivity. And the congealing of class privileges may become the real brake on any relaxation of the dictatorship, although key social groups at the top may win a measure of security. Certainly, in the downfall of Zhukov, the military has, for the time being at least, once again come under the control of the party. Deutscher clearly underestimated the role of the party, and in *Russia: What Next?* (published in 1953) failed even once to mention Khrushchev—so remote was he from the inner-elite struggles. What is relevant, however, for this presentation is that in Deutscher's scheme of analysis there is a clearly determinable sense (whether substantively right or wrong) of a mainspring of change; and thus it focuses attention on the question which all social theory must confront—the sources of change in social systems.

(6) *Neo-Marxist.* Leading out of Trotsky's discussion of the nature of Soviet society, a group of theorists argued that Russia, despite nationalized property, was no longer a workers' state, but a new social form—namely, "bureaucratic collectivism."[18] The distinction has been

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[18] The first book to insist that Russia was a new class state—calling it "bureaucratic collectivism"—was that of Bruno R., *La Bureaucraticisation du Monde*, Paris, 1939. The theme was debated in the Menshevik press in the early 1940's, with the late Theodor Dan arguing in *Novy Put* that Russia was still a workers' state, and Rudolf Hilferding and Solomon Schwarz arguing the contrary in the *Vestnik*. (Dan, following the invasion of Russia, gave qualified support to the Russian regime.) Hilferding's argument, a classic statement of the neo-Marxist position, was printed in the *Modern Review*, I, No. 4 (June 1947), pp. 266-71, under the title, "State Capitalism or Totalitarian State Economy," while Schwarz's data appeared later in his article, "Heads of Russian Factories," in *Social Research*, IX, No. 3 (September 1942), pp. 315-33, and in his collaborative effort with Gregory Bienstock and Aaron Yugow, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*, New York, 1944. The debate was carried over into the Trotskyite press in the 1940's, principally in the *New International* and the *Fourth International* in New York. Trotsky's last argument is contained in the collection entitled *In Defense of Marxism* (*Against the Petty-bourgeois Opposition*), New York, 1942. The revisionist position can be found in James Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution*, New

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important for the political orientations of the Marxist parties and sects. The orthodox Trotskyites, for example, claimed that Russia, although a "degenerated" workers' state, was, because of nationalized property, "historically progressive" and therefore worth defending in the event of a conflict with capitalist powers. The dissident Trotskyites, claiming that a new exploitative class society had been established, took a "neither-nor," "third camp" position. Analytically—i.e., in terms of its predictive utility—the scheme is of less value. The neo-Marxists, in their analysis of the future course of events in the Soviet Union, would tend to use the same terms as the Marxist analysts.

(7) *Totalitarian.* Expressed most forcefully in the categories of political philosophy by Hannah Arendt,[19] this theory argues that a radically new social form, different from tyranny, dictatorship, or authoritarianism, was created in Germany and exists now in Russia. The essentially new fact of totalitarianism is that all intermediate or secondary institutions between the leader and the "masses" have been eliminated, and that the ruler, unrestrained by legal or political checks, rules by terror. The theory, as applied to the Soviet Union by Bertram D. Wolfe, holds that no essential change in the nature of the regime is possible and that totalitarianism, through an inner "ideo-logic" of its own, can never relinquish its combative posture vis-à-vis democratic societies.

This argument was developed by Wolfe in his paper prepared for the Oxford Conference and published in the August 1957 issue of *Commentary*. Since his paper was subject to detailed challenge by Raymond Aron at the conference, it was not discussed in my paper as originally prepared. But in terms of my frame of reference, one point can be noted: as a "working tool" to explain specific political situations, the theory of totalitarianism, which Mr. Wolfe draws from Karl Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, Conn., 1957), is too sweeping. From such heights the terrain of politics, its ridges and gullies, become flattened and the weary foot-traveler finds few guides to concrete problems. Even on a simpler, intuitive basis, one can question the basic assumption of the theory—namely, that society becomes completely atomized and rule is anomic and direct. In a *crisis* situation, a state can fragment all social life and through terror, perhaps, mold a people to its will. But can a society live in permanent crisis? Can it hold such a rigid posture, without either exploding into war or relaxing? The

York, 1941, and Max Schactman's introduction to the revised edition of Trotsky's *The New Course*, New York, 1943.

[19] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, 1951 (published in England as *The Burden of Our Times*).

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basis of all social life requires not only a minimum of personal security, but the reasonable expectation by parents that their children will be educated, develop careers, and so forth. To that extent, a tendency toward "normalization" is at work in any crisis state.

(8) *Kremlinological.* These speculations, identified principally with the writings of the late Franz Borkenau and of Boris Nicolaevsky, focus primarily on the power struggle within the core elite and seek to identify the shifting coalitions ("who is doing-in whom") within the Kremlin as a basis for predicting political events. While open to easy satire, it is the supercilious who mock it at their peril, as the *New York Post* once learned when it scoffed at the speculations arising from the fact that all the Bolshevik leaders *but* Beria had appeared en masse at the Bolshoi Ballet. "Perhaps Beria doesn't like ballet," said the *Post* archly. Perhaps he didn't, but we never had the opportunity to find out, for two days later came the announcement that Beria had been arrested as a traitor.

In one form or another, Kremlinology is practiced today by every foreign office and by most journalists. Its emphasis is largely on personality and power groups, and less on the social systems and the way such systems can or cannot constrain these leaders. (See Section V for an enlargement of this discussion.)

D. HISTORICAL THEORIES

(9) *Slavic Institutions.* Represented in an earlier generation by Nicholas Berdayev, Sir Bernard Pares, and Sir John Maynard, and today to some degree by Edward Crankshaw, Ernest Simmons, and Werner Philipp (of the Free University of Berlin), this school states that much of contemporary Russian behavior can be accounted for by traditional Slavic character and institutions. "Too often we forget," said Professor Ernest Barker, in introducing Maynard's *The Russian Peasant: And Other Studies* (London, 1942), "that Russia, with all her changes, still largely remains the same." The theme is elaborated in Sir John's book: "All Russian regimes have been sudden and arbitrary. . . . Old Russia was always rough, with its Siberian exiles. . . . Planning . . . a characteristic feature of the new regime, is not as new at first glimpse as it looks to be. . . . Even the 'Party'—that misnomer of the vocation of leadership—is not really new: but rather a new application of an ancient institution: the priesthood . . ." etc., etc.

One finds a similar argument in the November 1951 lecture by Professor Werner Philipp on the "Historical Presuppositions of Political

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Thought in Russia," inaugurating the Osteuropa Institute of Berlin.[20] As a reviewer summarizes Professor Philipp's argument: "Conditions and traditions have produced a definite political mentality in Russia which goes back for several centuries. . . . The Russian distrust of the West, the cult and consciousness of the precedence of the community over the individual, the recognition of the unlimited power of governmental authority over society, and the discrepancy between political reality and the professed ideal aim, all these phenomena of Soviet thought and life have their roots in conditions which developed in Russia between the beginning of the thirteenth and the end of the sixteenth century."[21] The theme of an "eternal Russia" is propounded, too, by Crankshaw in his *Cracks in the Kremlin Wall* (New York, 1951).

To argue that the roots of Soviet life go down deep in the Russian past is not, of course, to justify those practices (although the argument lends itself sometime to apologetics, and in the 1930's and 1940's apologists like Bernard Pares or Maurice Hindus did justify Russian behavior in such terms). But like the characterological theories ("parallel travelers," one might call them), the Slavophile theory argues in effect that since Soviet institutions were shaped by historical social forms, and since they are deeply rooted in the traditions of the people, they will change only slowly.

(10) *Geo-political.* This school, which had some vogue during World War II (e.g., Nicholas Spykman at Yale, and William T. R. Fox's *The Super-Powers*, New York, 1944) and still has some supporters, holds that Russian foreign policy is dictated primarily by long-range strategic interests deriving from its position as a great land-mass power, and that its contemporary political aspirations (e.g., in the Middle East) reflect the historic drives of Great Russian policy. The school generally tends to minimize ideology (viz., Walter Bedell Smith's introduction to the Marquis de Custine *Diaries*, New York, 1951), and to see Russian policy primarily as a function of strategic power position. To some extent, the policy views of George Kennan (see his Princeton University lectures, *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J., 1954) and those of Henry Kissinger are shaped by these considerations.

[20] Horst Jablonowski and Werner Philipp, eds., *Forschungen zur ost-europäischen Geschichte*, Vol. 1, Berlin, 1954.

[21] Hans Kohn in the *Russian Review*, XIV, No. 4 (October 1955), p. 373.

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III. Kto-kovo—The Id and Ego of Bolshevism

During the truce negotiations in Korea, a slim book, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, by Nathan Leites, was used by the American negotiators as a tactical manual. Leites' research, embodied in the larger *Study of Bolshevism*, was sponsored by the U.S. Air Force's Project RAND. The fact that RAND has given strong support to the pioneering method of Leites (which is now being applied to the study of French politics) makes a more detailed examination of his work worthwhile.

Leites begins by attempting to define "Bolshevik character" as a type distinct in social history. The attempt to define historic character is not unique. (We have the image, somewhat overworked these days, of the "inner-directed Protestant.") What makes Leites' work unique are the novel categories he chooses and, above all, his method. There is no observation of behavior. Like Max Weber, who drew his "Protestant ethic" from the writings of Luther, Calvin, Baxter, and others, Leites scans the writings of Lenin and Stalin to infer similar norms which guide the Bolshevik Party. He reads the Bolshevik character as a "reaction" to the Oblomovs, who slept away their lives; to the Rudins, the high-flown talkers but never-doers; to the indecisive, soul-sick, moody students. The Bolshevik, as Boris Pilnyak put it, is "against the old peasant roots of our old Russian history, against its aimlessness, its non-teleological character . . . against the philosophy of Tolstoy's Karataev." The moral training of the Russian intelligentsia stressed both the prohibition against egotism and the prohibition against "dirtying oneself." Chekhov once said, "If all Socialists are going to exploit the cholera for their own ends, I shall despise them." But, for the Bolshevik, refusal to use bad means is merely an expression of sentimentality and stupidity; in Bolshevik doctrine, the worst egotist is precisely he who refuses to soil his hands. The party strives for humanity, and "purity" lies not in a personal refusal to act immorally but in dedication to the party. In such dedication the individual finds his defense against both egotism and personal impurity.

In contrast to the Russian intelligentsia, who spoke of ultimate things and sacred values, the Bolsheviks maintain silence about the sacred. Against the vice of outpouring emotion, the Bolsheviks uphold the virtue of reserve. Against the older Russian tendency to depressed passivity, introspection, nervous impressionability, and excited babbling, against the protracted searching for metaphysical truths and the posing of unanswerable questions—against all these, there is the determinism

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of history, the certainty of purpose, the commitment to action, the ability to avoid taking personal offense, the "masculinity" of action. Against the fear of a life with nothing to strive for, a life filled with uncontrollable, impulsive gratifications which arouse anxiety and guilt and thus lead to the famous Russian flirtation with death—Gorky tells how in his youth boys would lie immobile on a railroad track while trains passed over them—against this there are the constant goals of work and the party. Death is merely the point at which one has outlived one's *usefulness.* Of the suicide of Marx's son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, Lenin wrote: ". . . if one cannot work for the party any longer, one must be able to look truth in the face and die like the Lafargues."

Out of such elements of ethics and moral temper emerges, in Leites' view, the "operational code in politics." For Bolshevism, all politics is summed up in the formula, *kto-kovo*—literally, "who-whom," but in its most radical sense, "who kills whom." Political relations are between dominators and dominated, between users and used. There can be no neutrals. If politics is *kto-kovo*, then all political strategies are guided by this fundamental rule: one pushes to the limit, one refuses to be provoked, one acts when one is ready, etc.

Stated in these gross terms, the precepts become political commonplaces, akin to the generalized precepts of military strategists or the maxims of Machiavelli. What gives Leites' analysis its special point and quality are the nuances of detail: the Bolshevik use of procedural points for trading; the expectations that personal insults will be taken politically and not personally (Vishinsky contemptuously calls Romulo "an empty barrel" in the UN General Assembly and then sends roses to a reception at Romulo's home); the role of provocations, and the like.

This same rigidity and calculatedness of behavior the Bolsheviks ascribe to their adversaries. The "big bourgeoisie" are seen as the Bolsheviks see themselves—i.e., as *serious*, calculating men who, wielding power, obey the "laws" of power. Political acts are not accidental; any act of the opposing ruling class can only be a hostile move in the constant war whose final outcome must be the annihilation of one side or the other. For the petty bourgeoisie, on the other hand, particularly the liberals, the Bolsheviks have only deep contempt; they are sentimental, given to illusions, deceived by the content of ideologies, moralistic—in short, fundamentally *unserious.*

Is "Bolshevik" character the same as it was fifty years ago? In important respects, yes; Leites believes that there are certain invariant patterns. Before 1917, Bolshevism as a small party faced a hostile state; now, in its view, it faces a hostile world—its basic posture remains the

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same. Prerevolutionary behavior toward rival political organizations once displayed itself in small cafés and drafty meeting halls; now its scene is the great assembly halls of world politics: the same behavior repeats itself. The preoccupation with procedural issues—arising from the belief that a small point will "inevitably" grow into a big one and must not be conceded—which was manifested by Lenin in regard to the constitution of the editorial board of *Iskra* in 1900 (when he was "coexisting" with rival Social Democrats) was duplicated in intra-party disputes in 1921 and, again, at international negotiations at Yalta, San Francisco, and the Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1945.

The political consequence of this analysis is inescapable: if politics is *kto-kovo*, then "coexistence" as a sustained *modus vivendi* is impossible. Leites sums it up flatly: ". . . a 'settlement' in Western terms, with outside groups—an agreement sharply and indefinitely reducing the threat of mutual annihilation—is inconceivable, [although] agreements with them, codifying the momentary relationship of forces, must always be considered and often concluded."[22] But the party "maintains a full awareness of the basic conflict," and at the strategic moment presses forward again. Promises, as Lenin said, are like pie crusts, "made to be broken."

But let us now look more closely at Leites' use of psychoanalytic insight, for the novelty of his book lies there. To say, as Leites does, that the sources of Bolshevik character lie in a reaction to the extreme temper of the Russian intelligentsia in the nineteenth century is still to write history without the help of Freud; Lenin and his co-workers were perfectly *conscious* of their attempts to reverse traditional patterns of Russian character, to overcome Karataev and Oblomov. But when Leites speaks of the Bolshevik character as a "reaction-formation" to *unconscious*, overwhelmingly powerful wishes, he is approaching politics in a way that was impossible before psychoanalysis.

Two principal drives, according to Leites, explain Russian intellectual character: preoccupation with death, and latent passive homosexual impulses. (Tolstoy, for example, could not endure the idea of death or sex.) The Russian intellectual displayed a fascination with death that is terrifying to the Bolshevik. Against that fascination, the Bolshevik defense is to minimize death by work and, more important, to express a kind of personal omnipotence through the dissolution of the self into the all-embracing, undying party. Thus, Leites writes, "The earlier Russian feeling that life is empty because of death has

[22] *A Study of Bolshevism*, p. 527.

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been replaced by the Bolshevik feeling that death is empty and small and unable to interfere with life."[23]

The code of work becomes all-important. It is a basic defense against threatening feelings. Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, tells of the time in exile when Lenin was absorbed for hours in playing chess. "On his return to Russia Vladimir Ilyich abandoned chess-playing. 'Chess gets hold of you too much, and hinders work . . . ,'" he said. "From his early youth," she continues, "Vladimir Ilyich was capable of giving up whatever activity hindered his main work." In exile, many political refugees went often to the cinema, while others, scorning this mode of enjoyment, preferred to take physical exercise in walking. The group divided, said Krupskaya, into cinemists and anti-cinemists, who were jokingly called "anti-Semites." "Volodya," wrote Krupskaya to Lenin's mother, "is a decided anti-cinemist and a fierce walker."[24]

The theme of latent homosexuality, lying deep in the arcanum of psychoanalysis, is seen as a pervasive yet repressed element of Russian intellectual desire. In Dostoevsky, the utmost demonstration of emotion by the usually overwrought and emotionally charged characters is to embrace and clasp one another. To Bolshevism, the fantasy of men embracing each other is repulsive and frightening. When Lenin described those once close to him who had now made common cause with his enemies, he would say that they "kissed" and "embraced" one another. ("The Scheidemannites kiss and embrace Kautsky."—"The followers of Bernstein are impudently blowing kisses to [Plekhanov].")

To Leites, a further significant clue lies in the number of Lenin's intimate friendships which ended in violent ruptures. These included Struve, a close collaborator in the 1890's; Potresev, an early *Iskra* associate; Plekhanov, Lenin's "ambivalently loved master" who "capitulated" to the Mensheviks; Aleksinsky, perhaps Lenin's most intimate associate in the years after 1905, who later denounced him as a German agent; and Malinovsky, the Bolshevik whip in the Duma, of whom Lenin said, "He will not be another Aleksinsky," and who turned out to be a police agent.

"One might speculate—" says Leites, "the data discussed here allow no more than that—whether the Bolshevik insistence on, in effect, killing enemies and being killed by them is not in part an effort to ward off fear-laden and guilty wishes to embrace men and be embraced by them. This hypothesis is consistent with the existence of certain pervasive Bolshevik trends described in this study: the fear of being passive, the fear of being controlled and used, the fear of wanting to submit

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 137. [24] *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 261.

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to an attack. Once one denies one's wish to kiss by affirming one's wish to kill, this is apt to reinforce one's belief in the enemy's wish to kill by virtue of the mechanism of projection, probably heavily used by the Bolsheviks."[25]

On the basis of what documentation can one make such sweeping inferences? Even if we fully accept the psychoanalytic theories, how does one validate these judgments without putting the Bolshevik leaders on the couch, so to speak? Leites' method is to examine the imagery, fantasy, and characteristic literary metaphors employed by Bolshevik leaders, and the fictional models in Russian literature with which the Bolsheviks identify, or those they assail. Russian literature and the Russians' attitude toward it seem to make this possible. In few cultures have fictional characters become such sharply defined national types: Dostoevsky's gallery—the Karamazovs, Raskolnikov, Myshkin, Verkhovensky; Turgeniev's Rudin, Gogol's Chichikov, Goncharov's Oblomov, Chekov's multifarious characters. These are all models which are accepted or rejected by Russians as psychological masks.

Taking off from these literary sources, Leites draws on Freudian theory to highlight the latent meanings of specific imagery. For example, fear of impotence, fear of being beaten (in Stalin's famous speech to the managers of Soviet industry in 1931, the image of beating or being beaten occurs eleven times in a single paragraph), fear of contamination, of embraces, of annihilation, jokes about "cleaning out" the party, fear of being used as a "tail," etc. As chief evidence for his theories Leites relies on the marshaling of images, in a vast profusion. The result is a strange and fascinating medley of quotations—roughly three thousand cited for various points.

This method of analysis immediately provokes a charge of "reductionism"—namely, that all ideas are seen as being *au fond* something more primitive. Thus, Lenin's fierce attack on solipsism is seen as expressing panic about annihilation, while his attack on the "spontaneity of the masses" is seen as a defense against desires for impulsive, orgiastic gratification. In what sense, one may ask, is the primitive impulse behind an idea more "real" than the idea itself? This is a difficulty one often encounters in connection with psychoanalytic thinking. It is obvious that the psychological impulse *behind* an idea is no test of its truth; the test of truth comes *after* the idea has originated. Yet we have learned not to scoff at these hidden mainsprings, *for we are dealing less with the ideas than with the way in which they are held and used.* What

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 403-4.

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Leites is arguing is that any view held with stubbornness, exaggeration, and intensity—as all Communist views are held—and which violently rejects all rational tests, raises the presumption that it may constitute a defense against strong unconscious wishes or fears which stand in contradiction to the idea. To follow a pronouncedly masculine profession like soldiering does not label a man as a "latent homosexual," but if we find him compulsively, violently, and beyond reason insisting on his military posture, "common sense" permits us to suspect that he may be afraid of being less a man than he would like to appear.

Granting even the validity of the psychoanalytic method in the study of personality, we must still ask whether it can legitimately be extended into the analysis of politics.

Erich Fromm has argued, in *Escape from Freedom* (New York, 1941), that the sado-masochistic character, typical of the German middle class, found an outlet in the Nazi Party. T. W. Adorno and his associate authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950) have pointed to the rigid, compulsive individuals who seek authoritarian values. Harold Lasswell, in the early *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930), sought to show how the political arena acts as a displacement of personal needs. (For example, adolescents, feeling guilty about sex strivings, find sublimation in the generalized "love" appeal of political movements that emphasize brotherhood.) In these studies, characteristic of modern social science, the social structure is taken as fundamental and the personality components are seen as the responses.

Leites' view, however, goes beyond this. He says, in effect, that *character determines politics*. Since the mainspring of Bolshevism is action, the movement, by impressing its character on others, transforms all politics and, in the end, the social structure itself as well. (Compare the purposeful Bolshevik-type organization with interest-group parties, or tepid ideological parties, to see the difference.) Bolshevism, in this sense, can be considered as one of the few successful movements of pure will in history; its only competitors in this respect are certain religious orders. Because, in modern life, ideas (abstract, philosophical conceptions of truth) have become transformed into ideologies (active strivings to implement a creed as truth), Leites' type of analysis is possible, reflecting as it does a social reality. For ideologies are, in effect, attempts to unite ideas, behavior, and character; they demand a hardening of commitment. The Communist (or the Fascist, or the kibbutznik, or the 100 per cent American) is not only supposed to believe certain things; he is supposed to act, to *be* something, and, in acting, to fix his

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character. If one is "serious," one "lives" one's ideology. Thus ideology may be said to presuppose character.[26]

What determined Bolshevik character? Leites stops short of an answer to this question, possibly because the purpose of his book lies elsewhere—he is interested in describing the pattern of Bolshevik action in order to develop a practical way of counteracting communism. Whether or not his picture of this operational code is a true one is, he argues, independent of the origins of Bolshevik impulses. Formally he is correct, for the code's validity depends upon its internal consistency, upon its confirmation by other analysts using the same data, and finally upon its usefulness in making predictions. Yet, intellectually the sources of that code are important, for only by tracing them can we have a complete model of social analysis.

The conventional answer regarding Bolshevik character is that the conspiratorial nature of the conditions of underground work in the days before the revolution—the environment—shaped the peculiar structure of the Bolshevik elite and its unique code and discipline. But there were other parties, Marxist and Social Revolutionary, which operated in the same environment. And the ideological debates between Lenin and Martov in 1903 on the nature of the party membership antedated the development of "party work": Martov argued that a Social Democrat was one who sympathized generally with the party's program, while Lenin argued that only a professional revolutionary, only a conspirator, could be a party member. Thus the pattern was prefigured in the thinking of Lenin.

Leites, it seems to me, would be forced to argue that the Bolshevik pattern was a product of will. Further, if he is to be consistent with the psychoanalytic approach, he would have to argue that *it was the character of Lenin, the "primal father," which shaped the party* (his followers did call themselves Leninists) *rather than the party organization and the environment which shaped Lenin* and the other Bolsheviks. And it was the will of Lenin alone which altered the party's politics, as in the crucial decisions in April and July 1917. The Bolshevik Party, more than any other party in history, has demonstrated the nature of will. It was, and is, one of the most highly self-conscious movements in history. Its patristic writings are not only canonical; they are also "training documents" in the tempering of a "hard core" party membership. Individuals may join from a variety of motives, but all must be stamped in the mold or driven out. The splits and expulsions

[26] This may explain the intensity of the feelings of ex-Communists toward the party. Though they are free of the ideology, the rigid personality pattern remains.

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(becoming blood purges after power is achieved) which characterize Communist parties may thus be seen not as mere ideological or even power fights but as *a process of personality selection.*

With the Leites study we come full circle in the theories of history and politics. It was the fashion a hundred years ago to ascribe historical change to "great men" and the force of their personalities. Subsequently we interpreted history in terms of abstract "social forces"—population pressure, search for markets, etc.—which somehow, but never fully understandably, translated themselves through individual actors into tangible events. The glaring inadequacies of these deterministic theories have led to the reintroduction of psychological and, through Freudian influence, of characterological explanations. Even ex-Marxists have not been immune. Is not the current fashionable theory of the "primacy of politics" over economic forces simply a smuggled-in psychological theory of "power"? Most attempts to explain the situation in Russia today find expression in the "power" formula. But actually the formula of "power" explains little. It tells nothing about different tactics, different social groups, the different purposes for which power will be used. If a psychological theory of politics is to be employed, then the Leites view—with its emphasis on character as blending a power drive with ideology—is, in spite of all its limitations and uncertainties, far more subtle and imaginative than the contraband psychology of the political scientist.

However, two questions remain to be asked of the method: How are continuities of character established, and how, and with what difficulties, does an elite group impress its character upon a country?

In the Leites model, as we have seen, there is the implication that the initial change in the character of the intelligentsia—the emergence of Bolshevism—was a reaction-formation, and that the character of the "primal father" determined its political course. If that was true of Lenin, how does it apply to Stalin and to his heirs? In his study of *Hamlet,* Ernest Jones remarks that there are two kinds of sons: those who reject their fathers, and those who take over and internalize the essential characteristics of the father, often caricaturing his features in the process.[27] From this point of view, Stalin was the son who took over the lineaments of the father. The touches, however, were grosser. Where in Lenin's time it was the party that had the monopoly on foresight, under Stalin it became a group within the party, and eventually

[27] *Hamlet* . . . with a Psycho-analytic Study by Ernest Jones, M.D., London, 1947, p. 22. The argument is elaborated in Jones' *Hamlet and Oedipus,* New York, 1951, pp. 83-90.

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the Leader alone, in whom all wisdom resided. Devices once reserved for the enemy—particularly deception and terror—were exercised on the masses which the party claimed to represent, and later against rivals within the party itself. Lenin had opposed personal touchiness and insisted on the irrelevance of personal prestige; Stalinism reacted intensely to minor slights, but only after giving them a political interpretation. Lenin opposed bragging; the Stalinist regime went in for the greatest self-glorification in history. Lenin opposed the creation of "scandals" in the party; Stalin liquidated the party cadres under the most fantastic charges.

These changes in Bolshevik behavior *do not necessarily reflect changes in the unconscious wishes and fears* which Leites posits as the ultimate sources of the Bolshevik character. Psychological *defense* patterns may change—indeed, they often *must* change as older defenses become inadequate. But when such changes take place on a broad political scale, they become extremely important, and we are bound to ask why the changes in defense mechanisms have occurred, why *these* particular changes, and what further changes are likely to occur. Here Leites offers little assistance. His theory deals with the dynamics of Bolshevism in the process of its formation, but once Bolshevism has come to birth, the model, as he presents it, is static. Take, for example, the initial turning on Stalin by Khrushchev and company. One could say that this, in turn, represents a reaction to the overbearing, almost paranoid Stalin; or there may be more "rational" explanations: the need to win mass support, etc. Further, how are we to explain the seeming "openness" and marked vulgarity of Khrushchev's character? We have no guide in the model itself to the possibility or the nature of the change.

The static quality of the model comes in part from its methodology. The basic outlines of Bolshevik character are drawn not from the empirical world of action, but from the abstract canons of Bolshevik doctrine. In itself this is not too great a fault, since the doctrine itself is evident. The greater fault of the theory—and, paradoxically, its strength—lies in the fact that, starting from static doctrine, it posits a static force called "character" and then gathers all human action into that one hedgehog force.[28] But how often in social action does character or will actually impose itself on events? People live largely in social systems, and they are "chained" to one another in complex ways. All

[28] As George Ivask has said, if all men may be divided into foxes and hedgehogs, they may also be divided, following the satire of Saltykov-Schedrin, into boys with pants and boys without pants. If Lenin wore pants, is Khrushchev without them?

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of us, no doubt, would like to impose our "character" on the world, but in practice we find ourselves forced to modify our demands to conform with *possibilities*. Leites may thus be claimed to have given his concept of "character" a false autonomy, and in applying this concept to politics—which is *par excellence* a phenomenon of change within possibilities—to have falsified the nature of the subject.

IV. How the Harvard System Works

Turning now to the sociological approach: the study by three Harvard social scientists—Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn—is the best that contemporary sociology offers, and on this score alone merits attention. Their book, *How the Soviet System Works*, is a revised presentation of a report, *Strategic Psychological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System*, that was prepared for the U.S. Air Force, the agency which commissioned and paid for the five years' research that went into the study. In one respect, the study illustrates the hazards of such sponsored research, since the authors found themselves under pressure to produce a "popular" book which the Air Force sponsors could show to their own controllers. The result is not a happy combination: "theses" are condensed and presented with only partial documentation; the book is written in an attempted vernacular style which just does not come off. The project, based on systematic interviewing of defectors, drew data from 329 extended life-history interviews, including detailed personality tests; 435 supplementary interviews; almost 10,000 questionnaires on special topics; 2,700 general questionnaires, and 100 interviews and psychological tests, administered for control purposes, to a matched group of Americans. In all, 33,000 pages of data were accumulated. These, together with the list of over fifty specialized unpublished studies and thirty-five published articles on which the authors drew in preparing the book, indicate how rich their source materials were.

Economic and political matters were not considered to be within the scope of the project. The key concept was that of the "social system," and this is the heart of the Harvard contribution. A social system is simply the characteristic ways in which societies, or sub-groups, organize their activities to achieve specific goals. Since the resultant institutions or behavior patterns are linked, in meaningful fashion, presumably variations in one area are accompanied by regular—and determinate—variations in others. (Thus a change in the rate of capital accumulation, one of the fundamental determinants of an economic system, must

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precipitate changes in the rate of consumption, etc.) In the social system, reorganization of the structure of authority in the factory would presumably entail corresponding changes in the organization of the school system, the family, etc. For example, when Stalin introduced one-man rule and tight labor discipline in the factories in 1931, one could imagine a manager, confronted with a disrespectful student from a "progressive" school, asking, "What kind of a hooligan is this?" and insisting that school methods be changed so that students would learn obedience. The educational commissars, however, confronted with "wild" children from broken homes, would be forced to demand that the family be strengthened and divorce be made more difficult. And so, in linked fashion, we find the reintroduction of older, traditional forms of authority.[29] Yet such social change may become self-defeating, for as repression in the factory becomes pervasive, individuals need to find protection and do so in close family ties. And thus, after a while, the regime begins to complain about undue familialism. This example oversimplifies a social process, but it is not unjust.

The Harvard group has concentrated, however, not on locating change in the conventional institutions of society—family, political system, education, industry—but on the typical adaptive patterns of behavior which regulate the life of the ruled. These "central patterns" are: the need to conform to an explicit ideology; the refusal to allow independent sources of power; the centralization of all planning and control; the overcommitment of resources to particular objectives; the use of terror and forced labor; "storming" as a method of reaching objectives; the tolerance of evasions which fulfill the plan—e.g., *blat* (the network of informal deals)—etc. On the basis of these "operating characteristics," the Harvard group seeks to identify the general strengths and weaknesses of the *system*. Weaknesses: there are no orderly processes of succession in office; economic growth in heavy industry is disproportionate to that in consumer industries; there are constant purges and insecurities. Strengths: the atomization of resistance; the Russians' ignorance of the realities of the outside world; the deep loyalties to the system on the part of the managerial groups.

One trouble with this approach is that one does not know, actually, which of these "operating characteristics" are central and which are not, for the Harvard group seems to lack an organizing principle which determines the selections. Is "forced labor," for example, an "inherent" aspect of the system, or a fortuitous element which got out of

[29] The example has been adapted from Alex Inkeles, "Understanding a Foreign Society: A Sociologist's View," *World Politics*, III, No. 2 (January 1951), pp. 269-80.

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hand and may be discarded? And, if the latter, how is the judgment made?—on the basis of the fact that the terror has become self-defeating or that it is uneconomic, or because of moral disapprobation from the outside, or what? Moreover, if one seeks to forecast the "likely responses . . . of various segments of the Soviet leadership" in order to gauge the degree of loyalty and disaffection among the major social groups, the "central patterns" may be of less importance than an accurate definition of the different interests of such segments and of their power vis-à-vis other interest groups. The question is, what do we look for in a mode of analysis?

A mode of analysis is a function of the particular categories one uses to group together related characteristics. In political theory, one can classify regimes, as Aristotle did, as monarchies, oligarchies, or democracies; or, as Max Weber did, as traditional, rational, and charismatic. One's purpose dictates one's perspectives. The danger is that one tends to think of categories as realities rather than as theoretical constructs. This error has been appallingly true of Marxist thought, which in rudimentary fashion first employed the concept of a social system. Since in a simple Marxist model of capitalism, classes are formed in relation to the means of production, to the simple-minded Communist there could be no exploitation in Russia since the "people" owned the factories and there were, therefore, no exploiting classes. Hence, too, the fierce doctrinal debates as to whether Russia was a "workers' state," a "degenerated workers' state," or what.

But, given all these pitfalls, the gain in trying to define the *essential* nature of a system is that one can locate the causal factors (in modern jargon, the independent variables), the changes in which affect all other parts of the system. (To Marx, for example, the essential nature of capitalism is the compulsion to accumulate and reinvest. Crises are deemed inevitable because of ensuing gaps between consumption and production, because of overproduction, and because of the falling rate of profit, which is a function, presumably, of high capital and low labor inputs.)

The Harvard group, however, shrinks from seeking to specify the motor forces in the social system as they have conceived it. "It is difficult, if not impossible," they say, "to assign a rank order of importance to those operating characteristics since they constitute an interlocking system in which each has implication for the other."[30] Apart from the fact that one may question the "tightness" of such "interlocks" (what,

[30] Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

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for example, is the link between "storming" and "forced labor" as characteristics of the system?) or even the congruence of the different "operating characteristics," *is it so difficult to single out the factor of prime importance*? Is it not quite clear, really, that the Soviet system is characterized, essentially, by the centralized control of political power, that it is a *command* system, with few institutional checks, and that all other aspects of the system—the refusal to allow independent power, the overcommitment of resources, etc.—derive from that fact?

But, once that is admitted, a large element of indeterminacy has to be admitted as well. For, in such a command system, the decisions of a few men—and, in the case of Stalin, of one—become decisive in changing the nature of the system. If Bukharin, rather than Stalin, had won, would not Russia be a different society? Or if Malenkov, rather than Khrushchev, had kept power, would not the profile of Russia be somewhat different today? The development of Soviet society depends thus on the nature of Soviet political developments.

If this be true, then, in seeking to understand the Soviet Union we are back to Kremlinology, the endlessly fascinating and often exasperatingly occult game of charting the petty protocol at the dinner table or seeing who is called on to speak at the Supreme Soviet, and in what sequence, in order to guess who is "on first."

The essential fact is that the Harvard system, lacking a sense of motor, cannot locate the sources of change in the system. While it is important to know the "limits" of social action (e.g., how far one can push recalcitrant peasants before offering new incentives; or which groups have the greatest potential for independent action), in *politics* one has to know who composes a ruling group, how the group arrives at a decision, how the claims of subordinate groups are adjudicated, and so on. For in a society like Russia, where institutional and behavior patterns are not autonomous, a "social system" has no meaning unless it can be defined within the context of politics.

V. Who Eats Before Whom

The basic assumption of Kremlinology is that every move at the Russian *verkhuska* is shot through with the struggle for protocol, prestige, and power. Thus the manifest need to decentralize the Russian economy because of the increasing inability of a single center to direct the operation of 300,000 enterprises becomes a problem as well of whose power is increased and whose power reduced by such a shift. Thus, not in the final analysis, but in the immediate one, all rational-

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technical criteria bow to the political. And thus, in analyzing any move of Russian policy, we are forced to thread our way through the Byzantine intrigues which are spun in such power fights.

The real problem arises, first, in the definition of the contending power groups and, second, in the way we identify the alignments of individuals, particularly subordinates. One approach has been to define power groups in "functional" terms—e.g., party, army, secret police, state bureaucracy, etc.—and to locate spokesmen for those groups from the positions they hold. Thus the late Franz Borkenau, a leading practitioner of Kremlinology, wrote in the *New Leader* of May 6, 1957: "Since Stalin's death, an undisguised struggle has raged between Khrushchev as representative of the Party dictatorship and one-time Premier Georgi Malenkov as spokesman of the managers' demand for independence. Over the last four years, the managers have been making more and more effective demands for greater decentralization in the economy. Hence, Khrushchev and his ally Lazar Kaganovich have devised this scheme as a circuitous plan for undermining the managerial class." In a later article (June 3), Kaganovich was seen as standing on the sidelines, rather than at Khrushchev's side.

There are several difficulties with this sweeping type of statement. A word like "managers" contains a basic ambiguity. Are the managers the men who head the factories in the field, the heads of economic ministries in Moscow, or the planners in the Gosplan? If the "managers" include all three categories, is there an identity of interests among them? (Surely one would expect considerable friction between a factory seeking greater control over its own activities and a ministry in Moscow.) And, if not, which of the three are the real "managers"? A second difficulty arises from mechanically countering bloc with bloc. While it is true that there are often interest conflicts between functional groups, the very nature of a political power struggle carried on by small cliques and coteries requires the power figure to have his allies within *all* groups. Thus the fight may not be simply "managers" vs. "party," or "army" vs. "party," but may cut across these groupings. Is the army, for example, a unitary interest group (united on what interests?) or does Zhukov line up with X and Koniev with Y and Vasilievsky with Z? From what we know of armies elsewhere, certainly such internal conflicts and differing outside alliances take place—e.g., in the U.S. Army, the Marshall-Eisenhower group vs. MacArthur. The problem, then, is to locate those issues on which the army would stand united and those on which its top officers would divide. And, in so doing, one faces the problem of determining what it is that ties cliques

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and coteries together: school affiliation, loyalties to one who has made promotion possible, differences in generation, common wartime or service experiences, etc., etc.

Nor can one say that ideology determines alignments, for on key policy issues—consumer goods vs. heavy industry, tough or soft line toward the West, tough or soft line toward the satellites—there may be no unitary ideology which dictates a consistent attitude toward such issues. Malenkov may have wanted relaxation at home so as to be more tough with the West. Moreover, a top figure will often switch ideological sides opportunistically in a bid for support. Certainly Stalin's history is instructive in this regard. (The question is often put: does Khrushchev represent the "Stalinist" faction or does Malenkov? The difficulty with these formulations is that what we are observing is the break-up of a faction and, in such a highly personal situation, few of the formal sociological criteria for charting allegiances seem to hold.)

Even greater difficulties are faced in the task of locating the links of support down the line. Every foreign office and propaganda organization maintains extensive biographical dossiers on members of the Soviet elite in an effort to keep track of the shifting personnel as a means of measuring the relative strength of the contenders at the top. And often, as the example cited below shows, the method is highly tenuous.[31] How far one can go with this detailed, yet mechanical, scor-

[31] The *Radio Liberation Daily Information Bulletin* of May 14, 1957, carried the following news item, headed "Andropov—Head of the Satellite Countries Department of the CC":

"*Pravda* for May 12, 1957 twice mentions the former ambassador of the USSR in Hungary, Yu. V. Andropov, as 'head of a department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.' According to the *Pravda*, Andropov was present at Khrushchev's reception for the government delegation from the Mongolian People's Republic and also at a lunch given by Bulganin in honor of the same delegation.

"Although the Tass reports do not state precisely which department Andropov controls, it may be assumed that it is the fairly secret satellite countries department (even its official name is not known).

"In the past, B. N. Ponomarev, who was invariably called 'a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU' usually took part in such receptions and banquets in honor of party and government delegations from the satellite countries. The position occupied by Ponomarev has never been mentioned anywhere. In this connection it is interesting to note that at the lunch given by Bulganin and Khrushchev in honor of the Albanian party and government delegation on April 12th this year (*Pravda*, 13th April 1957) the order of those who attended was as follows:

". . . Serov—Ponomarev—Palgunov—Nikitin. . . .

"At the lunch which was recently given by Bulganin for the Mongolian delegation, the order of protocol was as follows:

". . . Serov—Andropov—Nikitin—Palgunov. . . .* [FOOTNOTE: * The protocol order at the reception given by Khrushchev was as follows: Gromyko—Pisarev (ambassador in Mongolia)—Andropov; however, it should be remembered that according to protocol, at a reception for a foreign delegation, the Soviet ambas-

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ing is open to question. One observer, in reviewing Boris Meissner's *Das Ende des Stalin-Mythos*, complains: ". . . he believes that he can say of any party functionary, from the top on down through lower ranks, whether he is a Khrushchev or a Malenkov man, a supporter of this or that tactical nuance of party policy. Very often these assertions are based on extraneous biographical information. Whoever served under Malenkov at some time in the past must, in Meissner's opinion, be considered a Malenkov adherent in all present-day situations. Whoever worked with Khrushchev twenty years ago in the Ukraine still must be his confidant today."[32]

And sometimes the same event—in this instance, the appointment of one F. R. Kozlov to the key post of candidate member of the party Presidium—is interpreted in diametrically opposite fashion. Harrison Salisbury, in the *New York Times* of February 16, 1957, reported that Kozlov was a member of a group to which Mr. Pervukhin belonged, and was "probably an adherent of Mr. Malenkov." Kozlov, said Salisbury, was one of the authors of the key propaganda documents of the "doctors' plot" of 1953; and one can surmise, therefore, in line with the logic of Kremlinology, that Malenkov was one of the directors of the plot. But Richard Lowenthal commented a day later in the *London Observer*: "Mr. Khrushchev's inner-party position has been reinforced not only by Mr. Shepilov's return to the party Secretariat, but by the promotion of Frol Romanovich Kozlov, the first secretary of the Leningrad region, to candidate membership of the party Presidium. . . . Having returned to obscurity during the early Malenkov era, he was at the end of 1953 promoted by Khrushchev's personal intervention

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sador of the country concerned is always given the place of honor, whether or not he actually merits it 'on the protocol ladder'.]

"Despite all these facts, it would be premature to conclude that Ponomarev has been replaced by Andropov, because Ponomarev is also to some extent connected with the international communist movement. (For example he was a member of the delegation of the CPSU to the Fourteenth Congress of the French Communist Party in July 1956.) A more probable explanation is that an 'international division of labor' has been carried out in the Central Committee; Ponomarev will henceforth maintain contact only with those Communist parties outside the orbit, while Andropov deals with the satellites.

"*Bearing in mind the fact that Andropov was released ('in connection with a transfer to other work'—Pravda 7 March 1957) in the course of a reshuffle of senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was begun by Shepilov immediately before his withdrawal from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, there can be no doubt to whom Andropov owes his promotion* (on the 'protocol ladder' he is now several stages above his former chief—V. V. Kuznetzov, first deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs—see *Pravda*, 12 May, 1957)."

[32] Immanuel Birnbaum, "Destalinization: Motives and Consequences," *Problems of Communism*, VI, No. 1 (January-February 1957), p. 41.

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to take the place of Malenkov's protégé, Andrianov, as head of the Leningrad party organization." And, by equal logic, since Kozlov had signaled the campaign of vigilance at the start of the "doctors' plot," Khrushchev was thus tied to the execution of the plot.

This is not to say that the method is wrong, but that someone's information is inadequate. (For the record, Mr. Lowenthal was right about Kozlov, and Salisbury wrong.) How excruciatingly difficult the problems of Kremlinology can be is seen from a report in the *New York Times* of August 10, 1957, which stated that the U.S. State Department simply did not know who was running the Soviet foreign office and writing its *démarches*. Said the report:

> The State Department has been trying for some time without success to solve a new Kremlin riddle.
>
> The question: Who is the man who really operates Soviet foreign policy? who is the Soviet opposite number to Secretary of State Dulles? . . .
>
> It is argued that Mr. Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin have been away from Moscow so much, unaccompanied by foreign policy experts, that they cannot possibly have had time to "mind the store" during recent months.
>
> Yet the State Department feels that the quality of Soviet diplomacy has improved noticeably during this period and now shows an unusual degree of sophistication in its understanding of the West. . . .
>
> The Secretary has asked the United States intelligence agencies to examine the evidence, but so far the investigators have drawn a complete blank. . . .
>
> The effect in Washington is to make it extremely difficult for the State Department to appraise either the Soviet Union's present intentions or the probable future of its foreign policy.

Consider, too, the dilemma of the Kremlinologist in having to make spot interpretations of a major change in the status of leading personnel when the announcement of the change itself offers no clue as to its meaning. Thus, the day after a terse announcement appeared that Marshal Zhukov had been relieved of his post, Harry Schwartz, the *New York Times* specialist, began his story in this fashion: "Two principal possibilities have emerged from Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov's removal yesterday as Soviet Defense Minister: a substantial decline in his real power or a step toward his promotion in the Soviet hierarchy" (October 27, 1957).

One can sympathize with these occupational hazards. Henry Adams, in his *Autobiography*, remarks that when he was in London during the American Civil War, serving as secretary to his father, the United States Minister, he was making reports on the splits in British Cabinet

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opinion—reports which became the basis of American policy (e.g., the Mason-Sliddel affair), and which, he felt, were based on firsthand information. Twenty years later, when the Cabinet papers were opened, he found to his dismay that his reports had been completely wrong. Shortly after the revolt in Budapest, Hugh Gaitskell raised the question in the House of Commons whether the Russians had been emboldened to intervene because of the news of Eden's action at Suez. The question, even if Gaitskell intended it only to press a political advantage, was not an unfair one. It would be important to know if this were so. Is there an answer? We have no access to sources.

But one *can* raise a question regarding method, at least as to the way in which Kremlinology has been applied. Put most simply, Kremlinology often becomes the obverse side of the Bolshevik mentality—that is, it becomes over-deterministic. The characteristic fact about Bolshevik mentality is its refusal to admit of accident and contingency. Everything has a reason, a preordained motive. Hence the sinister refrain in Bolshevik rhetoric: "It is no accident, comrade, no mere *accident*, that . . ." or, "Why at this time, why at *this particular moment*, does the enemy choose . . . ?" And so all such questions lead, with insidious intent, to the ultimate question: *kto-kovo*, who is using whom? One is reminded of the episode some years back when two Ukrainian delegates to the UN wandered into a small New York delicatessen during a hold-up and, failing to understand the command of the robbers, one of them was shot in the thigh. Vishinsky, either to embarrass the United States, or because he was truly suspicious, rejected the explanation of the New York police department that, since it was a hold-up, the shooting could not have been political. "How could it have been a hold-up?" he asked. "It was a *small* delicatessen." In wealthy, capitalist America, who would bother to hold up a *small* store?

One sometimes finds a similar logic among the Kremlinologists. Every move—both of personnel in the power conflicts within, and of policy in the international arena without—is seen as a carefully plotted, conspiratorially conceived, predetermined plan whose every consequence is anticipated; every move has a secret meaning which detailed charting of protocol and word counting can uncover.[33] But from what

[33] Imagine what the Kremlinologist and/or the psychoanalyst could do with the statement of Indian Ambassador K. P. S. Menon, the last foreigner to see Stalin alive, that at the interview Stalin occupied himself throughout the entire session with making doodles—of wolves.

Perhaps the most extraordinary attempt to trace Soviet elite maneuverings by means of "Kremlinological" methods is the RAND study of Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev*, Washington, D.C., 1958. In 1955, Rush observed that Khrushchev's title as first secretary of the party (*pervi sekretar*), which normally appeared in the Russian press

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we know of every chancellery in the world, few campaigns in political (or even military) affairs are ever calculated with such precision. And the analyst who fails to consider contingency runs the same risk as the Bolshevik in overdetermining the political game.

And with one more step we come full circle. Whatever the importance of power at the top, no group of power figures, however absolute their rule, can wield infinite power. The problem with the Kremlinological approach is the same as with that of Leites. Every attempt to impose one's will has to take into account the finite limits of natural resources and the recalcitrance of human institutions[34]—but how?

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in lower case, suddenly was given in *Pravda*, of May 25, 1955, as *Pervi Sekretar*. (The next day, the capital S was diminished, but the capital P retained, and the title appeared thereafter as *Pervi sekretar*.) From a clue as slim as this, and from others which at first glance might seem to be equally tendentious (e.g., Khrushchev's emulation of Stalin's use of the word *otrishoi*, or "belching forth," to characterize Malenkov as a right deviationist), Rush argued, in a paper prepared for RAND at that time, that Khrushchev was beginning to make his bid for power, and that he would use Stalin's ladder, the party secretariat apparatus, in his ascent. For some detailed questioning of Mr. Rush's reasoning, see my review of his book in *Problems of Communism*, VII, No. 2 (March-April 1958).

[34] Insufficient attention has been paid, for example, to the techniques of evasion practiced by Soviet scientists in carrying out their work in accordance with the common fund of scientific knowledge. Alexander Weissberg-Cybulski, who was editor of the physics journal in the Soviet Union, and later a director of an institute in Kharkov, before being jailed in the 1937-1938 purges, tells the highly amusing story of how, in the journal articles, research advances in Russia were attributed, out of political necessity, to the wisdom derived from dialectical materialism and of the problems that confronted the editors when the German Academy of Science asked for the secret of the new method. (See *Science and Freedom*, proceedings of the Hamburg Conference, London, 1955.)

More recently, Ivan D. London has noticed wholesale evasions of *partinost* in science: "For example, it is not difficult to show, on the basis of items abstracted from speeches, prefaces, introductory paragraphs, etc., that in the Soviet Union the whole development of physiology of the sense organs was prescribed by the Communist Party in order to provide a 'concrete basis for Lenin's theory of reflection' and to meet the 'demands of practice': industrial, medical, and military, the latter two in particular. Yet a detailed scrutiny of the technical literature, the published minutes of various meetings, conferences, etc., over the years reveals little to suggest that the serious programs of research in the field of sensory physiology in the Soviet Union have been really influenced, in any respect, by either practical considerations or Party dicta. Of course, superficially there may seem to be a planned compliance with practical programmatic aims—after all, 'Soviet language' fulfills, besides communicative, also prophylactic functions—but any sensory physiologist who is alert to his subject will recognize the dust-in-the-eyes purpose of certain parts of research programs. . . ." ("Toward a Realistic Appraisal of Soviet Science," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XIII, No. 5, May 1957, p. 170.)

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VI. The One Road and the Many—Exit Pirandello

Now that we have investigated many roads, are there some which can lead us to reality better than others? (Says a passage in the Talmud: "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there.") Perhaps a few distinctions—and questions—are in order.

A. THE DIFFERENT MOMENTS

There should be a clear distinction between the types of change which take place: between changes in Soviet society (the social system) and in Soviet politics, although in crucial moments one is dependent on the other. The difference is one of distinguishing between a process and an event; or, to revive an old distinction of the crusty sociologist William Graham Sumner, between *crescive* and *enacted* change.

Crescive changes are those which surge, swell, go on willy-nilly, and develop with some measure of autonomy. They variously derive from organic growth of tradition, or from changes in values (e.g., the decision of people to have fewer children or more), or from technical imperatives, once a key decision has been taken (e.g., the need for training more engineers, once a country industrializes).

Enacted changes are the conscious decisions or intents of legislators or rulers (e.g., the declaration of war, the collectivization of agriculture, the location of new industry, etc.). Those who enact change have to take into account the mores of the people and the resources at their disposal, but these serve only as limiting, not determining, factors.

Sociological analysis is most sure when it deals with crescive changes. These can be identified, their drift charted, and, like iceberg floes, their course and even their break-up specified more readily than others. But sociological analysis often fails in predicting political decisions. There are in history what Hegel called the "unique moments," and, in calling the turn, not pure reason but practical judgment (that unstable compound of information, intuition, and empathy) has to take hold. Bolshevism has been par excellence a movement minutely conscious of the past and supremely aware of the tactical and strategic nuances of events. It has been this constant awareness of "unique moments" (the "revolutionary situation," as Lenin first conceived it) and its ability to adapt its timing to the changing situation that have given Bolshevism its unique political advantage in the past.

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B. THE PROBLEM OF PREDICTION

The nature of the changes which one describes conditions the kinds of prediction one can make. One can define, and predict, the limits of broad crescive changes (e.g., if one knows the resource pattern of the Soviet Union—amount of arable land, minerals, manpower—one can make a guess about the slowdown in the rate of economic growth), but in predicting the short-run policy turns one comes up against the variabilities of accident, folly, and simple human cantankerousness. The situation is reminiscent of two radicals in the 1920's debating the future course of Soviet politics. "The objective situation," said one, "requires that Trotsky do so and so and so and so." "Look," replied the other, "you know what Trotsky has to do, and I know what Trotsky has to do, but does Trotsky know?"

One of the key problems in the analysis of power is the mode of succession. In the Soviet system, as opposed to a constitutional regime, there seems to be no formal definition of legitimacy, and no system of investiture of power. In seeking to duplicate Stalin's rise, Khrushchev used the party secretariat as a power lever. But in doing so he was taking a big gamble. In the war years and after, Stalin had emphasized his governmental and military titles rather than his party position. At the time of his death in 1953, Stalin was only one of nine party secretaries, but was, uniquely, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Malenkov relinquished his post as party secretary, when forced to make a choice, and sought to legitimize his authority through the post of Premier and the Council of Ministers. It is the measure of Khrushchev's shrewdness that he assumed correctly that, despite the rise of the technical and military classes, the mechanics of political power had not changed essentially since the 1930's. Yet can we assume that these "laws of mechanics" will hold in the naming of Khrushchev's successor? How do we define the balance of forces and predict the direction in which they will tip?

And yet, given all these problems and pitfalls, it would be a forward step in the social sciences if a group of Soviet experts were, at regular intervals, to make predictions at different levels of probable Soviet developments and state the reasons for their inference. (Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn, for example, stated that the collegial system of power in Russia *could* stabilize itself; Rush said that it would not, and predicted Khrushchev's bid for power.[35]) By systematic review of the pre-

[35] Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn, *op.cit.*, p. 239; Rush, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

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dictions, the successes and failures, one could probably obtain a more viable operational model of Soviet behavior.

C. THE ROLE OF THE IRRATIONAL

In social theory, the weight of analysis has always been thrown on the side of the rational explanation. The presumption (cf. Moore, Rostow, Deutscher, Aron, etc.) is that a society ultimately makes its choices on the basis of the rational alternatives which confront it. But how much meaning can one make of the role of pique (e.g., Tito's anger, as reported in the Dedijer biography,[36] at the fact that "we were treated like Komsomols," or Khrushchev's resentment at being forced by Stalin to dance the *Gopak*) in explaining the precipitateness or intensity of political acts? And, taking into account the researches of Leites, what weight can be given to the role of emotional components, conscious or unconscious, as a clue to political stance? Is it simply that rationality dictates the political course, and emotions the choler, or what?

D. MYTH AND MONOLITH

One difficulty with analysis in social science is that it deals with categories, not people. In recent analyses of the Communist movement, particularly in the United States, the movement has been seen as a monolith, with each adherent a disciplined soldier or a "true believer" ready always to follow orders of "the party."

To some extent, the West itself has been seduced by the very image of "the Bolshevik" with which the Communist rulers have sought to mold the "new" Soviet man. For, like any human group, the Communists have not been immune to personal rivalries and, more important, they have not been immune to the inherent factionalism which besets all radical movements. In fact, one might argue that factionalism, if only the need at times to chop off a "left" wing or a "right" wing, has been necessary in order for the party to maintain a myth of inviolate correctness. Certainly, however, the strains and factions of earlier years (the defections of Levi, Ruth Fischer, Brandler, Thalheimer, Souvarine, Rappaport, Rosmer, Bordiga, Silone, Cannon, Lovestone, Wolfe) have had their counterparts—although the struggles were more hidden and suppressed—in the defections and expulsions and murders of Marty, Tillon, Lecoeur, Hervé, Cucchi, Magnani, Reale, Tito, Petkov, Gomulka, Rajk, Nagy, and thousands of others. In fact, not monolithism but factionalism has been a basic law of the Communist movement. And we have failed to see this and exploit it. For from general

[36] Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito*, New York, 1953, p. 327.

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political experience—whether it be in the trade union movement or political parties—we know that ruling groups rarely collapse, but fall through the defection of key power figures who control substantial followings. This was the experience of the CIO with the "Communist problem" in the United States, and the meaning of Tito, Nagy, and (perhaps) Gomulka in the international Communist movement.

But more than a tactical inability to exploit the fissures and cracks is involved. In the character approach, and in Kremlinology, too, there has often been a "false concreteness." One saw all Communists as "the enemy," as "the Bolshevik," and any unrest, particularly in the satellites, purely as power conflicts between rival leaders. But there was more than this. There was also the simple recalcitrance and the simple decency of the human being which lay underneath. Who becomes the *apparatchik*, seduced by sadism and power, and who does not; who the bureaucrat and who the lurking idealist; who the Rakosi and who the Gyulya Hay—this question is not, as we saw in Poland and Hungary in 1956, a closed book.

We can now see, in retrospect, the real meaning of the first Nagy regime in 1954-1955, how the momentum gathered when people were able to communicate with each other, exchange experiences, and realize that some hope of change was possible.[37] But why did almost all the specialists in Soviet affairs fail to catch the significance of those clues in 1954-1955? Was it because they were so mesmerized by the thought of "power" alone as the singular clue to the meaning of social conflict as to forget its impact on people?

Having said this, we must also recognize that political events do not return in the same trajectory. Having failed to catch the "unique moment," we are apt to forget that the moment may not return. The lesson of the last few years, from East Berlin to Budapest, is that a "thaw" breaks up glaciers and log jams, creates rifts and fissures, and sends massive floes down the sea of history. But have not the Russians —who are more sensitive than most to the lessons of history—seen this as well and, learning from these events, may they not have decided that, if they can help it, there will be no more thaws?

[37] We realize, too, the profound wisdom of de Tocqueville: ". . . it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary, it oftener happens that when a people which has just put up with an oppressive rule over a long period of time without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. . . . Patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds. For the mere fact that certain abuses have been remedied draws attention to the others and they now appear more galling. . . ." Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, Anchor ed., New York, 1955, pp. 176-77.

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E. THE WORD AND THE DEED

Every society, every social organization, lives for certain goals which, in considerable measure, are dictated by its ideology. We know—to use an example from modern trade union experience—that many individuals act quite pragmatically when their doctrinaire ideological goals conflict with the ongoing reality, and they compromise accordingly. Yet, when called upon to take a stand on issues far removed from their immediate experience, the only vocabulary, the only rhetoric, the only categories of analysis or even simple formulae available to them are the old ideological banners. They use them and become trapped; for ideology is a hardening of commitment, a freezing of opinion.

Since the Bolshevik ideology is the only formal canon of Soviet intentions that we have, an answer to this question is of prime importance: To what extent are the Soviet leaders committed to the formal Bolshevik ideology (e.g., the incompatibility of compromise, the attribution to capitalism of inherent imperialist aims, etc.), and to what extent are they prepared to modify it on the basis of experience and reality?

The answers are contradictory: (1) If one accepts the "characterological evidence" (e.g., Dicks, Leites), compromise is precluded. The rigid psychological postures and even paranoid suspicions of the Soviet rulers make it difficult for them to appraise realistically the changes in the Western world. (2) An extreme Kremlinologist might say that the Soviet rulers are cynical and regard the ideology simply as a necessary myth for the masses. (3) A geo-political theorist, taking a completely rationalist view, would argue that strategic interests rather than ideology determine the behavior of Soviet rulers. (4) The weight of some evidence (see pp. 29-35 of the Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn book) is that ideology, even though cynically used by the Soviet rulers, is a real factor in the way they think and in the formulation of their goals.

But all this was before Khrushchev. While in the fields of literature and the arts the party has moved to reassert *partinost* (ideological control), in other fields practical considerations rather than ideology seem to determine policy. Soviet economists, for example, in conformity with the Marxist theory of value, could not admit of the productivity of capital, or utilize the interest rate to measure the rational allocation of capital. But even under socialism capital scarcities exist, and if cost economies were to be achieved, some disguised techniques had to be

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created in order to carry out the functions of the interest rate. After the war, these evasions of dogma were attacked by the ideologists. "In the hot debate which followed," writes Robert Campbell, "the conflict between the very real problem of the planners and the demand of purity in doctrine was made quite clear. The Soviet leaders faced an impasse; one of the central assumptions of Marxist economic theory had been proved wrong by their own experience, and they were faced with a painful choice between ideology and rational expediency. . . . So long as Stalin was alive, no official line emerged to break the deadlock. About a year after his death, however, the Gordian knot was cut, and cut in such a way as to constitute a surrender of orthodoxy to reality."[38]

In the field of agriculture, Khrushchev has taken the dramatic, drastic step of abolishing the machine and tractor stations, which, in the Stalinist scheme, represented a giant step forward in the elimination of the peasantry, and is turning their equipment over to the *kolkhozes*. And we can surmise that, in the fields of nuclear physics and other strategic specializations, the pressure to squeeze all theories into the ritualistic formulae of dialectical materialism has diminished.

And yet, at some point—but where?—some essential aspects of the regnant ideology—but which?—must be maintained, for without a central belief system with some continuity, disintegrative opinions begin to spread (e.g., Poland). Nothing demonstrates better the incalculable effects of such opinion—and of the role of single events in politics—than the corrosive effects of the Khrushchev speech denigrating Stalin. Once the charade is exposed, how can the large masses of people—particularly the youth—retain any belief, when the leadership itself has destroyed the moral and psychological basis of believing? Paradoxically, this may lead the rulers to an even more intensive effort to assert the validity of the central features of the ideology. A movement is never more fanatical than "when prophecy fails," or when hypocrisy is exposed, for in an effort to still the panicking doubts of the believers, it redoubles its efforts to assert the fundamentals of the faith.[39] And however cynical a ruling group may become about the "myths" that are necessary for the masses, in such situations they may find themselves psychologically trapped by the verbal formulae they employ, and act as if the ideology were real.

[38] Robert W. Campbell, "Some Recent Changes in Soviet Economic Policy," *World Politics*, IX, No. 1 (October 1956), p. 8.

[39] In this connection, see the interesting study, *When Prophecy Fails*, by Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schacter, Minneapolis, Minn., 1956.

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F. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC

In the past, a determining factor in the behavior of foreign Communist parties, and in the policy of the Soviet government, has been the internal power struggles in the Soviet party. But one can argue now that the primary motives of internal Soviet development (e.g., the continued emphasis on heavy industry) are in reflex to the tense world situation. In any assessment, how do the Soviet rulers weigh these considerations?

Both the characterological and the geo-political approach state, in effect, that whatever the internal developments in the Soviet Union, Soviet policy will be combative and expansionist, and that internal and external calculations affect only the timing of aggressive moves. But this leads, with deliberate intent, to the question which is the purpose of this visit: To what extent is the Soviet system a qualitatively new phenomenon, subject to its own laws and indestructible from within; to what extent can the Soviet Union evolve gradually from within into a more stable, normal society?

The approaches broadly labeled characterological, Kremlinological, and totalitarian would argue the former, while the sociological (including M. Aron's variant in the paper presented to the Oxford Conference) and the neo-Marxist, plus some of the historical school, would argue the latter proposition.

Derivative questions immediately arise: Was Stalin an aberration, or does communism, by its very nature (e.g., vanguard party, dictatorship of the proletariat, Bolshevik ideology), take one through a period of the Stalinist type even without a Stalin? Can Communist regimes in Europe, and especially in Asia, "leap directly" to a mellowed phase without going through the type of upheaval which Russia experienced? Are the repressive phases merely a function of forced industrialization? At this stage the author, like Pirandello pursuing the illusion of reality, is tempted, almost, to repeat the ten theories which first set him off in search of reality. But, except for a coda, the play is done:

There is one large variable which these theories, in the nature of things, cannot adequately take into account—the behavior of the free world, which is the most important "reality factor" limiting the freedom of action of the Communist leaders. Here the role of social science becomes characteristically ambiguous. For the theories we have been discussing are designed to shape the behavior of the free world in its opposition to communism, but in so doing they set up the risk of a self-confirming hypothesis whereby we, because of our judgment of

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how the Communists may be expected to act, adopt policies forcing them to confirm or negate that judgment. (Just as the Russians force us into similarly prefigured molds.) This is always a danger, but we can minimize it if we remember that no matter how far our social science sophistication has come, it cannot take the place of that practical flexibility which is demanded by two necessary humilities: an awareness of the limitations of our knowledge, and of the openness of history.

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THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND SECURITY FOR EUROPE

By FRITZ ERLER

THE published report on the international conference on NATO held at Princeton University in June 1957 has been read widely and with great interest.[1] Every participant in that conference will recognize the report as an accurate and fair summary of the discussions. But its authors have also written in their introduction that "there is not a single participant who would give his unqualified support to the whole report."[2] This is certainly true of me.

Before the published report arrived in Europe, the news agencies had printed some parts of it. The uproar in Germany was considerable. It was caused by the fact that Chapter V, on German reunification, ended with the remark that "there seemed to be a good bit of support for the man who commented, 'For years now we have been saying that Germany must some day soon be reunited. But the fact is, and I say it with a heavy heart, maybe it is better for us if she is not.' "[3] This quotation was widely publicized just at the moment when personal talks between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Dulles raised the fear that a bilateral Russian-American settlement of certain issues might possibly be based on the idea—also embodied in the report—that "perhaps some national partitions must now be accepted for an indefinite period—but not necessarily forever—as one of the prices for avoiding the much greater costs of an East-West war."[4]

This is the heart of the problem. Can peace in Europe be based upon the partition of Germany? I bluntly say no. Not only because I am a German, born in Berlin and desiring to see my fellow-countrymen living in freedom under a freely elected government of our own choice. But also because the partition against its will of a nation with the economic and military capacity of Germany will lead sooner or later to all kinds of political tensions and risks, growing the more dangerous the stronger the military position of the two parts of Germany become. The partition of Germany is not the price of peace, but a potential source of war.

[1] *NATO: A Critical Appraisal*, prepared by Gardner Patterson and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Princeton University Conference on NATO, Princeton, N.J., June 19-June 29, 1957. Copies available from the International Finance Section, Princeton University.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 12. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 93. [4] *Ibid.*

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The proposals for German reunification discussed in the report[5] encountered two opposing arguments: (1) that the Soviet Union would not give up areas under its control; and (2) the Western powers could not give up the military capacities of Western Germany, now a partner in the Atlantic alliance.

The cruel fact is that both East and West, in basing their policies upon the integration of their respective parts of Germany into their military power systems, further consolidate the partition of Germany and destroy any hope for a peaceful reunification. To date, German public opinion holds the Soviet Union responsible for the partition of Germany because of its refusal to permit free elections in all parts of the country, the Soviet zone included. But if the Western powers, in contradiction to their official declarations in favor of German unity, base their strategy on the continued military participation of West Germany in integrated NATO forces, public opinion in Germany will sooner or later hold them likewise responsible for the partition of the country. The far-reaching echo of the Princeton conference report furnished a significant warning in this regard.

If the Western powers are unwilling to discuss even minor adaptations of their strategy for the sake of finding an acceptable solution of the German problem, NATO will become a symbol of the partition of the country instead of a symbol of common defense. This would mean the death of NATO. An alliance can exist only if its members find their vital interests protected by it and if public support consists in more than lip service. We have only to keep in mind the serious disturbance in the alliance created by the problem of arms for Tunisia. If NATO bases its very existence on the indissoluble military integration of West Germany, it will either inhibit the reunification of Germany or destroy itself if reunification nevertheless comes about.

Therefore we in the West must limit very carefully the form of military integration of West Germany into the NATO framework in order to avoid these two dangerous eventualities. If we do otherwise, and subordinate political necessities to military requirements, we will be setting a bad example and establishing a new form of militarism, even if the proponents of that policy are civilian politicians. In order to limit the form of military integration, we should not try to create bases in West Germany for middle-range ballistic missiles. Even military reasons argue against doing so: the heavy artillery cannot be put in the front-line trenches, immediately under the nose of the enemy. In the

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 86-89.

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event of a conflict, these bases would be destroyed immediately, without having served any practical purpose as deterrents.

I do not think that the West German elections in September 1957 signified a public acceptance of partition. Prosperity and the Hungarian revolt led the electorate to confirm the Adenauer administration. But by no means did the nation, by its vote, accept partition. Some of the most ardent followers of the Chancellor were shocked by the above-quoted portions of the Princeton conference report. If NATO proves to be incompatible with German unity, public opinion will even withdraw its support for the membership of the Federal Republic in the alliance. Whoever wishes to preserve the Federal Republic as an important member of the alliance for the time being must be ready to discuss other solutions for a reunified Germany.

Other solutions have to be found. Nobody has dared to say that the Soviet Union could possibly be brought by peaceful means to give up her zone in Germany and to allow it to come entirely into the NATO alliance. There is a widespread conviction that the Soviet Union is not willing to accept a united *free* Germany under any conditions. But it has to be made clear to the simplest mind that the fault is entirely Russia's—and not even partly that of the West. Therefore I deplore the argument that for strategic reasons West German military participation in NATO is a higher necessity than the establishment of a free united Germany which is protected and limited by other instruments than the actual NATO solution. The reunification of Germany will be possible only if relations between East and West change considerably and if progress is made in the limitation and inspection of armaments. One cannot discuss the future military status of a unified Germany as if the rest of the world were going to stay as it is now. A solution of the German problem has to be sought in conjunction with disarmament and European security arrangements.

It may be that the chances of finding such a solution are not very great at present. But then they are very small in the field of disarmament, too; nevertheless, we discuss disarmament proposals and take them seriously—at least I hope we do. The NATO Conference in Paris last December demonstrated the willingness of the Western powers to make a new effort to solve some of our problems by serious discussions with the Soviet Union. I trust that these discussions will develop into something more than a mere show, serving only to win public support for a speeding-up of the armaments race. The atomic armaments race is so important a problem that we should give more freedom to the leading power on our side to discuss the matter directly with

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the Soviet Union. Nothing can be accomplished by new conferences held in the glare of the television cameras. We should return to the patient methods of solid diplomatic work, so that when a conference is called, it will formalize conclusions reached during months of earnest preparation.

If we Europeans place our confidence in our American friends, we can be sure that, in discussing the disarmament problem directly with the Soviet Union, they will not sacrifice the vital interests of their European allies. But we should abstain from binding them to a fixed position established beforehand by fifteen nations. To do so makes negotiation impossible and deprives the United States of that flexibility which is necessary to success. If we believe our security to be guaranteed by the American commitment to deliver H-bombs on Moscow in the case of Soviet aggression, we should consider diplomatic activity by an American ambassador in Moscow to be an even better path to security.

It is useless, however, for anyone to formulate a solution that would be acceptable only to the Soviets or only to the Western powers. Every solution must be agreed to by the Western powers, by the German nation, *and by the Soviet Union*. Whoever neglects this fact will not find any solution at all. Is there anybody who claims that we have only to wait until the Soviet Union is so impressed by the military strength of the West that she will give way and put her part of Germany under General Norstad's command? Considering the forty years of its existence, I do not believe in the breakdown of the Communist state. There will be changes, as we have witnessed quite recently. But the military power of the Soviet Union will not be greatly influenced by them, important as they may be for the internal situation of that country and for the life of its people. And it does not seem to me that either the Sputnik or Western efforts in technical co-operation will have a decisive influence upon the existing balance of deterrence.

Therefore, I cannot see how waiting, even when combined with considerable efforts in rearmament, could create better conditions for the reunification of Germany. This holds true also for the problem of disarmament. Waiting, alone, will make things even worse than they are, so long as the armaments race continues. Mankind is on the way to collective suicide. We are developing means of destruction that can turn every border incident into a world war, and perhaps put in the hands of a fool the possibility of ending the life of mankind. Strategic discussions do not open up a way out; to military pressure and technological development by one side, the other answers with more pres-

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sure and more development. Only political decisions can break this vicious circle. Therefore, the requirement is for intelligent discussions that link the various world problems for which no separate solutions can be found.

To be sure, we are not here contemplating an ultimatum. One cannot say: No disarmament is allowable if Germany is not reunited. But it is fair to say that no disarmament solution will be a durable one if no solution for Germany is found. Without offering an ultimatum, it is necessary to think of one problem in discussing the other, to prepare the solution for the second in paving the way for the first. It is obvious that the reunification of Germany is excluded as long as the armaments race continues and each side entrenches itself in its part of Germany, regarding that portion as a military fortress.

Neither is reunification of Germany possible so long as each of the two power blocs insists on having the whole of Germany as its military ally. Neither of them will allow unification if it carries the risk of seeing the whole of Germany in the opposite military camp. Because a unified country cannot be a participant in two opposing alliances at the same time, unification is possible only if all parties involved agree on some broad aspects of the military status of a reunified Germany, especially on the question of her non-membership in the military alliance systems of the West or the East. The West cannot allow, and the German nation does not wish, the Red Army to establish itself at the border of the Rhine—but neither will Russia tolerate a US command at the Oder.

When the Paris treaties were ratified, the Germans were told that this would create a better bargaining position for German unity. If now we learn that strategic reasons force the West to maintain a solution for half of Germany as the only possible model for the whole, this approximates the position of the man who wishes to buy a commodity but keep his money.

In 1955 the Western powers discussed some proposals for thinning out the military forces established on both sides of the iron curtain in Europe. Unfortunately, the discussions were soon given up. When the USSR put forward the proposal for an agreed reduction of foreign troops in Central Europe, no serious study was given to it. But then—and also unfortunately—unilateral disarmament took place. The French troops left Europe for Africa, the British troops in Western Germany were reduced, and the Americans may well follow their example. Instead of gaining Soviet concessions by negotiation, the West granted the Soviets part of the reduction they wanted, without discussing with

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them a counterpart in Central Germany or East Europe. The proposal of the thinned-out zone could be implemented by the four powers which took the responsibility for "Germany as a whole," repeated at the Geneva Conference in 1955. Of course, after the Paris Agreements the Western powers could act only in agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. But no recognition of the East German Communist regime is necessary for that solution.

Modern technology has created new dangers, but it has also opened up new opportunities. Intercontinental ballistic missiles are on the way to diminishing the value of Germany and other Central European states as principal bases for attack or defense for both sides. Could this not lead to the idea that the two major powers might profit by leaving between them an area lacking the most destructive atomic equipment? Such an arrangement would be possible only in connection with a system of limitation and inspection of armaments. Hence my statement that the German problem is indeed closely interwoven with the questions of disarmament and of European security. The Polish government has proposed the creation of an area in Central Europe free of atomic weapons, and the proposal has been backed by Czechoslovakia; it is seen as a step toward the withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland and other Eastern European countries. Moreover, the Soviet Union has recently broached the idea in its letters to various heads of Western governments. We should discuss the proposal seriously, instead of calling it "unrealistic," as many of our leaders call every proposal that might lead out of the deadlock in which we now find ourselves.

Other possibilities are Churchill's speech on May 11, 1953, advocating an East Locarno, the ideas of van Zeeland about the military status of a united Germany, the Gaitskell plan linking the German problem to that of greater liberty for the nations of Eastern Europe, and the various ideas for a system of collective security in Europe based upon a *united* Germany and not—like the Russian proposals with the same label—upon a divided one. Last but not least, we should mention here the Reith Lectures delivered by George Kennan on the BBC during recent months, which have attracted world-wide interest.

None of these proposals pretends to be a definitive solution. All are susceptible to improvement in the course of discussions among friends and during negotiations with the opponent. All have in common that they recognize the necessity of a certain adaptation of the present military dispositions on both sides, NATO included, if Germany is ever to be united at all. This readiness is the decisive point. If the West is not

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adaptable, it will be immobilized on the German problem and leave all initiative to the USSR.

The conception of unarmed neutrality is not feasible so long as everybody—the Germans included—fears that the military opponent will fill the vacuum. Classical neutrality will not do either, as nobody would allow Germany, and Germany herself could not afford, an army sufficient in size and equipment to defend the country against every conceivable enemy.

Therefore it is necessary to bring about a solution excluding Germany from the existing military blocs but providing security for Germany *and* her neighbors. Hence the proposal to include a united Germany and at least her immediate Eastern neighbors (as, e.g., in the Gaitskell plan) in a security arrangement consisting of the necessary provisions for non-aggression; the peaceful settlement of disputes; immediate assistance in case of attack, without the restraints imposed by any right of veto; determination of the size and the equipment of the armed forces of all participants, with a system of inspection (this idea is already laid down in WEU); and, finally, a guarantee of the whole arrangement by the United States and the USSR. The two should not be required to act only in concert, because this would give to each side a veto against the implementation of the guarantee.

Such a solution would permit both the existence of NATO without West Germany and the presence of American armed forces in Europe. The future development of the alliance will depend on the character of the relations between East and West after the reunification of Germany, because NATO, after all, is not an end in itself but only a means of co-operation to secure a common defense against aggression. The organization to achieve that aim must obviously change if the political and military scenery changes considerably. As President Eisenhower put it: The *present* arrangements will be maintained *so long as the threat exists.*

The European countries will surely not accept limitation and inspection of their armed forces if the two world powers are not willing to do the same. This is an additional reason for believing that no European solution comprising German reunification can be obtained without progress in the field of general disarmament. Even though all arrangements cannot be negotiated and implemented at the same time, each single step should be taken with the complexity of the whole set of problems in mind. And we know very well that the military status of a reunited Germany is only one part of the problem. In order to buy freedom for the Germans and other non-Russian Europeans, other

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Soviet interests will have to be detected and mobilized in the bargaining process.

So, in the heart of Europe, the existing system of opposing blocs would be replaced by a regional system of collective security, perhaps preparing the way for a world-wide collective security system in the framework of the UN. The original WEU was a pact of five powers against a revival of German aggressiveness. By including Germany—and by the stipulations about limitation and inspection of armed forces—it became a model for a system of collective security that has to include the possible aggressor. The lining-up of states in opposing military blocs aggravates international tensions. A system of collective security is "round," and not directed against a particular power believed to be the one possible aggressor; and thus it avoids all the adverse political consequences of the latter system. Modern wars are especially cruel because they join modern armaments and ideological wars of extermination, modern crusades. Mankind has to overcome that crusading spirit if it is to survive.

The proposal advocated here would liberate several dozens of millions of Europeans from the physical presence of Russian troops and advance the frontiers of freedom some hundred miles to the east. A united Germany will be a cultural, political, social, and economic part of the Western family of nations even if her armed forces are not put under the command of an American general.

I cannot see that the West would lose anything very important by such an arrangement—on the contrary. If for general political reasons the results to be obtained are worth the price, we have to instruct our military counselors to hammer out the necessary adaptations of our strategic planning. Our security will not suffer if freedom is restored where it has been lost. In the rocket age the Central European space no longer has its former military importance as a glacis. And radar installations could still work for the West at the eastern border and for the East at the western side, as was proposed by the Western powers in Geneva in 1955. A step-by-step implementation of these proposals would replace the foreign (i.e., American and Russian) troops in Germany and the Eastern European countries only in proportion as the armed forces of these countries can take over the responsibilities.

The military status of a united Germany has to be known before reunification becomes possible. But then the international status of Germany will be fixed by a peace treaty on which every power can exercise its influence, but which cannot be *imposed* but only negotiated. And in all internal problems Germany must, like all sovereign nations, pos-

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sess the right to determine her own affairs. Germany will not be a Communist satellite, but will establish internal order on the basis of political freedom and respect for law.

It is useful to know that every party represented in the Federal parliament has declared that it will respect the obligations laid down in the Paris Agreements. *Pacta sunt servanda.* The opposition will execute the treaties, without exaggerating their obligations. No serious politician in Western Germany thinks of violating the North Atlantic treaty by, for example, leaving it. The opposition only asks the government to discuss with the Western partners solutions for serious proposals that could serve toward the reunification of Germany. Up to now, the official policy has produced none. And the opposition asks for discussion of those proposals with the USSR only after complete agreement with the Western powers; its position is not one of opposition to the West, but rather of a desire to be backed by it.

But the interdependence of reunification and disarmament makes it necessary for West Germany to be careful in executing the North Atlantic treaty. The treaty asks for *a* military contribution. It has not laid down an obligation to equip the German forces with atomic weapons. The distribution of these weapons to other states than now possess them would spoil any hope of coming to an agreement in the field of disarmament. Mankind would live on the edge of total destruction if the general distribution of those weapons put them into the hands of fools. As long as no general agreement can be obtained, it is preferable to have the responsibility for the balance of terror in no more hands than currently hold it. Wider distribution would not so much change the balance as aggravate the risks.

The complexity of the disarmament problem is well known. It is futile to present here all the details about conventional weapons, atomic weapons, guided missiles, adequate inspection, and so on. Mutual distrust has led both sides to make all kinds of propaganda proposals, which are then given up the same day the opponent seems to accept them. As long as disarmament discussions are nothing but propaganda gambits, there will be no useful outcome.

One should try to fix on the proposals of the other side instead of answering with a whole series of counterproposals. And I think, too, that it is not good to say: Let us wait for more strength on our side before going on with these negotiations. Hysteria is a bad counselor. The balance of terror has not seriously been affected either by Sputnik or by the clean bomb. The advantage of one side will always remain very slight compared with the whole field of destructive capacity, and

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also very short in duration. Therefore these advantages are never arguments for or against disarmament discussions. Neither side is likely to capitulate. For this reason, equals can continue to negotiate whenever they want. And they should do so.

In 1914 Germany felt encircled by Britain and her friends, and Britain felt menaced by German expansionism and naval armaments. Mutual fear turned a relatively small incident into World War I. The current armaments race is caused by political tensions, but it is also a cause of more tensions. To prevent war, we have to learn from 1914 and avoid the fatal end of an atomic arms race.

The constant fear of annihilation degrades mankind. Freedom from fear has to be one of our aims. It hurts whenever the Western world abandons some of its liberties in order to support the fight against the Communist threat. What use is it to defend freedom by destroying it? What use is it to fight communism by becoming equally totalitarian?

The atomic threat forces mankind to return to barbarism without war. If our cities have to be created below the surface of the earth, if our free institutions have to be given up for the sake of an effective defense, is this not barbarism, even though it is equipped with television and refrigerators? The progress of barbarism can be seen in the fact that no democratic government has asked the simple question whether the production and use of atomic weapons are compatible with international law. Is the need for defense sufficient argument to cover every crime? Are strategic necessities sufficient reason to break every law? Is this compatible with the principles laid down by the four powers in Nuremberg? Even the smallest atomic device used for "tactical" purposes would have the effect of an attack of some hundred bombers of World War II. Such a "weapon" will kill more non-combatants than soldiers, especially in the densely populated areas of Europe.

The testing of atomic weapons has severe consequences for the health and the lives of thousands of human beings. Governments are minimizing the danger—but most scientists recognize it. Who gives to a government the right to inflict illness, death, and mental and physical deficiencies on future generations of people in states that are not even subject to its jurisdiction?

In Europe, the discussion about a new strategy on the part of the United States has been followed with great interest. The declaration of Secretary of State Dulles that the European allies should have atomic weapons to permit local defense without being forced to fall back on massive thermonuclear retaliation is in line with the ideas of Mr. Kissinger about atomic warfare which is limited in the size of weapons

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and in the theater of war.[8] These ideas look—even if this is officially contested—as though the United States were trying to get rid of its commitments to the defense of Europe, since it is now exposed to immediate Soviet retaliation. But with atomic weapons, no *defense* of Europe is possible, only deterrence of an aggressor. To that purpose, no distribution of atomic weapons to ground forces is necessary.

The dilemmas of our time are apparent to everyone. No ideal solution for all of them can be produced today. NATO should serve as an instrument for discussing a common policy on these decisive questions. It has to be more than a matter of military machinery. The Western strength in negotiation resides more in a common policy than in a number of divisions. We have come to a point where only *political* decisions can save mankind. We must have the courage to envisage a certain adaptation of our military positions if we can get, in return, a sufficient counterpart. We must win back the political initiative. Arming and waiting are no substitutes for a constructive policy.

If and when a common policy has led to such results, the community of interest of free nations (larger by far than NATO) and the common pattern of their social life will be strengthened even if the political organizations are changed. What counts is the aim, not the organizational form. We must have more self-confidence. Let us not behave like a rabbit before a snake. Some of the West's political leaders become quite hysterical when the USSR displays a technical success. Let the Communists believe in their final triumph—I am convinced that freedom is stronger than slavery and that mankind will develop free societies in varied forms everywhere, if we do not now surrender by committing suicide or by destroying our own free institutions.

The world is getting smaller every day. The conquest of space has begun. This is a challenge to the whole of mankind. If we want to survive, we have to create such relations among states as exist in modern civilization among individuals: replace the right of the jungle by respect for law, treaty, court, and police. To do so would lead to only *one* armed force on the globe: an international police.

This sounds utopian. So did space flight until recently. Technical achievements develop quickly, and our political institutions have to keep pace. An international police force already has some precedents in the framework of the UN. It can be and has to be developed. We

[6] Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1957.

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have to move in that direction to govern man-made technology, or we shall be its slaves.

Practical policy today cannot yet be based on these principles. But our policy must keep the way open to that end and must not be allowed to bar it. The Thirty Years' War in Europe nearly exterminated whole nations; as a result of it, Protestants and Catholics learned to coexist. For some it is still difficult: although they have ceased killing each other, missionary work continues. Equally, two patterns of society have to learn to coexist without destroying each other. In this sphere, too, missionary work must go on until history, by effective changes in both camps, has replaced the problems and oppositions of today with other ones. This was the feeling of Woodrow Wilson, in lines that appear in the foyer of Woodrow Wilson Hall at Princeton University: "There must be not a balance of power but a community of power, not organized rivalries but an organized peace." We should stand for that—in NATO and beyond.

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SOME POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA*

By WILFRED MALENBAUM

I

THE contemporary Indian scene is exciting. Of immediate relevance to the present article are two basic aspects of the evolving situation in India. First is the fact that there is in process, for anyone to see, a deliberate effort to raise living standards. The government of independent India articulated a framework for economic expansion almost a decade ago, at about the time that President Truman dramatically injected the problems of economic development in the arena of international affairs. Since then India has been proceeding with development activity more or less within this framework.

Elsewhere in the free world—or, better, in the areas uncommitted to the Communist bloc—there has been much talk of development needs and some planning, but relatively little action. Indeed, for any contemporary parallel to the Indian performance one must turn from these areas to Communist China. There one finds *the* other conscious, comprehensive program for inducing growth in what is a classic example of a static economy. These current performances in a Communist and a non-Communist country take on additional interest and significance from the striking similarity in the economic problems of the two neighboring lands. In both, the enormous population, the concentration of employment in agriculture, the unfavorable people/resource ratio, the very low level of per capita income, the long history of hesitant industrialization while the new economies of the Western world marched ahead—all these pose problems of initiating growth that are unequaled in recorded history.

The first important fact, then, is that India has embarked upon a development effort. Second is the fact that this effort is being pursued within a formal system of democratic group relationships. Top leadership in India seems determined to respect the democratic prerogatives of the individual, even in a society where the vast bulk of the people are illiterate, where feudal patterns still persist in interpersonal and intergroup conduct, and where transport and physical communication are

* In an earlier form, this article was presented as a paper at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Boston, April 3, 1957.

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still limited. Accomplishment of the difficult feat of conducting popular elections in India provides a dramatic illustration of this leadership view. A parallel illustration is the tremendous outlay of leadership effort in the attempt to build up from village-level plans an approximation of the national development plan.

It is this democratic approach, especially in the context of the totalitarian parallel in China, which frames the usual political questions about economic development in India. Will economic achievement somehow contribute to stable political development, perhaps along the lines of India's present political institutions? Or, are the conditions for economic growth so disruptive of existing social relationships that they must give rise to political instability, at least for a significant period of time? Thus, are not the rising expectations on the part of millions of Indians bound to exceed what can be fulfilled by even the most optimistic rates of economic growth? Or, on the other hand, do land reform, other expropriatary measures, a ceiling on personal earnings, the promise of major income redistributions, and the like constitute so great a threat to the existing seats of social, economic, and political power that regressive political movements of the communal type must attain greater influence? Conceivably, too, the development effort may founder; what dangers to political stability might then follow?

However important such political consequences of the present development effort may be, the preconditions for economic growth raise political questions of greater immediacy. In today's undeveloped lands, an economic event or sequence of events is not likely to trigger growth, in contrast to the situation that prevailed in most of the countries which made this transition from stagnation to economic growth during the past century or so. Rather, the transition must be effected by the determination and persistent action of leaders in the society, generally leaders in political life and especially in governmental affairs. One-shot actions—such as political separation from the mother country, or nationalization of a valuable foreign investment, or negotiation of a large loan or grant from abroad—can at most constitute early steps in this process. It is essential that a more or less consistent program of action be pursued continuously over a long period, until the habit of economic growth has somehow been built broadly into the society. Only then might the need for conscious leadership in development play a significantly smaller role. Finally, this series of actions needs to be directed with reasonable efficiency at the development goal. The model for

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growth underlying the framework for action must be as realistic as the situation, or at least knowledge of it, permits.

II

Both the economic content of these general remarks and the political problems associated with them can be made more specific in the Indian context. Perhaps the best way of starting is to discuss the why of these problems in India. Almost uniquely among non-Communist countries, India appears to have embarked upon a planned path of economic growth. On the political side, Indian leadership not only seems able to pursue this path, but is apparently committed to do so in a democratic framework. What is the difficulty, then?

The truth is that there are major uncertainties ahead in regard to growth, in the political and the economic sphere. Indian achievement during the First Plan did exceed expectations in many directions. There was not only an increase in output beyond what had been anticipated, but a growing adherence to the desirability of planning and a broader self-assurance on the part of the Indian government as to its ability to handle the difficult administrative and technical problems involved. Yet, with all credit to India for an achievement without parallel among free-world nations, it must be pointed out that external circumstances were unusually favorable. Notable, of course, was the weather—with excellent monsoons, at least after the first two years of the Plan. The international political and economic environment was such that India could obtain assistance from abroad beyond what was actually used during the First Plan. The Plan demanded no important shifts in earlier patterns of investment; consumption levels did not need to be lowered; nor were people faced with unpleasant choices about what to do with increased incomes. True, government did want more tax revenues than it collected, but at the same time the Indian people were prepared to lend to government more than seemed to be demanded. The economy actually suffered somewhat from deflationary pressures.

The Second Plan has a much harder road ahead of it. It anticipates a total investment from domestic resources which can be mobilized only with new and major types of effort and sacrifice. The Plan is optimistic; it expects to generate an unusually large amount of product per unit of investment. But the over-all output targets are not so ambitious as to permit much lowering. Indian resources, leadership, and status in the world warrant the retention of the major Second Plan

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goal—a 25 per cent expansion in national income. But this will require a big push.

Government and the Congress Party are of course still committed to fulfilling the Plan, and presumably therefore to any political requirements of such a major effort. Pursuit of the development objective has been challenged by non-Congress adherents at both ends of the political spectrum on specific points or in particular regions, but not because the Plan demanded too much from the people. Indeed, the recently elected Communist government of Kerala makes much point of the fact that in Kerala the effort will be at least as great as that demanded by the Plan. This contrasts with most other states, where it is the Congress Party itself which shies away from the need for increased taxation, for example. In general, however, India's over-all political climate has been notably stable, especially so in view of the cataclysmic events of the past decade—independence without any immediate economic benefit; partition; famine; land reform; nationalization; various degrees of linguistic regionalism and reorganization of states. None of these occasioned major political reshuffling. Conceive of any near-parallels in Latin America!

In some contrast to this picture on primarily national issues, there has been local political turmoil over more regional issues. There are the problems of the regional languages that are provided for in the Constitution, the demands for linguistic states, and the related dangers of communal and caste domination of language areas. Two excellent recent analyses have made us dramatically aware of such problems in connection with the elections in Andhra and the recommendation of the States Reorganization Commission in Bombay.[1] Much attention has been given to the theme that the transition from English as the official language opens a Pandora's box, in view of the myriad difficulties of demarcating language boundaries in India. To date, these outbursts have been overcome by an *ad hoc* toughening of the leadership in Delhi. While Prime Minister Nehru himself has been reported to view acts of violence in the heat of local politics as manifestations of a grave weakness in Indian political life, it is more likely that such acts reflect the limited outlets that popular pressures find in India's political and governmental system. Purely on political grounds, independent of any special requirements arising from the development program, there appears

[1] Selig S. Harrison, "Caste and the Andhra Communists," *American Political Science Review*, L, No. 2 (June 1956), pp. 378-404; Marshall Windmiller, "The Politics of States Reorganization in India: The Case of Bombay," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXV, No. 9 (September 1956), pp. 129-43.

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to be a need for vitalization of party and official hierarchies, particularly in the links between Delhi and local and rural levels.

III

What actions are needed for a big push? Certainly, total investment targets must be achieved; indeed, given the optimism in the structure of the Plan, these levels of investment must perhaps be increased. Tax revenues in India have yet to grow more rapidly than national income. Action is needed to reduce tax evasion. Equally unpleasant for government administrators, there is a need for new levies—not only those which increase the tax burden upon the organized sectors, but also those which bear upon the broad base of the Indian population. Thus, there is no national income tax for farmers, and the state levies are both uneven and light. To supplement these, there is room for some form of land tax. These are not popular measures—simply necessary ones.

Per capita incomes in India are low, but research is making quite clear that increases in rural incomes, at least in the short run, are not readily absorbed in increased consumption. The propensity to consume is smaller than is generally believed; government must be prepared to assure that as much as possible of the increase in rural income goes—partly through taxation—into investment for the Plan. In this regard, it is important to note that India's rural economy does most of its saving in kind rather than in cash. If high investment levels are to be achieved, India needs a program for channeling these non-monetized resources into the most productive rural uses. To do this, various operating agencies of government should be extended rapidly into all rural areas.

The fact that India today is over-urbanized has important implications for the allocation of new investments. Rates of urban growth, especially in the largest cities, need to be curtailed, rapidly. To say this is *not* to take a position against rapid industrialization; the hard fact is that even the optimistic levels of industrial and related output of the Second Plan—levels whose achievement will probably need even higher investment than anticipated—cannot create enough work opportunities of the big-city type by 1961 to maintain present urban populations, to say nothing of the very high annual rates at which urban centers continue to grow. India is thus confronted with an increasing need for high social-overhead expenditures—higher, at any rate, than would be required by the same amount of unemployed people in smaller urban or in rural areas. With growing urban unemployment, India is

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also confronted with a greater risk of political action under irresponsible leadership. In a democracy, the flow of people to the large cities can be stemmed only by making the smaller urban and rural areas in India more attractive to their inhabitants. There is need for a program of rural and small urban development of an order of magnitude not yet contemplated. This emphasis clearly complements that mentioned above in connection with savings mobilization. Given the desire and the need to keep big industry growing as rapidly as resources permit, the rural program has to make the fullest use of the non-mobile investment resources available in smaller communities. As much as possible of the new investment needed here must use "savings" in the form of consumer goods and under-utilized labor.

Finally, with respect to this economic model for Indian growth, there is need for an over-all pattern of industrial, agricultural and, especially, overhead investments which will provide new plant to yield employment at a more rapid rate than is now anticipated over the next five to ten years. Open unemployment increased during the period of the First Plan; the Second Plan itself offers little hope of keeping abreast of even conservative estimates of the new growth in the labor force. Actually, there are several possibilities for increasing the employment potential of the Plan, without any appreciable change in total investment outlays and with essentially the same total output. Indeed, the bundle of incremental outputs, employment, and investment is more consistent in such alternative allocations of investment than in the program of the Second Plan itself. An over-all expansion which is more labor-intensive will again mean emphasis on smaller urban areas and on rural growth.

By stressing these essential small-scale components of an Indian model for growth, emphasis is simply being put where change in the Plan will best contribute to India's over-all objectives. With respect to the essential large-scale components of the program, exception can be taken to the specific allocation of investment as between capital and consumer goods industries, or as between transportation and industry as a whole. But there can be no doubt that India needs this modern industrial orientation. Indeed, the argument for more attention to the rural and small-scale sectors stems from the need to assure an over-all economy which can maintain the growth in the large-scale components.

Among the political problems bearing on the implementation of the development program, reference is frequently made to India's industrial policy, with its emphasis upon investment and conduct of

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business by the public (governmental) sector. A philosophical and political preference for government enterprise, it is argued, deters private enterprise and impedes expansion in the entire economy. While there are of course strong supporters of this view in India's business communities, they are certainly not numerous relative to the support given by business—to say nothing of politically conscious groups generally—to an aggressive public sector in Indian industry. Government must always be prepared to undertake the investment that it considers necessary. Full reliance cannot be placed upon the spontaneous acts of a private sector seeking its own profit objectives, even when this spontaneity has been induced by major governmental programs in the overhead sectors. In India, as in many developed as well as underdeveloped countries, government must be responsible for this heavy dose of economic and social-overhead investment. It must also undertake many specific operations which in the United States, for example, belong distinctly within the scope of the private businessman. The reasons for this need not be dwelt upon at any length here. They stem from the thinness of the supply of entrepreneurship—especially for heavy industry—even in India, which is more blessed in this regard than are other poor countries. There is also a difficulty in raising enough funds privately for big industrial investments like steel mills.

Of major importance is the fact that there have been decades of limited action by the private business sector in India, particularly in heavy industry, after what looked like the hopeful beginnings of industrialization a century or so ago. This interruption of growth has resulted in more than a delay in getting started. In our own economic expansion, we point to the new railroad or the new banking facility or the new research discovery as inducers of further investment. But this is a chicken and egg problem: the railroad, the discovery, the new facilities were results as well as causes in this process. A bundle of things was happening more or less simultaneously. Indian bundles are composed of the old and the new. The big businessman there has the new road; he has the capital market; he is aware of the new invention—and, along with all these, he is aware of poverty and backwardness, the obvious manifestations of the need for development. But this is no longer a position of disequilibrium to him—one which sets in motion pressures toward balance and at a higher level. Rather he has become psychologically adjusted to the imbalance; he is less sensitive to the new as a spur toward improving the old. Be this as it may, there is a need for government to fill a broad big-business leadership role in India.

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While government seems most willing to fill this need, it is much less enthusiastic about becoming involved in agriculture and small-scale enterprise where there would be more agreement on the scope for public activity. It is precisely in these latter areas that there exist in India political and administrative deterrents to developmental action by government. Government is not prepared—as yet, at any rate—to extend its leadership activities into the villages on the necessary scale, or to furnish leaders of the quality required. Nor is the Congress Party prepared for the realignments that would probably have to accompany this focus on the very extensive small-scale sector of India. I am fully aware that India is considered the home of rural emphasis, what with Gandhi, community development programs, and the like; that India is the proponent of labor-intensive forms of economic activity, what with its small-scale industry organization, hand-pounding of rice, textile handicrafts, and the like; that India is a country favoring heavy taxation of the wealthy and the general reduction of regional and occupational income differences, what with its emphasis on the individual and its socialistic society. However, these characteristics are more a matter of aspiration than of implementation; or, at least, implementation of a large enough order of magnitude. One wonders why the Plan persisted in an optimism which research and observation in India could have corrected. One must note the lip service paid to rural and small-scale enterprise by a governmental elite which actually has the urban proclivities of most Western-educated and Western-oriented people.

IV

Weaknesses of the development program are becoming more evident on the current Indian scene. Answers are being sought in a lowering of targets and of previously anticipated efforts. Answers are needed, I believe, in strengthening the scope and intensity of government action. Thus, community development has shown notable successes, as have government actions in support of small-scale enterprises, where adequate effort and personnel have been allocated to the task. In these cases, one sees economic progress through a wide use of local resources which might not otherwise have been utilized; one also sees an ability to generate new local leadership. India sorely needs both in the present development effort. Government must establish organizations which take a conscientious and honest interest in rural and small-area development; the Congress needs political organizations which encourage a constant challenging of the top hierarchies by the large proportion of

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the population which is not resident in the major urban centers of India. Such a political structure will constitute both a spur to governmental action and a stimulant to the development of new leaders, first at local and state and, eventually, at national levels.

In this last regard, one must note the political danger inherent in the one-man domination of India's current political scene. Prime Minister Nehru grows older, but there is not an obvious successor in or near the limelight; nor does there exist a party structure in which such new national leadership has been incubating. The high command remains primarily with the aging group which served Gandhi in the cause of emerging nationalism. Excepting Nehru, there are few whose strength lies in their accomplishments since independence, few who have demonstrated their abilities in dealing with current problems, like the development program or the reorganization of the states. The operational problems of today have not yet been met sufficiently to permit them to yield a new leadership. The potential for this exists; it has not yet been encouraged to come to the surface.

If there were new governmental emphases along the lines we have suggested, they would leave their mark on the political structure that follows upon economic achievement. Given the wide interventionist nature of the program, one may appropriately question whether some "wrong" kind of political outcome is not thereby assured. Yet it should be pointed out that the government's role in India's economic life has a long way to go before it attains the importance that it has in the United States, to say nothing of Britain or China. The important thing is that action along these lines could achieve growth in the Indian economy. Given such progress, the political risks may well become smaller. Moreover, should such steps be undertaken in the near future and under the guidance of the capable and moderate men who are now in power, there is a better chance that expanding governmental activities will always be tempered by an appreciation of the role and responsibilities of the individual in Indian society.

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FAMILY IMAGERY IN A PASSAGE BY MAO TSE-TUNG

An Essay in Psycho-Cultural Method

By JOHN H. WEAKLAND

THIS article points out and analyzes some overt and implicit family imagery underlying political and economic discussion in one passage by Mao Tse-tung, and discusses the value of such analysis. Along the way, some methodological questions—the significance of form and content in such "content analysis," and verification of the findings—are also considered.

Late in 1939, Mao wrote a brief work entitled "The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China."[1] This work, said by its translator to have been intended primarily for the education of the Chinese Communists, is a short description and discussion of Chinese society in ages past and its recent revolutionary struggles. The first section deals with "The Chinese People," the second with "Ancient Feudal Society." Then follows a section on "The Colonial, Semi-Colonial and Semi-Feudal Society of Modern Days." The passage of interest here forms the beginning of this section. It reads:

> The Chinese society of the past three thousand years was a feudal society, with which we have already dealt. But is the present Chinese society still a purely feudal society? Definitely not. China has already been transformed. After the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese society was gradually turned into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. After the Mukden incident in 1931, when the Japanese imperialists launched their invasion of China, Chinese society became a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. We shall now analyze the process of this transformation.
>
> As we have said, the Chinese feudal society lasted three thousand odd years. In the middle of the nineteenth century, as a result of the invasion of foreign capitalism, the internal structure of this society experienced a profound change.
>
> The invasion of foreign capitalism broke up the economy of the Chinese society. This invasion of foreign capitalism had, on the one hand, destroyed

[1] New York, Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, n.d., mimeographed. The text of this edition is stated to be that of the first English translation, by the China Digest Translation Service, Hong Kong. The translation of the passage in question has been compared with the original Chinese (*Chung-kuo ko-ming yu Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang*, Hsin-hua shu-tien, Ch'a-Chi branch, September 1945) and found generally accurate. However, a few words or phrases have been retranslated more literally, as noted below, in order to make the basic imagery used in the original more evident.

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the self-sufficient natural economy of China, the town handicraft and the rural home handicraft; whilst on the other hand, it had promoted the development of the town and rural commodity economy.

Not only had these conditions shaken the very foundation of the Chinese feudal economy, but they had also created certain objective conditions and possibilities for the rise of Chinese capitalism. The destruction of the natural economy had created markets for the capitalistic commodities, whilst the widespread bankruptcy of the peasants and handicraftsmen enabled capitalists to exploit cheap labor.

In fact, because of the effect of foreign capitalism and the destruction of the feudal economic structure, as early as the latter part of the nineteenth century, that is, sixty years ago, some businessmen, landlords and bureaucrats had invested in the new industries. Towards the end of the same century and at the dawn of the twentieth century, that is, forty years ago, Chinese national capitalism began to emerge. Twenty years ago, during the imperialistic World War I, when the European and American imperialistic countries were busy at war, and for the time being had loosened their hold over China, the native industries of China, especially spinning and weaving, flour and silk industries, got a chance to develop. In this period, the number of factories in the spinning and weaving industry rose from 22 in 1913 to 44 in 1922; the flour industry's mills in 1916 were increased to 107; while 60 new factories of the silk industry had sprung up. At the same time, one hundred and eight Chinese banks were established.

The process of the rise and development of the Chinese national capitalism coincides with the process of the rise and development of the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat. If we say that part of the businessmen, landlords, and bureaucrats were the predecessors of the Chinese bourgeoisie, then part of the peasants and handicraftsmen were the predecessors of the Chinese proletariat. Regarding the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat as two distinct classes, they are newly born; there are no such classes in Chinese history. They emerged from the womb of the feudal society, and formed two new social classes. These two are related to each other, and opposite to each other. They are the twins of the old Chinese society, the feudal society. But not only did the rise and development of the Chinese proletariat co-exist with the rise and development of Chinese bourgeoisie, but the former had already come into existence before imperialism had taken firm roots in China. Thus the Chinese proletariat, as compared with the Chinese bourgeoisie, is older. Therefore its social power and social foundation are wider.[2]

At first, certainly, there does not seem to be much that is striking in this passage; perhaps not even much that is interesting at all. Yet there is one striking detail: the use of the metaphor of the birth of twins in the last paragraph. Such a way of referring to the bourgeois and proletarian classes is, in fact, particularly noteworthy in writing that other-

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. Part of the final paragraph above has been retranslated more literally, and differs slightly from the source cited.

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wise seems routinely Marxist in thought and expression. Such apparent discrepancies or peculiarities are often the best clues in psychological and anthropological inquiries,[3] and so it is here.

Even after the overt use of family imagery in one paragraph suggests that the whole passage might be worth closer attention, re-examination of the passage as it stands does not readily disclose any further indication of underlying family imagery or conceptions. This situation is changed, however, if the general *form of expression* Mao has used is first examined and clearly discerned, is transposed into a more familiar one, and then the content is again looked over closely. Before this is done, it may be of interest to consider briefly the problem of form in content analysis generally.

Form in Content Analysis

In terms customarily used, any communication has one aspect called "content" and another called "form." "Content" seems to refer to what a message is about—"the topics or matter treated," as the dictionary puts it, the referents of the main symbols, perhaps. "Form," on the other hand, seems a matter of the organization of the symbols in a message, which may be considered at any of a variety of levels—grammatical, semantic, syntactic, and so on. In an important sense, this seems just as much part of any communication, as much content, as is "content" itself; the form of what is said or written may convey information from sender to receiver just as much as the conceptually separated "content" does. This has been recognized in some quarters, particularly in psychoanalytic study of communications. As Lewin notes, "A special principle in psychoanalytic method is the effort to analyze manifest forms and formal elements into antecedent contents. . . . Freud undertook to treat all formal elements of the manifest dream picture on an equal footing with content elements [in *The Interpretation of Dreams*]."[4] Another instance of attention to form in psychological work is found in the use of form of expression as a means of diagnostic classification.[5] Somewhat

[3] Such an orientation, of course, is prominent throughout Freud's psychological work. Cf. also Ruth Benedict's statement: "I read this literature [on Japan] as Darwin says he read when he was working out his theories on the origin of species, noting what I had not the means to understand. . . . I read, asking the ever-present question: What is 'wrong with this picture'? What would I need to know to understand it?" (*The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Boston, 1946, p. 7.)

[4] Bertram D. Lewin, *The Psychoanalysis of Elation*, New York, 1950, p. 13. This passage, however, considers only one of several possible significant treatments of form; others are mentioned below.

[5] E.g., Eva R. Balken and Jules H. Masserman, "The Language of Phantasy," in

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related to this is attention to form—or a mixture of form and content characteristics—in identifying communications of other sorts. Under this fall such matters as ascribing authorship on the basis of "style" in literary inquiries, or ascribing Communist inspiration to political statements on the basis of style of expression as well as of the views put forth.

Yet in most of the "content analysis" currently carried out, largely by people of sociological, political science, or journalistic background, form receives no mention or attention. Such neglect seems reasonable only when the messages involved are actually in a form that is standard and familiar—if, say, Americans are examining the content of passages from American newspapers—and even then only at the cost of relatively superficial analysis. These limitations, though, are commonly unnoticed or glossed over. What may be lost by such neglect of form in content study?

First, form may itself be significant, yielding important information on analysis. This is the possibility stressed above by Lewin. This matter will not be considered at any length in regard to the passage by Mao here being examined, although Mao's writings could profitably be studied along this line, and such an approach has already been taken toward some other Chinese materials.[6]

Second, the form may affect the content, and may need to be taken into account to avoid misinterpretation. This may occur in many ways, one of which can be mentioned as a simple example: at times the main part of a message is "framed" by a brief indication, usually prefixed, sometimes suffixed, that it is to be interpreted in a special way—that the message is ironic, a dream, a piece of madness, a parable, and so on, through many possibilities. It is obvious that if form is ignored, and such a message is subjected to a routine "content analysis" which operates essentially by counting up occurrences of main symbolic elements, the body of the message will heavily outweigh any framing. The message will therefore be taken largely at face value, and a strange result will occur—perhaps an analytical summary statement diametrically opposed to the real sense of the message.

A third possibility is that the form of the statement may obscure important aspects of the content. This can occur whenever the symbolic organization of a message received is unfamiliar to us. Such obscurity

Contemporary Psychopathology, ed. by S. S. Tomkins, Cambridge, Mass., 1943, pp. 244-53.

[6] Cf. John H. Weakland, "The Organization of Action in Chinese Culture," *Psychiatry*, XIII (August 1950), pp. 361-70.

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(together with the employment of unusual symbols) occurs very markedly in dreams, myths, and the language of psychotics, but in some degree it is present in all communication that is foreign to our usual habits. This sort of situation causes trouble especially when it is not readily apparent—when a communication is labeled as, or is apparently, of a familiar nature, but fundamentally is not. One can expect this rather commonly in translations, particularly those from the more exotic languages, such as Chinese. Moreover, political discourse often tends to be more mythical in essential nature than is generally recognized.[7] This sort of obscurity is the aspect of form which is most important in Mao's passage on politico-economic changes in recent Chinese history.

Mao's Form of Expression and Its "Translation"

The essential problem in getting Mao's communication into a form more conducive to an examination of its basic content and underlying imagery involves "translating," or transposing, Mao's content into a form one feels to be simple, natural, and familiar. It is possible that this operation might not require considering Mao's original form or the desired form in any analytical way. However, such an analysis was undertaken in the original study of this passage, and to discuss Mao's form and the ways in which it differs from what we might usually expect may help to clarify and validate the transposition we will offer.

In written English exposition—especially in scientific, non-literary writing—there tends to be a grouping together of references of one sort, plus an arrangement of such groups in a progressive order, from one topic to another, along a temporal or logical line of development—a classification and sequential ordering of content. Thus a paragraph may be composed of a number of sentences dealing with several aspects of one matter, and a following paragraph will take up a related, usually subsequent matter in a similar way. In contrast to this lineal organization, Mao's style—though he is concerned with historical description—at the level of sentence and paragraph organization (and also for the larger sections of his work, which are not discussed here) displays a particular kind of repetitiveness—what might be called "progressive repetition." Repetition is quite evident on a little inspection. For example, the second, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of the passage quoted all contain a mention of the disruption of the Chinese feudal econ-

[7] Obscurities of this sort may exist mainly for the recipients of a communication—perhaps calculatedly—but also for its creators as well.

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omy by the invasion of foreign capitalism. But this repetition is not just simple reproduction of the precedent statement. In each paragraph, the statement about invasion and disruption is made a bit differently. Also, as the paragraphs succeed each other, the statement is gradually expanded, and related topics, such as the resulting development of Chinese capitalism, are gradually introduced, to receive increasing attention as they also appear repeatedly, until they begin to die out and give place to newer statements. To a considerable extent, then, each of Mao's paragraphs largely repeats what the preceding paragraph has said, perhaps more briefly or with the omission of its earlier part, and then proceeds to make an introductory statement about something further, which is picked up and developed more fully in subsequent paragraphs of similar structure.[8]

This style, going round and round yet gradually advancing and expanding, is the more readily discernible in Mao's writing because very similar forms have already been discerned in previous studies of other cultural materials. In Chinese movies, for example, the progression of the plot toward its eventual outcome often involves multiple repetition of very similar incidents, with slight alterations in intensity or circumstances each time, until enough alteration accumulates to bring about some resolution.[9] "Progressive repetition," again, is a major feature of traditional Chinese educational practice. A child learns to read or to write, or an artist to paint, very largely by repeated copying of models —the teacher's reading, copybooks with printed characters, paintings by established artists. Copying begins with models that are simple in organization but are whole and final, not analytical elements—brief but basic sentences from the classics, whole characters, whole objects. As skill is acquired, the learner advances to the copying of models that are similar in kind but more complex, involving more elements or more detail. Repetition leads to development which is largely elaboration or refinement *within* an original basic outline,[10] much as Mao begins with statements in broad outline and gradually supplies detail within this outline. Mao's general form also fits in with very basic and general Chinese conceptions about time and change, in which the universe is conceived as fundamentally cyclical and repetitive, with any

[8] The paragraphs beginning and ending the main sections of "The Chinese Revolution . . ." are similarly organized on a broader scale; they summarize the content of an entire section and also make a link with the preceding or following section.

[9] John H. Weakland, "An Analysis of Seven Cantonese Films," in *The Study of Culture at a Distance*, ed. by Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux, Chicago, 1953, pp. 292-95.

[10] Weakland, "The Organization of Action . . . ," *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 366-67.

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progressive change taking a very secondary place; it is striking that a revolutionary document, presumably concerned with irreversible change, should in its form so parallel these old beliefs.[11]

Mao's Passage Transposed and Summarized

Mao's passage essentially purports to be a historical analysis, concerned with a number of conditions or events in the recent past of China, and with their relationships as part of a single "process of transformation." The nature of his statement may now be clarified, at least for Western scientific readers, by transposing its form. This can be done by grouping together all of his statements on each condition or event he mentions —which involves also a certain amount of summarizing and generalizing—and arranging these groups in a roughly temporal order. Doing this, one obtains:

(1) There existed for a very long time an old Chinese feudal society. It was enduring and stable, and its economy was a naturally functioning and self-sufficient (literally, "self-giving and self-enough") system.

(2) Relatively recently, this system was invaded, by foreign capitalism, a different sort of system, which penetrated it rather forcibly.

(3) This invasion affected the old organization profoundly: "As a result of the invasion . . . the internal structure of this society experienced a fundamental change."

(4) Much of this effect was destructive: the "very foundation of the Chinese feudal economy" was "shaken," and the functioning of the society's economy was "split." The old, self-sufficient, natural functioning (the "handicraft economy") was destroyed.

(5) The invasion, however, had constructive effects also. (a) First, it provided potentialities for the occurrence of something new. The invasion "created certain objective conditions and possibilities for the rise of Chinese capitalism." (b) The potential could become actual. Destruction of the old system of functioning brought needs—"created markets for the capitalistic commodities"—and furthered a sort of resource—"bankruptcy of the peasants and handicraftsmen enabled capitalists to exploit cheap labor"; all this "promoted the development of the town and rural commodity economy."

(6) Indeed, a new system developed strongly, and "Chinese national capitalism began to emerge."

[11] In other parts of "The Chinese Revolution . . ." there is considerable repetitive and cyclical emphasis in the subject matter also—even on the topic of revolutionary activity!—so that both form and content express something similar.

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(7) This new society apparently has two sources, old Chinese society and the invader. That is, its form and name are capitalistic, but its substance seems to be derived from the old feudal system.

(8) This substance of the new system is composed of the two classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat. "The . . . development of the Chinese national capitalism coincides with . . . the development of the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat."

(9) These derive from segments of the old system: ". . . part of the businessmen, landlords, and bureaucrats were the predecessors of the Chinese bourgeoisie . . . part of the peasants and handicraftsmen were the predecessors of the Chinese proletariat." Yet they are also new: "Regarding the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat as two distinct classes, they are newly born; there are no such classes in Chinese history."

(10) With a somewhat similar combination of opposite views, Mao presents these two classes as split, divided, instead of manifesting the old unity, but yet in a sense closely interrelated: "These two are related to each other, and opposite to each other."[12]

(11) Finally, much of the foregoing seems to be summed up in the explicit image: "The Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat . . . emerged from the womb of feudal society. . . . They are the twins of the old Chinese society."[13]

Mao's Passage Viewed in Terms of Family Imagery

The last item in this transposed version of Mao's text overtly phrases ideas about politico-economic events in the imagery of family life. What about the rest of the communication—does it, too, perhaps embody family imagery? If so, it should make some coherent sense if phrased at that level. Such treatment of one short passage necessarily is tentative (questions of validity will be considered later), but it does seem that Mao's complex statement can be covered rather well by an interpretation of this nature, as follows:

The old Chinese society is a female figure, though somewhat an-

[12] The conception of two opposite but complementary elements, which fit together to form a whole, is old and pervasive in Chinese thinking. Perhaps the best-known example is the pair *yin* and *yang*, the female and male, negative and positive, etc., principles by which a complementary dualistic view of the universe is expressed.

[13] The distinction of older and younger as between proletariat and bourgeoisie does not clash with the "twins" idea in Chinese thinking, which customarily distinguishes between the elder and younger of twins. This carries to a logical extreme the Chinese feeling and principle of social organization that no two persons should have exactly equal status—age, of course, being a major basis of status ascription.

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drogynous. This conception is of a legendary nature and scope—originally she stood alone, self-sufficient, almost timeless, and was a unity, yet one with a harmonious internal organization of different elements. "Foreign capitalism"—by implication, male and paternal—forcibly invaded her. This violent conquest was, in essence, a rape. This rape resulted in a terrible disruption of her functioning and her gradual death, but also in the conception and the birth of twins, the Chinese proletariat and capitalist classes, opposed yet interrelated—which, gradually growing up, began to form a new society as the old died (this to be completed later in the Communist order).

Both father and mother had rather peculiar roles in this procreation: It seems as if the father, "foreign capitalism," had only a relation of disruptive stimulation to the mother, old China, and contributed little to the progeny. The similarity of name and form of father and of the progeny taken jointly—the developing Chinese capitalism—and the partial similarity of father and younger twin are not stressed. In fact, that which resembles the father, though overtly prominent, is basically only external and temporary. But the inheritance from the mother is great; the progeny are the offspring of her womb, each descended from a part of her previous self, and will in time fundamentally resemble her old self more, as these classes—it is elsewhere clearly implied by Mao—develop toward the new Communist society, which once again will be unitary and enduring.

The Nature and Validity of This Interpretation

This treatment of Mao's passage easily might seem strange and of doubtful validity. The interpretation just presented is manifestly remote from the original material. The procedure used in making it may appear highly "subjective." Since such interpretation is unusual in this field (though similar thinking about an overtly political statement might occur often enough in psychotherapeutic interviewing), it does not have the sanction of common practice, which in actuality frequently substitutes for methodological scrutiny. Therefore some clarification and substantiation are needed here. Such an approach also tends to involve related matters about the possible value or significance of interpretations of this sort, but so far as is feasible these will be deferred for later discussion.

The basic question, really, is "How is Mao's statement being treated here in making such an interpretation?" It is *not* being considered in terms of promoting an alternative to its manifest content; this erroneous

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view, though, is likely to arise, embodied somewhat obscurely in contentions referring largely to the original author's subjective experience and intent—e.g., "Was Mao really thinking about politics, or about family life?" Posing such an alternative is misleading and confusing, as the two aspects are not on the same level and so are not relatable in this way. Rather, Mao's statement is being treated more abstractly, as exemplifying a certain way of viewing something, the something here being historical politico-economic events.

Any statement about objects or events, even the most "objective" scientific report, involves both whatever was observed specifically and, at more general levels, the observer's way of observing and reporting—his system of conceptualizing experience. This latter, which is based on past experience and learning (above a common biological base), any speaker customarily takes for granted and is largely unaware of, but it nonetheless affects what he sees, thinks, and says, and is correspondingly reflected therein. Also, most hearers usually either share a similar system (as members of a group with important similar experiences) and equally take it for granted, or are so differently oriented that they ignore or otherwise reject the message. It is possible, however, to focus attention on the nature of the message as reflecting the speaker's system of conceptualizing, rather than on its "subject." That is what we have attempted to do. We are not concerned at this point with the political events Mao discusses as such, nor are we claiming that instead he is "really" thinking or talking about family life. We are raising the question, "*How* is he looking at and talking about these political events?" In answer, it is here suggested that, although his conscious conceptualization is Marxist, in part his viewing is related also to family events and experience.[14] As stated, this notion is based on discerning some apparent reflections of the familial situation in the message, starting from the one overt use of family imagery.

The validity of this broad assertion can be examined more critically by (1) making as clear and specific as possible just what familial con-

[14] I am indebted to Robert C. North for the suggestion that some reflections of family and sexual conceptions can also be discerned in the classical Marxist writings on dialectical materialism—for example, in Engels' *Anti-Dühring*. A study comparing the extent and specific nature of such imagery in the original Marxist works with that employed by Mao would be of great interest.

There are many possible levels at which the present sort of examination can be pitched; many different areas of prior experience probably are relatable to anyone's system of viewing experience currently. This study aims only at examining one such area—though one generally important—at some length, though undoubtedly not exhaustively; other more or less abstract levels of message and family structure could be paralleled also.

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ceptions are believed to be reflected in the passage, and (2) examining their relation to any other available information on familial experience or conceptions that are relevant to Mao as the author.[15] The interpretation already given constitutes the first of these steps, and the second will follow below.

First, though, this matter of validation may be more readily grasped if we restate the problem on a more formal and general scientific level, employing terms in which such questions have been most fully and explicitly considered. To make the interpretation given here is like formulating a *theory*, with the original passage serving the role of raw or partially ordered data, and similar general critical considerations apply. The purpose of theory is to describe and interrelate, in a general and systematic form, some chosen aspects or features of a body of data in a manner, ideally, that also facilitates the establishment of links with other knowledge. The "correctness" of any theory, fundamentally a structural or organizational problem, is properly judged by how well this function of summarized, systematic, selective description is carried out. The important general questions, then, in judging our interpretation are: (1) Do the analysis and resulting interpretation account well for the original data? That is, does the interpretation include and accurately parallel the relevant features of content and relationship of the original passage—does it fit, in the respect that it was supposed to? (2) Does the interpretation fit or agree with any existing theory that may be presumed relevant? (3) Does the interpretation also fit or agree with other data believed to be similar or related to the original message or to the interpretation?

On the first count, of course, there is no question of independent checking of facts, since the interpretation was designed to fit the totality of the relevant basic data of the original passage by Mao. The question is rather one of judging whether this was accomplished, which each reader must largely do for himself, in the absence of clear and accepted standards in this area. It may be pointed out, however, that even though the interpretation seems remote from the original in content, a close correspondence in form has been pointed out in detail, and the interpretation is relatively simple and systematic; this is as it should

[15] It must be admitted that some prior study of the Chinese family, and some general ideas about the relevance of the family to patterns of thought, were probably important in the genesis of the interpretation in the first place, so that the interpretation and its examination and support cannot be entirely separated in this instance. However, the recognition of family themes in this particular passage came as a surprise, and some of the supporting evidence, and much of its organization, were discovered or developed subsequent to the interpretation.

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be if family thought underlies the passage, for organization is markedly characteristic of family life everywhere.[16]

Substantial support of the interpretation offered can, however, be supplied by considering its agreement, first, with relevant theory, and then with relevant data. The segments of theory and data utilized in this operation are several and broad in range, so that there is no very sharp distinction among them—or even between theory and broadly outlined and summarized observations. In effect, what follows is a series of comparisons of our interpretation with various better-established bodies of material at gradually decreasing levels of generality, though never to the "crucial experiment" level possible with refined theories.

In recent years there has been a considerable development of the broad theoretical idea that many important aspects of political behavior are rooted in childhood experience, and that, as a corollary, political behavior and expression reflect such experience, which of course is closely related to forms of family life. There have been accompanying attempts to fill out and support these conceptions by description of principles and examples.[17] This theory has been considered mainly by two groups, with rather different foci of attention. Psychoanalysts, led by Freud, have been interested in framing extremely general propositions about childhood and family life as a basis for later thought and behavior. *Totem and Taboo* can be considered as Freud's work of this kind which is most "political" in subject, dealing with authority and rebellion in group life, though highly generalized and speculative.[18] Also, working in a clinical situation remote from the presumed primary circumstances, the psychoanalysts have given much attention to the reinterpretation of current utterances. Anthropologists, of late often holding similar views on the relations of childhood and adult life, have been more concerned with immediate and detailed observation of limited areas of adult and child behavior and with the statement of correspondingly more limited—if still broad—relationships. Recently there has been some juncture of views and efforts between the two groups.

[16] This fact has appeared over and over again in anthropological work on the family, not only for various times and places, but also for very varied levels of study—from the organization of kinship systems, first studied a hundred years ago, through study of family customs, up to recent study of child-rearing practices in various cultures, practices which may be recurrent and systematic even when the participants are not consciously aware of them.

[17] This development is discussed and examined at some length in Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts," *World Politics*, 1, No. 1 (October 1948), pp. 102-19.

[18] Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, in *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, ed. by A. A. Brill, New York, 1938, pp. 807-930.

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The resulting body of work certainly is not complete or perfect, but it now exhibits some well-supported and generally accepted main principles: the pattern of experience of early childhood forms a frame of learning which shapes later thought and behavior markedly and demonstrably (though not totally, of course); conversely, signs of childhood experience may be read in adult life. In the present instance and in other terms, this means considering seriously whether the governing of the family is not the earliest experience of "government" that anyone encounters, forming a broad framework for organizing and conceptualizing all similar experience, including experience of the more highly differentiated and specialized sort of government met in adulthood. Correspondingly, developed and specialized adult political conceptions, expression, and practices reflect in part and at a certain level the more general childhood experience of family governmental organization.[19] These views, obviously, are consistent with the principles of the interpretation made here, though no sharp test is afforded.

This broad scientific view of family life in childhood as affecting later behavior and expression, and as being reflected in them, is interestingly correlated with the finding that, in Chinese culture particularly, human relationships and especially the family system are often a rather explicit model for thought and expression. Such explicit connections, widespread in Chinese practical and philosophical thinking, occur especially often in discourses on social organization, even for areas that to us seem distinct and distant from the family situation. Thus in old discussions of the Chinese empire and of bandit groups, and in recent discussions of business organization and government reform, there recur overt imagery of family organization, family relationship terms, and statements of principles just like those proclaimed by Confucius and by ordinary Chinese informants in regard to family ordering. Precisely in the area of international relations is such expression very evident; it is found in imperial, Nationalist, and now in Communist pronouncements. For example, Chinese Communist sources ranging from elementary school texts to city newspapers use images of the Soviet Union as the "elder brother" and China as the "younger brother" within the "socialistic world," or of the capitalistic world as resembling the "feudalistic big

[19] A similar principle holds for the economic sphere, but the "economy" of infancy and childhood has received little attention compared with their "politics," and has been related to adult economics only to a limited degree, though there has recently been some anthropological interest in this matter. A good deal of attention has been paid to the "political" problems of ordering the rights and disciplines of even the very young child, but only very recently has there been even much psychological interest in such a primary "economy" as the maternal-infant relationship in feeding.

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family," with the United States assigned the role of "elder brother."[20] Such usage appears more prominently in Chinese thinking than similar imagery of a "family of nations" does in current Western political thinking, where there is more overt stress on impersonal principles; in Western thinking, family and bodily imagery tend to be covert or unconscious.

Such materials indicate that the Chinese specifically relate ideas about international affairs and ideas about family relationships in their thinking and expression. Also, Chinese discourse on international affairs, especially when concerned with dangers for China, at times employs sexual imagery fairly explicitly. Chiang Kai-shek's recurrent use of the word "penetration" in describing imperialist inroads on China[21] may be suggestive only, as the original Chinese term does not have such manifest sexual connotations as the English. But the dangers of "enticement" and "rape" mentioned in a Chinese Communist sociologist's warning against American influences[22] are a clear example. Thus both of the major lines of imagery appearing in the present interpretation of Mao's passage are manifest in other Chinese writing on similar subjects.

Next, taking as a cue the explicit family reference used by Mao himself, it is important to see if the present interpretation fits with information on the family in Chinese culture generally, and with any particular information available on Mao's own family life.

Comparison of the family interpretation with information about the actual Chinese family system is a complex task, full of pitfalls. With what *sort* of information about the Chinese family is it to be compared? —there are various views of the Chinese family system available from different sources. Since we are here concerned with *Chinese* political thinking, we can initially rule out most non-Chinese accounts of the Chinese family; their point of view is likely to be too bound by their own culture to be worth comparing with any family images that may underlie Mao's statements. But the dominant picture remaining when this elimination is enforced is the usual sort of cultural stereotype of the family system enunciated by the Chinese:[23] the ramified but closely

[20] John H. Weakland, "Chinese Family Images in International Affairs," in Mead and Metraux, eds., *op.cit.*, pp. 421-26.

[21] Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, New York, 1947.

[22] Pan Kwang-tan, "A Diagnosis of American Psychosis," translated in *Chinese Press Survey*, x, No. 4 (1950), pp. 88-95 (from *Kwancha*, Peking, May 15, 1950).

[23] This stereotype seems to be both an "official" view of the Chinese family, as pronounced by experts from Confucius on down, and also the sort of description anthropological informants give as "real." But it is in fact an ideal, not an account of actual behavior. This tendency of the Chinese to present an ideal as real—apparently to themselves also—has caused much confusion in Western studies of China. Cf. Marion J. Levy, *The Family Revolution in Modern China*, Cambridge, Mass., 1949, p. 46, n. 10.

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knit, well-organized, and harmonious extended family which is patriarchal and patrilineal, with the wives entering the husband's family and household upon marriage, and the main relationship that of father and son. This picture certainly seems wildly out of line with that outlined in the above interpretation. But should it not be? After all, the patriarchal-patrilineal picture of the family is the official one, and it is against such old, official views in many areas that Mao, a revolutionary, has been in open, lifelong rebellion.

Indeed, the Chinese Communists have attacked the traditional family system in particular and have advocated drastic changes. Their writings and speeches on this topic have especially stressed reduction of parental authority and emancipation of women—with the government entering as a benevolent new authority in both cases. Pronouncements on emancipation of women have made a particular point of the freeing of the young wife—whose marriage, of course, traditionally was arranged without her consent—from the arbitrary exercise of power by her husband and his allied or dominant mother. Emphasis on such a view of family affairs does seem thoroughly consistent with our interpretation of Mao's passage. In fact, a rather sophisticated Chinese informant with whom I had discussed anthropological work, and who had translated for me newspaper stories on international relations that employed family imagery (for example, describing South Korea as the "younger brother" of the United States), explicitly made a similar connection of ideas. On reading some of Mao's *China's New Democracy* she commented spontaneously, "You know, all those words he uses about colonialism and semi-colonialism; I think he sees China as the daughter-in-law"—of the imperialist countries.

However, it is still not necessarily true, or even likely, that there should be *no* systematic relation at all between the traditional family system in Chinese culture and Mao's politico-economic statements, if their interpretation here in family terms is justified. Rather, it is important to consider the possibility that Mao's family conceptions, consciously or unconsciously, may be in important respects an *inversion* of official ones, and also the possibility (of great political significance) that some such inverted view may have been covertly but widely present in Chinese culture. The very extent of Chinese emphasis on officially formulating and propagating an ideal view of the family and emphasizing its reality makes it seem very likely, psychologically, that other ideas are being suppressed but do exist. This sort of possibility of inversion itself finds a partial expression in Mao's passage: the official or nominal relationship of the foreign intruder to the progeny is played

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down, though they bear the same name, "capitalism," as father and son bear one name. And a less specified, less formal relationship between "mother" and "sons"—old China and the two new classes—based on original biological or substantial unity, is played up.

Information about the possible nature of more covert and unofficial Chinese conceptions of the family may be gained in several ways. The official view may be compared, on the one hand, with information that indicates the nature of actual family behavior, and, on the other, with information on fantasies about family life and relationships (from interviews with informants, projective tests, novels, movies, and so on). Such approaches may be oriented or aided somewhat by careful consideration of the Chinese ideal picture, bearing in mind the findings of Western psychology to the effect that ideals are often polar to disvalued ideas and emotions that are being repressed.

The picture that emerges when this is done[24] is one of a family system in which, though the tie between father and son is socially emphasized, the emotional relationship is actually one of distance and apparently of hostility also, whereas mother and son are emotionally close.[25] There also appears to be considerable distance between husband and wife, certainly initially, as there has been no previous acquaintance before marriage. At an overt social level, marriage seems to involve the "intrusion" of the new wife into the organization of the husband's family and household, which she joins at marriage. However, to the wife (and later to her sons) the reverse may well seem true—her person is intruded upon by the husband, a stranger, and her whole organiza-

[24] Much of the view presented here was developed by the author and other members of the Chinese Group of Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures, under the general direction of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, and the specific leadership of Ruth Bunzel. See Ruth Bunzel, "Explorations in Chinese Culture," New York, Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures, 1950, mimeographed.

Some materials are also available in ordinary published sources that document some aspects of the view of the family given here. See, for example, Levy, *op.cit.*; Warner Muensterberger, "Orality and Dependence: Characteristics of Southern Chinese," in *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, Vol. III, New York, 1951; Martin C. Yang, *A Chinese Village*, New York, 1945.

[25] The importance of the mother-son relationship appears especially in stories of the careers of outstanding Chinese men, whose success is recurrently ascribed to maternal care and education, the father being dead or absent from the picture. Examples of this are Confucius and Mencius (K. S. Latourette, *The Chinese: Their History and Culture*, 3rd ed., New York, 1950, pp. 70, 71), Yo Fei, a famous Sung Dynasty general (a common historical legend told me by a Chinese informant), and, in modern times, Dr. Hu Shih (Meng Tsiang, "Herald of a New China," in Ting Ling, *Our Children and Others*, Hong Kong, 1947, p. 57).

There are also some corresponding traditional stories of fathers and daughters, especially women warriors whose skill was learned from their fathers (e.g., Mu Lan, Shih-San-Mei).

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tion of living is also intruded upon by him and by her mother-in-law, under whose sharp control and direction she now falls. These may be very severe experiences for Chinese girls, previously inexperienced and sheltered from explicit demands at home and, like Chinese generally, dependent on a certain personal distance and reserve for preserving emotional stability and security. The new wife, it seems, feels both weak and alone until she begins to gain allies and rise in importance by *herself* becoming the mother of sons and thus grasping the positive aspects of mother-son closeness or identification, as earlier she had suffered from its negative ones at the hands of her closely identified husband and mother-in-law. Yet this adjustment has its penalties, too, in that Chinese mothers feel, and may say, that they are using up themselves, their own life, in bearing and rearing children.

This latter view of sexual and family relationships—emphasizing feelings rather than ideals, and the maternal viewpoint rather than the paternal—does appear to align closely with the "family story" in Mao's passage as here analyzed.[26]

Finally, some of the information we possess on Mao's own family experience and conceptions seems to agree with this "family interpretation" of his adult politico-economic expression. It has already been shown that the manifest ideology of his political party fits this interpretation, especially its views on the emancipation of women. Also, it is stated by a writer aligned with the Chinese Communists that

> There is a . . . thread which can be traced through the lives of the intellectuals who have joined the Communists or broken from old feudal traditions into revolutionary activity—this struggle between father and son . . . and the enlightened attitude of the mother who fought for her child's right to self-determination.
>
> Mao Tse-tung was constantly at war with his petty-bourgeois father from earliest childhood and it was always his mother who defended him and aided his search for new culture and knowledge. Chou En-lai . . . speaks in glowing terms of the enlightened liberalism of his step-mother . . . who encouraged him to read books of many kinds, even revolutionary tracts, instead of keeping his nose to the old classics as his father demanded.[27]

[26] It might be objected that such a viewing of the Chinese family situation involves an extensive psychological interpretation of the basic information and is therefore of uncertain validity. It may be pointed out in reply that all, or nearly all, of our data on the Chinese family consist of communications received. These, like any communication, must be interpreted. To take at "face value" *is* an interpretation, not an avoidance of interpretation, and the simplicity of this sort of interpretation is no guarantee of accuracy in a complex situation.

[27] Meng Tsiang, "Herald of a New China," in Ting Ling, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

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This story of Mao (and the parallel for Chou) obviously follows the same pattern as the older stories on the relationship of mother and great son cited earlier, with two alterations. Here the type of education the mother promotes is new, and instead of a missing father there is described a struggle with the father. Mao is also quoted as himself describing this struggle and his mother's aid:

> My mother was a kind woman, generous and sympathetic, and ever ready to share what she had. She pitied the poor and often gave them rice when they came to ask for it during famines. But she could not do so when my father was present. He disapproved of charity. We had many quarrels in the home over this question.
>
> There were two "parties" in the family. One was my father, the Ruling Power. The Opposition was made up of myself, my mother, my brother, and sometimes even the laborer.[28]

Other fragments of information indirectly support this picture of mother-son identification and hostility to the father: Mao states that as a young man he was not interested in women, and never lived with the girl who was married to him by parental arrangement.[29] Some probable implications of this attitude may be suggested by an apparently parallel account of a young Communist guerrilla; in his case, a similar disinterest in women and rejection of his family-chosen bride were accompanied by violent hostility to his father, whom he surprised making love to another man's wife, and by many relationships of his own with older women who were motherly in their treatment of him while the young Communist was rather impersonally chivalrous toward them.[30]

Some Values of Such Analysis

This particular analysis was a product of curiosity aroused by the striking image of "twins from the womb of the old feudal society," in conjunction with an existing anthropological bias toward attention to family experience as generally having an important influence on many later and more specific patterns of behavior. Following up these leads has resulted in the working-out of a fairly complete family-rela-

[28] Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China*, New York, 1938, p. 113. Here Mao himself relates the political and family spheres explicitly, though laughingly, according to Snow.

Rather similarly, a popular Chinese Communist biographical work (*Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang ti chung-yao jen wu* [Important Persons in the Chinese Communist Party], Peiping, Min-chien Publishing Co., 1949) states that Mao's father disliked him and called him the "rebel" of the family, while his mother was agreeable and kind.

[29] Snow, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

[30] Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World*, New York, 1949, pp. 242ff.

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tionship interpretation of the original politico-economic passage which, as the evidence marshaled shows, is consistent with the original and with a considerable number and variety of established data and theoretical conceptions.

These accomplishments are gratifying as such to the author, and are presumably of value as a contribution to science, as is any establishment of relationships among apparently diverse phenomena. But many readers with more specific interest in either China or politics may find the approach used here and the sort of family materials it draws on unfamiliar and unattractive in comparison—and, necessarily, competition—with more usual sorts of political, economic, or historical interpretations. Therefore a brief attempt to make explicit some potential values of such analysis is in order.

In this particular analysis, viewing it somewhat generally, Mao's original account of political and economic events has been paralleled and supplemented by a newly constructed explicit account believed to be related to a fundamental but latent level or source of thought and expression in the original, and subsequently further information related to this new account has been presented. The general values of this procedure derive from the operations of comparison that are possible between two such accounts that are related and yet differ in certain important respects. The original account is complex; it deals with particular events from a historical-temporal point of view, with a largely "objective" factual attitude (whether accurate as to facts or not); it is importantly restricted in selection and emphasis; and it is concerned with rather highly differentiated categories of "political" and "economic" events; not much integration or generality is really achieved by whatever Marxist theory is applied as an overt conceptual frame. The interpretative account instead considers what Mao wrote as expressive communication about a certain area of (largely indirect) experience—not as facts, but as a viewing—and relates some of its features to a basic system of family experience, conceptions, and feelings, stating this in a form that is comparatively unitary, general, systematic, and a-temporal, or at least cyclic, rather than linearly historical.

More specifically and descriptively, this interpretative account thus takes note of the observer and writer, as well as of the situation he describes, and attempts to build up a positively stated systematic picture of certain important patterns of thought and feeling—about the viewing of political and economic events in relation to family experience, in this instance. This picture of patterns is not conceived as portraying such events in themselves. Perhaps there is no purely objective view of

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historical events as such—entirely lacking human interpretation; at any rate, the sort of picture drawn here can be used to move back toward and to illuminate the political sphere. Without going into a general examination of the question of how behavior is influenced by a person's unconscious ways of viewing, as against his conscious conceptions —a problem of great importance generally, and for political behavior specifically—we may point out a few ways in which recognition of such underlying patterns is significant. An awareness of the fact that certain specific ways of thinking and feeling about politics do exist, and are resonant with very highly charged experiences of childhood, enables us to expect specific emphases and de-emphases of political events different from what we would "naturally"—that is, on the basis of our own childhood experience—expect. In other words, we are helped to understand why events are seen as thus-and-so, and also the nature and intensity of related political emotions. This can be useful, even if we wish to disagree with such viewing and its consequences.

At the same time that the sort of interpretation promoted here thus helps us to understand how Mao is viewing what he is writing about, it is also helpful in gaining some understanding of things he is *not* writing about, on which no direct data are available, because of the systematic nature of the patterns here discerned and outlined. A political area neglected or suppressed in Mao's own writing can be investigated to some extent by considering what the corresponding situation at the family level may be, investigating this on the basis of available data and known patterns, and projecting the significance of the findings back to the political sphere. This might be important in estimating the basic significance of some matter that overtly is played down—such as feelings of rivalry or resentment toward the Soviet Union—or in judging a probable interpretation of and reaction to a proposed policy of the United States. And, most importantly, such possibilities hold even for contingent estimates of future events, as the family model of thinking is, though not total and final, more comprehensive and less temporally bound than the record of past political events. For example, in estimating what the developmental tendencies of the Chinese Communist regime and its leaders will be, one can consider that acquisition of political power and control, after a long period in opposition, is like changing from the position of a rebellious son to that of a father. Then one can meaningfully inquire, "What occurs in the Chinese family situation—or in other analogues to it—when a formerly rebellious son becomes head of the household himself?" and project the tendencies found to the political scene. In all such operations, it is also important that the interpretative account developed here is more unitary and in-

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clusive than are more specialized and differentiated views. That is, such an account tends to provide a single framework within which both political and economic aspects of a situation can be viewed, rather than developing differentiated and perhaps conflicting analyses of events and tendencies.

On the other hand, this sort of analysis may be of little value in determining specifically what Mao will openly say or do at a particular time and place. That is not its object, or the function for which its characteristics suit it. Such analysis attempts to develop a coherent, rather comprehensive, and systematic account of thought and emotion underlying political behavior. Estimates of basic tendencies may well be based on such an account, yet individual events be uncertain or even seem contradictory to the account. In a specific situation a single factor, temporarily powerful, may be determining against a general trend. Or overt political speech, and temporarily even action, may be counter to what the account, considering the covert as well as overt, presents as the fundamental nature of a situation.

This has been a study of a specific political statement, interpreted in relation to certain conceptions and feelings about family relationships that are believed to derive from childhood experience. The approach, however, is believed to be widely applicable to other political expression and activity, even where familial reference is not as manifest in the original. It represents generally a pointing-out of behavior and expression as such—that is, as involving human interpretation—and a referring-back from a complex, specialized, differentiated, and intellectualized area to an earlier, more general and undifferentiated, though systematic, and more immediately emotional, area of experience. As noted earlier, this is like adding theory to particular observations, to some degree. Its scientific advantages include the values of theory generally—increase of order, unity, system and, with these, predictability.

To employ such an approach seems especially worth while at present, when the social sciences generally are characterized by specialization and division of areas of knowledge, of facts and observers, and of data and theory. Its practical advantages involve possibilities of understanding *what* logic and *what* feelings are being expressed politically, at a time when political psychologizing, which is necessary and indispensable, often still operates at the naïve level of dichotomous classification of political thinking as "irrational"—someone else's—or "rational"—our own. Some such change is necessary if we are ever to develop broad policy and long-range plans instead of alternating between a somnolent belief that all's well that's quiet, and a frantic patching-up—in our limited terms—of overt manifestations of international trouble.

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THE MIDDLE EAST AS A SUBORDINATE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM*

By LEONARD BINDER

I

RECENT developments in the study of international politics reflect two major emphases. One comprises a variety of attempts at systematization and stresses the "frame of reference" approach;[1] the other seeks specific knowledge of national policies in greater detail and stresses the "area studies" approach.[2] Theoretically, the first explains international politics in terms of broad generalizations applicable to all international actors insofar as they conform to an ideal model or depart therefrom in a calculable manner. The second seeks to understand international politics in terms of the relationship of foreign policy to the total social and historical context from which it emerges.[3] This article is an attempt to find a middle ground between these two emphases.

The variety of attempts at systematization are in the main derivations from or modifications of balance-of-power theories, but contemporary interest has focused primarily upon the notion of power rather than balance.[4] There is another tendency to substitute patterns of interrelationship of varying degrees of intricacy for the notion of balance.[5] Implied in this theoretical approach is the hypothesis that such patterns of interrelationship (sometimes called "system") are a function of the distribution of power among states (sometimes called "structure").[6] While

* EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was written prior to the formation in February 1958 of the United Arab Republic and the Arab Federation. The author has appended a brief discussion of these developments in the light of his analysis of the Middle Eastern international system.

[1] For a discussion of some of the issues involved, see Fred A. Sondermann, "The Study of International Relations," *World Politics*, X, No. 1 (October 1957), p. 102; and Kenneth W. Thompson, "Toward a New Theory of International Relations," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX, No. 3 (September 1955), pp. 733-46.

[2] Despite Sondermann's views, it seems to me that a strong rationale for this approach is presented in Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, *The Dynamics of International Relations*, New York, 1956.

[3] To be distinguished from Sondermann's "freight car" category.

[4] Especially Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, New York, 1948.

[5] Especially and most recently, Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Relations*, New York, 1957.

[6] See William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, *United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955*, Washington, D.C., 1956, especially Ch. XVI.

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system/structure theories are an improvement upon the crude notion of multilateral power maximization through a restricted number of diplomatic-military gambits, they lack the refinements necessary for dealing with "aberrent" action unrelated to power. One of the reasons for this lack of refinement is overemphasis upon US-USSR relations, an overemphasis usually summed up in the loose term "bipolarity."

An underlying assumption of most such approaches is that international politics is total and global. This assumption is based upon the possible character of modern warfare, and is therefore potential rather than actual. Insofar as the security considerations of the United States and the USSR have no territorial limit, international politics is global and total for these states. But the great-power view of world politics is not necessarily reciprocated by the lesser powers. While neither the great-power nor the smaller-power view tells the whole story, the view of the smaller powers is sustained by the development of a situation of mutual deterrence. Insofar as a situation of mutual deterrence obstructs great-power intervention, the smaller powers are free to act. Hence international politics is not global or necessarily total for the lesser powers.

The consequence of the non-global character of international politics for system/structure theories is clear. Any system or pattern of scientific rules which adequately describes US-USSR relations must fail to explain the politics of the uncommitted states. All that such theories may do for politics that are not oriented to the cold war is to define the conditions under which they exist. Of course, this is only a technical limitation, for if we understand power in its broadest sense and if we make no artificial distinction between domestic and international politics when considering system, the same general principles will be applicable to the uncommitted states. But it must be stressed that the identity of the principle from which systems are derived does not require that all systems so derived be identical. Thus it is the purpose of this article to establish a link between system/structure theory and the area studies approach by positing that we are confronted not with a single global international system, but with several in a variety of relationships.

Thus far our problem has been approached from the side of system/structure theory; but there are difficulties on the side of area studies as well. The major problem is the possible conflict between the theoretical universality of the social science disciplines and the delimitation of a group of countries for special study. Do area studies comprise a merely convenient or practical method, but entail a nevertheless arbitrary subdivision of the subject matter of the social sciences? One of the pur-

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poses of this article is to suggest that area studies may be justified in terms of a discipline; or, rather, to assert that it is both possible and necessary to justify area studies and to delimit areas in terms of the discipline by means of which an inquiry is to be pursued. Obviously, this means that the "Middle East," for example, may not signify the same thing to a political scientist and an anthropologist; but that is less harmful than area dilettantism. Furthermore, the burden of proof that an area exists rests with the area specialist, and must be referred to substantive problems which cannot be solved without the concept of area.

Just how many international systems exist, and the precise nature of their diverse relationships, are problems for area specialists and political scientists to work out together. In what follows, it will be assumed that there exists a system of US-USSR relations characterized by bipolarity in the sense that there are only two actors of importance involved. If this assumption is granted, it will be readily agreed that this bipolar system is the dominant one in the world today, and that the relationship of other systems to it is that of subordination—in the sense that changes in the major system will have a greater effect on a minor system than the reverse. The Middle East alone will be used as an example of a subordinate system because of the writer's interests and limitations.

The substantive problem which concerns us here is the inapplicability of the theory of bipolarity to Middle Eastern international politics. The term "bipolarity" has been defined above as characterizing an international system in which there are only two actors. To this definition must be added the qualification that the persistence of the system is due to the roughly equal power of both actors.[7] In what sense may bipolarity characterize a universal system?—i.e., in what sense can bipolarity explain the international politics of the Middle East? Two possible meanings of bipolarity present themselves, the first emphasizing structure and the second emphasizing system: (1) where the power of the United States and the USSR is in each case very much greater than the power of all other states, and where we are unable to ascertain whether or by how much the power of one exceeds the other, and where our estimates of power in each case may err in either direction by the same amount, and where the difference between actual and estimated power is greater than the sum of all uncommitted power;[8] (2) where the dominant factors of international relations are the very great power of the United States and the USSR and their rivalry, which leads each to attempt to

[7] See Kaplan, *op.cit.*, p. 40 (the fourth "condition").
[8] This is similar to Kaplan's "tight bipolar system," *ibid.*, pp. 43f.

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counter every action of the other regardless of its locus or circumstances, and where the inferiority in power or the disunity of the uncommitted states renders them unable to resist effectively this pattern of great-power action.[9]

The systematic consequence of the first conception of bipolarity is the ability of the great powers to disregard the uncommitted states; and suggests that any attempt of one of the great powers to secure a foothold in an uncommitted state is a manifestation of a gratuitous imperialism. The structural consequence of the second conception is that the approximate equality of the power of the United States and the USSR is precarious, and so the uncommitted states may not be ignored.[10] Neither conception is fully explanatory of recent great-power policies in the Middle East, and if the second seems more accurate at present, it does not explain the success or failure of particular great-power actions.

From the point of view of the uncommitted states, neither of these conceptions represents a desideratum: their goal is to break bipolarity, or to insulate their own affairs against its effects, or to make use of it to gain their own ends.[11] This final alternative suggests the temporary reversal of the subordinate relationship of the Middle Eastern system, but our preferred explanation is that bipolarity characterizes only US-USSR relations and not their relations with third powers.

II

While historically minded persons will find no difficulty in tracing the evolution of Russian interests and aspirations in the general area of the straits and the Persian Gulf, they will be unable to explain the comparative inactivity of the Soviet Union in the Middle East from, say, the end of 1948 until mid-1955.[12] As evidence of American interest in the Middle East, the historian must be satisfied with the activities of a few devoted missionaries until the middle of World War II.[13] From 1945 on, the United States took an increasingly keen interest in the area. Since 1950 the United States has concentrated on organizing the defense

[9] Similar to, but not quite the same as, Kaplan's "loose bipolar system," *ibid.*, p. 36.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 40 (the fifth "condition").
[11] The final alternative contradicts Kaplan's fifth condition cited above, as well as his rules 7, 9, and 10, *ibid.*, pp. 38-39. This difference is an additional reason for the present writer's preference for the concept of subordinate systems to that of "loose" bipolarity.
[12] Walter Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, New York, 1956, pp. 260f.
[13] E. A. Speiser, *The United States and the Near East*, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1950.

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of the Middle East, while renewed Soviet activity seems to have developed only after the initial and limited American success in bringing the Baghdad Pact into existence.

Soviet action in the Middle East to the end of 1948 was apparently aimed at deriving the maximum of territorial gain and political influence during the disorganized circumstances following the war. Subsequent American efforts to organize the defense of the area were rationalized by reference to aggressive Soviet behavior during the preceding period, but such efforts could also be related to the goal of sustaining British influence in the Middle East to the maximum possible degree, or to the principle of collective self-defense outside of the United Nations. Against a background of Soviet inaction and wide acceptance of the notion of bipolarity, American rationalizations have been unconvincing. We cannot know the reason for Soviet inaction until 1955, though several possibilities present themselves. The Soviets, no less than we, were concerned elsewhere, in Europe and in the Far East. The Soviets may have considered the Middle East of little importance. They may have judged the Middle East quite unready for the nationalistic-*cum*-Communist ideological offensive which worked so well elsewhere in Asia. Or they may simply have preferred to rely on the anti-imperialistic attitude of Middle Eastern leaders as sufficient to preclude the success of Western efforts.

Of more importance than the reason for Soviet inaction in the Middle East until mid-1955 is the circumstance under which Soviet activity was resumed with great intensity. The limited success achieved by the United States in the signing of the Baghdad Pact has already been mentioned. Aside from a series of dire warnings, the initial Soviet reaction was nil.[14] What elicited a far stronger reaction was the development of an important breach in Arab unity over the Pact. Thus, the Soviet Union was encouraged to act in the Middle East not primarily as a consequence of an American success, but as the result of the provision of favorable intra-area circumstances.[15] These circumstances—i.e., the Egyptian-Iraqi dispute—were the indirect result of wholly indigenous conditions characterizing the Middle Eastern international system.

More recent action by the United States in Jordan and with regard to Syria has tended to fall into the same pattern.[16] This tendency has not

[14] E.g., *Pravda* of March 8, 1955, cited in Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, *Events in the Middle East*, Washington, D.C., 1957, p. 9.

[15] See Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi, *Middle East Crisis*, Penguin Special, 1957, pp. 52-53.

[16] Re Jordan: Department of State, *US Policy in the Middle East*, September 1956-June 1957 (Documents), p. 69, "News Conference of Secretary of State Dulles, April

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been complete, however, as exemplified by the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Doctrine was a reaction to a Soviet success, but its implementation was not at all suited to the circumstances provided by the indigenous system of Middle Eastern relations. The Doctrine was directed against a hypothetical act of Soviet aggression, so that adherence to its goals by some Middle Eastern states may be likened to an act of pure devotion. For those who saw no threat of overt Soviet aggression, and who accepted the general idea of bipolarity, the Doctrine was interpreted as an act of imperialism.

If overt Soviet aggression was considered unlikely in the Middle East, intra-area aggression and subversion had become more likely, if only because the Suez invasion nullified the Tri-partite Declaration of 1950, destroyed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954,[17] and gravely weakened the Anglo-Iraqi arrangement under the Baghdad Pact. Unilateral American support for the Tri-partite Declaration was both unconvincing and inadequate.[18] Developments in Jordan, however, presented the United States with its first opportunity for limited but effective action aimed not at "constitutional" change of the Middle Eastern structure, but at its preservation. Support of King Husain of Jordan by all manner of unconventional means, without eliciting any formal declaration from his government and without obtruding our disproportionately great power in the area, was at least temporarily successful.

This successful example of playing the Middle Eastern game by its own rules was followed more recently by a perhaps typical example of American exaggeration. The temporary stabilization of the Hashimite Jordan regime was accompanied by some revulsion of Saudi feeling against too-close association with Egypt. After a long cold war of their own, the Hashimite and Saudi houses began to discover a common interest in the institution of kingship and the aristocratic orientation of their regimes. When the extent of the Syrian commitment to the Soviet Union became better known (and perhaps increased as a result of frustrations in Jordan), the United States attempted a vigorous counteraction. The idea was ineptly phrased as a "quarantine" of Syria

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23, 1957." See also note 63, *ibid.* On April 30, 1957, six US naval vessels of an amphibious force visited Beirut: "Developments of the Quarter," *Middle East Journal*, XI, No. 3 (Summer 1957), p. 286. Re Syria: see *New York Times*, August 17, 1957, *et seq.*, especially August 21 dispatch by D. A. Schmidt, ". . . the US by itself cannot do anything. . . . It is up to the governments of the Middle East . . ." (p. 1 in nearly all cases).

[17] The British government still insists that the treaty is valid.

[18] The latest reaffirmation of the Tri-partite Declaration stressed its applicability to the Israeli-Arab dispute only; Department of State, *op.cit.*, p. 65, "News Conference Statement by President Eisenhower, April 17, 1957."

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by neighboring states, but the slogan was never defined.[19] In spite of the wide popularity of the notion of Arab unity, publicity was given to a policy of dividing the Arab world while an American representative was canvassing support in the area. In view of subsequent events, especially the Syrian rejection of King Saud's offer to mediate the Syro-Turkish dispute, it would seem that the "quarantine" policy was out of keeping not with the inclination of Middle Eastern governmental relationships, but with their capabilities.

It is risky to generalize from so few examples, but certain suggestions present themselves for further study. From these examples it seems that initiative must be left to Middle Eastern states themselves. It would also seem that great-power involvement within the Middle Eastern system must be as unobtrusive as possible if it is to be successful. And, as might be expected in view of the low level of power in the area, action to maintain the status quo will be more successful than revisionism.

Domestic politics in the Middle East, as elsewhere, are of great importance in determining the nature of its system. Here, however, the nature of domestic political issues is distinctive, and their bearing on international developments unique. It is fairly well known that the foreign policies of various Middle Eastern countries are designed to have a maximum of impact upon the domestic affairs of target countries within the system. Political and constitutional instability, coupled with the attraction of Islam and Arabism as political symbols, make the direct interventionist appeal a rewarding circumvention of the frequently inadequate or inefficient diplomatic process. However, the degree to which non-area states may engage in these tactics is strictly limited by the anti-imperialist bias of Middle Eastern political leadership. Furthermore, what may be done in the name of Islam or Arabism may not be done in the name of Western security or even Middle Eastern security. If the withdrawal of aid for the Aswan High Dam project was directed at weakening the Nasir regime domestically,[20] the move clearly backfired, and demonstrated the limitations upon non-area states attempting to play by Middle Eastern rules.

It would appear that the existence of a bipolar system, or the counterbalancing of the United States and the Soviet Union, cannot explain all post-World War II developments in the Middle East. The fact is that the most vigorous of American efforts were pressed at the very

[19] *New York Times*, August 23, 1957, p. 1, dispatch from Washington by D. A. Schmidt, in which the term "isolation of Syria" is used. "Quarantine" was the revised version of this slogan.

[20] Wint and Calvocoressi, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

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time of the most complete Soviet inaction. The failure of American policy was not due to Soviet counteraction, but to indigenous circumstances militating against the acceptance of American overtures at their face value. These same circumstances explain why King Saud could accept American aid, could attempt to construct an anti-Egyptian Arab alignment, could welcome—if not accept—the Eisenhower Doctrine; and yet support Syria against the United States and Turkey at the United Nations. These same circumstances explain why Israel may act against structural change in the Middle East, and Turkey may not. And, on the brighter side, they explain why Communist arms sales to Egypt and Syria probably will not lead to the incorporation of these states in the Soviet bloc.

It is erroneous to look upon the Middle East as being in the "middle" between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is clear that the great-power relationship has an important bearing on Middle Eastern affairs, but the latter may not be understood wholly or even primarily in terms of the major international system. If power were to be likened to rays of light, we might say that extra-area power is "refracted" when projected into the Middle Eastern element. If we are ever successful in quantifying power for purposes of international political analysis, we shall have to give that power separate coefficients in each system. The concept of subordinate systems complicates the problem of quantifying power, but it also complicates the problem of reducing international system to a set of rules. Progress toward the latter goal, if it is at all attainable, must first depend upon identifying the unique characteristics of each system.

III

A preliminary and perennial problem is that of defining the area of the Middle East. Official definitions such as that of a foreign ministry or a United Nations body are arbitrary and meaningless in terms of a disciplinary approach. Possible criteria for delimitation of the area in terms of the study of international affairs might be the existence of regional organizations or defense pacts, but this is to neglect the close interrelationship of domestic and international politics, to take no account of power, and to fail to reflect conflicting intra-area policies. Elsewhere the existence of a religious opposition to nationalism has been cited by the present writer as a criterion for delimiting the Middle East in terms of the study of comparative government, and this characteristic was supplemented by reference to the shorter colonial experience of

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Middle Eastern states.[21] On this basis the Middle East proper stretches from Libya to Iran, with fringe areas including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Maghrib, and a core area including the Arab states and Israel. This definition may be allowed to stand for present purposes, with some refinement to be added in terms of the applicability throughout this area of the characteristics to be discussed.

With the exception of Iran, all parts of the Middle East proper—the Arab states, Israel, and modern Turkey—were once part of the Ottoman Empire. They share disparate elements of the formerly common Ottoman legal system, and vestiges of the old millet system. Wherever a landed aristocracy exists, it can usually trace its roots back to Ottoman times. All of these states have a common administrative tradition from which they have only partially departed. Except for Israel and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon, all are susceptible to a common Pan-Islamic ideal. Because of the location of Mecca and Medina within Saudi Arabia, that state may perhaps most advantageously manipulate the symbols of Islam. Pan-Arabism ties all these states, except for Turkey and Israel. Because of the middle-class appeal of Pan-Arabism, the monarchical states are at a disadvantage in using the symbols of Arab nationalism in their foreign policies. Until the recent imposition of political boundaries upon the area, communication was comparatively unobstructed for those who desired or were compelled to travel or maintain commercial contacts throughout the empire. Despite administrative divisions and varying degrees of autonomy in outlying or inaccessible districts, the clergy of each faith comprised a single cohesive group.

The political boundaries which have been established in the area have little historical significance and frequently less ethnical validity. Moreover, these boundaries are often associated with imperialist intervention, and consequently lack legitimacy. The existence of such boundaries over a relatively short period of time has tended to fix them in a legal and political sense for the present, but they must be recognized as inherently unstable. If they are to be retained for any purposeful reason, such policy will require positive action.

A phenomenon which may be directly related to the common political-territorial heritage of all these states is that nearly all are in some degree revisionist. Those that are not—Libya, the Sudan, and the Lebanon—are relatively unimportant or inactive; while Iran, like Turkey the residuum of a once great empire, is at least potentially revisionist.

[21] "Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Middle East Governments," *American Political Science Review*, LI, No. 3 (September 1957), pp. 651-52.

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Nearly universal revisionism has resulted from the usual incongruity of nation and territorial state, from the persistent conception of certain parts of the area—the Gezira, the south Syrian Desert, Palestine, "geographical" Syria—as territorial units, and from the fact that none of the Middle Eastern states was a "winner" in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Under these circumstances, diplomatic relations are more than usually tense and suspicious. Alliance is impossible except where states have no common border (Egypt and Syria) or an unimportant one (Iraq and Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia). The Turco-Iraqi alliance is therefore an exception to be explained in terms of the provision of a wider framework involving the major system, and in terms of the peculiar domestic political position in Iraq. The only other basis for alliance is a wide one, involving mutual self-denial through acceptance of the status quo. The Arab League Pact was diverted to this purpose by Egyptian policy, and thereby earned general Arab support and even the capacity to recruit non-charter members. The negative character of the alliance was demonstrated in the lack of Arab concert during the Palestine war.

In view of this nearly universal revisionism, alliances with non-area powers are extremely suspect and highly unstable, because area interests generally receive a higher priority than non-area interests. It would seem that any attempt by an extra-area state to establish close relations with two or more Middle Eastern states which have themselves been unable or unwilling to establish a bilateral alliance will be doomed to failure. Such seems to have been the fate of the proposed Middle East Defense Organization. Insofar as Iraq was concerned, the Baghdad Pact was more important as a revision of Anglo-Iraqi relations than as establishing close Turkish-Iraqi relations. Obviously, Turkey will play but a minor role in determining Baghdad Pact policy, and it remains to be seen what kind of intra-area co-operation will result from the recent change in emphasis from military to political defense.

Another consequence of the former political unity of the area is the ease with which domestic politics may affect affairs in neighboring countries. Recently even Iran has grown closer to former Ottoman territories in this regard. The policies of Musaddiq undoubtedly affected the Egyptian position on the Suez Canal, while the fate of Faruq had its implications for the Shah of Iran. Turkish nationalist policies have had a tremendous impact throughout the Middle East, and not least in Iran. The fate of Islam in Turkey will elicit responses in all Muslim countries, as did the suppression of the Muslim Brethren in Egypt. Among the Arab states, it is well understood that an Egyptian editorial

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will threaten the stability of the Jordanian government, while a Syrian military coup will encourage Iraqi politicians or terrify Lebanese leaders. In the confrontation of Israel and the Arab states this characteristic is less well defined, but domestic power shifts that portend alterations in the Middle Eastern international structure have an immediate effect on Israeli policy, as the treatment of Jews throughout the area affects domestic Israeli affairs.

With only partial exceptions, the power structure of the area must be reckoned in terms of population and foreign aid. Generally speaking, the entire area is characterized by profound weakness, governmental instability, and administrative inefficiency. The general lack of resources, low level of economic development, and low level of education are the fundamental causes of this weakness. Turkey, which is best endowed in regard to nearly all of these factors, has about the largest population in the area and has received the largest amounts of foreign military and economic aid.[22] Turkey is the strongest Middle Eastern power. Egypt, because of the size of its population (about equal to that of Turkey), would be of comparable power were it better endowed with mineral resources, were its population better educated and in better health, and were it the recipient of larger amounts of foreign aid and technical assistance. Israel has a small population, but has the best-educated population, a fairly efficient administration, and a relatively stable government. Israel has the highest standard of living in the area and has been the recipient of the largest per capita amounts of foreign aid. Israeli industry and technology are relatively advanced for this area as well. Israel probably stands next to Turkey in power. The population of Iran is the third largest in the Middle East (excluding Pakistan) but this population is spread over the largest land area and is characterized by much disunity. The Iranian situation is much the same as that of Egypt, except that it has a smaller population and has received larger amounts of foreign aid. Iraq, with a somewhat larger population than Syria, and having always enjoyed greater military and technical assistance, is the more powerful. More recently the expansion of Iraq's petroleum production has provided an adequate financial basis for economic development, so that Iraq may grow rapidly in power. Jordan has a small population, but, until recently, its power could be measured in terms of the British-trained, led, equipped, and subsidized Arab Legion. The efficiency of this organization has probably fallen since its last test in 1948, so that it

[22] "United States Aid to the Middle East, 1945-1957," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, VIII, No. 11 (November 1957), pp. 385f.

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may be considered a sufficient achievement if the Legion can keep order in Jordan and sustain King Husain.

If it is granted that foreign aid and population are the key elements in the Middle Eastern power structure, then it follows that the scope of foreign intervention in the area is wide. Given the general weakness of the area, relatively large amounts of both material and technical aid can develop a temporary superiority of power even in such a state as Jordan. If such power could be turned to the purposes of an extra-area state, it might disrupt the entire Middle Eastern system. On the other hand, no Middle Eastern government need become the instrument of an extra-area state because extra-area power may not be transmitted at full strength from the dominant bipolar system, nor can it become such an instrument because of the orientation of domestic Middle Eastern politics. In other words, it is possible for an extra-area state to help a Middle Eastern state achieve its own ends, but unlikely that an extra-area state can compel a Middle Eastern state to serve extra-area interests. Moreover, even in helping Middle Eastern states to achieve their own goals when these coincide with extra-area goals, the scope of foreign intervention is limited by the greater ease in maintaining the status quo than in changing it.

If the Suez invasion illustrates anything besides poor military execution and even worse political direction of the military, it illustrates the limited ability of extra-area states to commit power to the Middle East and the limited period during which such a commitment may be maintained. The time limit may be important, for it determines that, in the long run, the crucial power factor will be population (and possibly petroleum) rather than foreign aid. But this eventuality would require the complete insulation of the Middle Eastern system from all external influence—and such a situation is hardly conceivable at present. A more immediate consequence of the wide, if nevertheless limited, scope of external influence is the near-equality of the role of each Middle Eastern state within the subordinate system, limited only by domestic political circumstances. These factors add up to an inherent instability of system, suggesting further that, should external vigilance be relaxed or a domestic (and therefore inaccessible) upheaval take place, violent changes will occur throughout the area. It is more than likely that extra-area states will be unable to control or direct these changes because of the negative character of their influence and because in some cases there may be no widely accepted political authority through whom such influence may be channelled. For the present these questions are academic, because the tendency in recent years has been for foreign influ-

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ence (of both the United States and the USSR) to gain in strength and further to support the status quo.

National security may be the irreducible minimum goal of any foreign policy, but the nature of the security problem in the Middle East is only vaguely related to the security problem in the major international system. Certainly, the concept of security in a nuclear war is so far beyond the scope of Middle Eastern governments as to be nearly meaningless. Even among the members of the Baghdad Pact, only Turkey seems to have given the problem some thought. In a more concrete if less humane approach to "nuclear security," we may say that the nature of the security problem in the Middle East differs from that in the major international system because of the relatively low public capital investment in these countries and the small portion of the population resident in urban centers. Middle Eastern countries do not make good targets for nuclear missiles.

To be meaningful for purposes of analyzing the international relations of the Middle East, the dominant security consideration must be related to actual foreign policies and hence to "local" problems. The Middle Eastern security consideration must be predicated upon the continuance of the present system. That is to say, national security in the Middle East means the security of existing individual states, and not the security of the free world or of Islam or of Arabdom.

There are some who argue for an Arab national interest in terms of an Arab nationalist ideology.[23] This argument suggests either that the interest of the Arab peoples is opposed to that of their governments in most cases or that an ideal is in some manner an interest, and that an interest may exist quite apart from benefiting any specific group of individuals. However that may be, the notion of an Arab national interest, insofar as it insists upon the political unity of the Arab states and possible territorial expansion at the expense of Israel, Turkey, and Iran, is a threat to rather than a substitute for the security interest of all existing states in the Middle East.

By relating the security consideration to existing states and by distinguishing it from at least one constitutionally transcendent ideology, it is a simple matter further to relate that consideration to the interest of a ruling elite. While the popular support for existing governments varies from state to state, it is clear that those governments, politicians, administrators, military officers, and allied groups have the greatest stake in continued independence. If this point of view is pressed far

[23] H. Z. Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1956, pp. 84f.

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enough, we may find in some cases that the threat to the security of the state is as much internal as it is external. This seems to be the case in Iran and most of the Arab states.

The domestic political process in these states has an important bearing on the manner in which this kind of security is pursued.[24] The dominant characteristics of this process are the stringent limits upon access to or participation in decision-making and the erratic uncontrolled progress of social mobilization. The latter characteristic results in short-lived and disoriented political or interest organization and correlative erraticism in political action, frequently punctuated by disjointed acts of violence.[25] Lacking popular support in most cases, and often lacking reliable information, Middle Eastern governments are at a loss to provide against sudden upheavals. One of the greatest weaknesses of these governments in the last analysis is the lack of means to satisfy increasing demands for jobs and higher standards of living, or demands by the military for better equipment and a larger establishment, or both of these at the same time. Problems such as these induce Middle Eastern governments to accept foreign aid, not primarily as a means of strengthening or developing their country, or as a means of guaranteeing their security against extra-area aggression, but as a means of staying in power.

IV

Within the Arab core of the Middle East the preceding generalizations apply with the greatest relevance. The overlapping of domestic and foreign politics, the relative equality of all international actors, and the paradoxical inadequacy of the diplomatic process are all enhanced by the common ideal of pan-Arabism. While certain recent developments permit us to talk of groupings of Arab states—the Three Kings group and the Cairo-Damascus entente—subsequent events have demonstrated that such groupings have not basically altered the Middle Eastern system.

It is among the Arab states that the equality of role of each participant is most out of keeping with the facts of international power. How else can we explain the rivalry of Egypt with its 23,000,000 people and Iraq with only 5,000,000? How else can we explain the threat that King Abdallah posed for Syria? The posture of individual Arab states may

[24] See Dankwart A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Princeton, N.J., Center of International Studies, 1956.

[25] See George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucian W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX, No. 4 (December 1955), pp. 1024-27.

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change: Jordan from Abdallah's aggressiveness to Husain's defensiveness, Iraq from pressing for unity with Syria to acting against Syrian attempts to subvert its government, Saudi Arabia from close association with Egypt to a cool, correct relationship and from financial support of Syria to financial support of Jordan; but all remain as though fixed in place because of domestic political circumstances, because of extra-area influence, and because Israel exists in their midst. Intra-Arab rivalries have, therefore, an air of unreality about them, and many an ingenious diplomatic program has been cast on the trash heap.[26]

There is another sense in which four of the Arab states are equal. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia can each make an impressive claim to be the political nucleus about which the future inclusive Arab nation-state will form. Egypt's claims are based upon its larger population, more important contemporary cultural achievements, and its recent international successes. Syria can assert its conception and early nurturing of the Arab movement, its provision of a throne for King Faisal ibn Husain, and its historical position as the locus of the "Arab" caliphate. Iraq's claims stem from its early achievement of independence, its superior power in the Fertile Crescent, its initiation of political pan-Arabism after World War I, and its not inglorious history as the center of the Abbasid caliphate. Saudi Arabia is, however, the original Arab homeland, the seat of the "Rightly Guided" caliphate, and the center of the Islamic religion. Neither Lebanon, nor Jordan, nor Libya, nor the Sudan can make similar claims, but all are quite content with the coexistence of these rival aspirations.

Despite the rough equality of role among the Arab states, the pattern of their interaction is marked both by variations in intensity and by incomplete multilateralism. The greatest intensity exists in the relations of the Fertile Crescent countries. Egypt has become a full participant in this intense pattern as a result of the conflict with Israel and Israel's logical choice of Egypt rather than Jordan as the country to defeat, as a result of the disagreement with Jordan over the future of the Arab portions of Palestine, and as a result of recent Egyptian diplomatic successes in Syria. The source of the greater intensity of Fertile Crescent relations is the more extreme applicability of the earlier generalizations

[26] E.g., Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Joint Command announced March 6, 1955; Five-Year Egyptian-Saudi Defense Treaty announced October 27, 1955; Jordan-Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian "Unified Frontier" plan announced March 23, 1956; Egyptian-Saudi-Yemeni Five-Year Defense Pact announced April 21, 1956; Lebanese-Jordanian co-ordinated Defense Pact announced May 21, 1956; similar Jordanian-Syrian arrangement of May 31, 1956; and the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian agreement of January 19, 1957, to subsidize Jordan.

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on boundaries, revisionism, domestic politics, and pan-Arabism. These same factors determine that the intensity of relationship is almost completely multilateral in character. Libya and the Sudan participate in this system only through their relations with Egypt, and these relations are for the most part bilateral. Saudi Arabian policy among the Arab states has been marked by both astute caution and a curiously anachronistic element. Saudi caution is based upon the inability of the Saudi government to project its power beyond its own borders, and upon the extreme vulnerability of the existing social and political structure of that country to the influences of middle-class Arab leadership in the more "modern" states. The anachronistic element enters in the tendency of the king to utilize internationally the quasi-diplomatic methods which have served the House of Saud so well domestically. The domestic success of these methods is due to the combination of dignity, honesty, and power maintained by the king; but their lack of international success is due to the absence of international power. Saudi Arabia is, of course, vitally interested in the Fertile Crescent, and for a time its foreign policy was dominated by the dynastic feud between the houses of Hashim and Saud. But the intensity of Saudi action internationally has been notably less than that of the others (except for Libya, the Sudan, and the Yemen), first because the Hashimite states were dominated by the common British ally, later because Egypt was better able to accomplish Saudi purposes in maintaining the division of the Fertile Crescent, and more recently because of the recognition of common interests with the Hashimite states. Recent developments in Syria, perhaps coupled with some pressure from the United States, have prodded King Saud to attempt too much. His failure to mediate in the Syro-Turkish dispute will probably result in the more usual lower level of international activity. The preceding analysis suggests that Egypt is the hub of Arab relations, and the essential element in the success or failure of extra-area policy. It further suggests, in contradiction of the news reports which have followed King Saud's visit to the United States, that a successful Middle Eastern policy may not be built on that king's prestige.

Turkey, Iran, and Israel stand in a special relationship to the Arab "core" of the Middle East. Turkey retains the aspect of a former imperialist overlord, an aspect which is enhanced by Turkey's insistence upon its European status. Prevalent anti-Western attitudes involving the use of the slogans of neutralism and anti-imperialism may be applied against Turkey with little shifting of ideological gears. Turkish membership in NATO and the official secularism of the state are further

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distinguishing characteristics. The total effect of these special features has been to hamstring the operation of dominant Turkish power in Middle Eastern affairs.

During the postwar period, the Turkish government has made several overtures to the Arab states with a view to engaging them in closer relations. For a long while the United States hoped to use Turkey as the cohesive element in organizing the area for defense. Except for Iraq, which has always been somewhat more favorably inclined toward Turkey, the response of the Arab states has been negative. And well it might be, too; for a continuing Middle Eastern problem is how to prevent renewed Turkish domination of or intervention in Arab affairs. The global problem of security against the Soviet Union runs a poor second to this local structural problem.

The systematic tendency of the Arab states has been to exclude Turkish influence, and this was matched earlier by Turkish aloofness from Arab problems, Turkish recognition of Israel, and the relation of Turkish security to that of Western Europe. The change in Turkish policy was due to American predilection, and was based upon calculations related to the global conflict in the major system and not the peculiar characteristics of the subordinate Middle Eastern system. Obviously, this policy failed, and for good reason, but it established the special role of Turkey in the Middle East. That special role is one of bridging the gap between the major and the subordinate systems, for the position of Turkey has a good deal of ambiguity. The imperialist epithet may be applicable to Turkey in a historical sense, but not in terms of the immediate post-World War I policies of nationalist Turkey. Turkey, too, can be seen as a new nation-state pointing the way to a successful political renaissance for other new non-European states. It is the latter aspect of Turkish history that would have to be stressed for Turkey to play a more effective role in Middle Eastern affairs.

Iran also has a special relationship to the Arab states, and it, too, tends to bridge the gap between the major and the minor systems. There is no tendency for Iranian policies to be construed as imperialist; usually Iran has been the most abject of those suffering imperialist intervention. The particularly unfortunate position of Iran was that of being coveted by both Britain and Russia while being allied to neither. But for rather special circumstances the fate of Iran might have been that of nineteenth-century Poland. To escape from this position Iran has recently sought to emulate the part of Turkey in alliance with the West, a possibility opened to Iran only by the decline of British power in the Middle East.

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Iran is separated from the Arab states by the divergence of its sectarian Islam and by the historical effect of a four-century-old political boundary. Despite the vagueness or shifting character of this boundary, it has had a persistence which has served to prevent the complete cultural and political assimilation of Iran and Iraq. On the other hand, the existence of important Shi'i holy places in Iraq exemplifies the usual Middle Eastern overflow of domestic into international politics. The competitive Iranian oil industry rivals that of neighboring Arab states, but it is not a truly divisive factor. While Iran may benefit from the disruption of oil production in the Arab states, as those states benefited from the interruption of Iranian oil production, such competition implies a close interrelationship rather than a disinterested lack of relationship.

Despite its adherence to the Baghdad Pact, Iran has a close relationship to the Arab states in many ways. The sense of unfulfilled nationalism in Iran is familiar and makes Iran a respected member of the new-nation international. While Iran, or the Shah, has preferred an alliance with the West to the equal pressure of both East and West, it is clear that the highest good for Iranians is the absence of all pressure. In this sense Iran joins with most neutral states in desiring to break bipolarity. The pressure of the Soviet Union is so great, however, and the domestic position of the Shah would be so weak in the absence of external aid, that it is unfeasible for Iran to act upon this favored policy.

Because of its non-Arab character, Iran cannot interfere in inter-Arab relations; but because of its history as a victim of imperialist exploitation, Iran more than Turkey dignifies the Baghdad Pact with a sincerity which has some appeal in the Middle East. Under Musaddiq some effort was made to win Arab support against the British, and it seemed as though a close relationship might develop between Egypt and Iran. Nothing came of these beginnings because of the extreme disparity in the kinds of problems faced by each country, and because neither had the power to help the other. Furthermore, Iran's typical response to pressure is to confound the outsider by a demonstration of weakness and anarchy rather than strength and defiance. A strategy of this kind does not encourage alliance nor does it produce international leadership.

Should Iranian power increase, and should the pressure from the north abate, it may be expected that Iran will return to more aggressive policies abandoned over a century ago. A truly strong and stable Iran might willingly attempt to involve itself in the diplomatic maneuvering among the Arab states, and might be better able to lend support to the

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government of Iraq should that state become isolated from other Arab states.

Israel, like Turkey and Iran, is another link connecting the Middle Eastern and the major global system, but it is the weakest systematic link of the three. Its function in this regard is largely negative. Since the Arab states cannot themselves cope with what they consider to be a disruptive element in their region, the role of the great powers in confirming the partition of Palestine has had a continuing impact on the Middle East. The existence of Israel, not yet accepted by the Arab states, lends constant validity to the dependence of the Middle Eastern structure upon the major bipolar structure. This situation tends to foster the notion that the Palestine question may be solved to the satisfaction of the Arab states only if the influence of the great powers is entirely withdrawn. Since the Soviet Union did in fact withdraw from the Middle East after 1948, emphasis was placed upon the withdrawal of the Western powers. Lately the Soviet Union has been invited into the area to counterbalance American influence—an example of members of the subordinate system attempting to exploit the possibilities of the major bipolar system.

Within the Middle Eastern system itself the place of Israel is important; but again it functions in a largely negative manner. Israel has functioned as a stabilizing influence in inter-Arab affairs by preventing important structural shifts and diverting the energies of the Arab nations from their own disagreements or internal difficulties. If, in time, peaceable political unity ever comes to the Fertile Crescent, its success would seem to depend upon Israel continuing to moderate the application of Egyptian pressures on Syria and Jordan. The demise of the Kingdom of Jordan will probably be delayed more by the presence of Israel than by external financial aid and military support.

The state of Israel was established at least as much by military action as by resolution of the General Assembly, and this fact has tended to focus attention in and around Israel on the question of armaments. The continued state of quasi-belligerency has perpetuated this tendency, not only because of recurrent border incidents, but also because of the diplomatic boycott of Israel. The diplomatic boycott has compelled Israel, in seeking to exert its structural weight in the area, to participate in the Middle Eastern system by the measured use of force. The tendency to stress armaments diverts scarce resources from economic development, and thus has a deleterious effect on all concerned which external intervention has been unable to prevent.

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V

The preceding discussion of the special characteristics of the Middle Eastern international system, though far from providing a manageable group of systematic rules, should serve to illustrate its distinctive nature. If bipolarity is a useful term in describing certain contemporary aspects of international politics, it is clear that it is inadequate to describe either relations within the Middle East or between the major bipolar system itself and this subordinate system.

It is much more difficult to derive policy suggestions from this kind of preliminary analysis, but one point does stand out. It seems clear that policies based upon the assumption of global bipolarity will be unsuccessful in the Middle East. It may be further suggested that policies derived from the assumption or reality of a situation of "mutual deterrence" in the major system will effect no progress toward the solution of disputed problems in the minor system. If the mutually deterrent system is to work in the subordinate area, each of the great powers must indicate its willingness to fight over the most minor issue, while the indigenous states must act in so responsible a manner as not to change mutual deterrence into mutual destruction. Since Middle Eastern states are neither responsible nor keenly aware of the relationship between the major and minor systems, it does not seem likely that they will act to sustain the situation of mutual deterrence. It is far more likely that the Middle Eastern states will feel compelled to act in terms of their own complex system so as to preserve their individual positions within the Middle Eastern structure; and that they may feel that mutual deterrence is a condition which exists independently of their action, i.e., that the United States and the Soviet Union will, in the last analysis, not react to the moves of third parties in the Middle East if such action would entail a global nuclear war. In this sense Middle Eastern states, and the Arab states in particular, may believe that there is more room for maneuver along the brink than actually exists.

An attempt has been made in this article to describe the major patterns of interaction of Middle Eastern states without imposing a rigid set of rules upon such action. The most important conclusion arrived at is that Middle Eastern patterns are relatively independent of the "rules" regulating the dominant bipolar system. The rapid development of events compels us to add that this analysis is dynamic only in the sense that emphasis upon the relative independence of intra-area action permits alteration of the system itself, but static in the sense that it

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describes only existing patterns and the existing distribution of power.

Three new constitutional arrangements have arisen among the Arab states to complicate the symmetry of complete multilateralism and formal structural equality. These are the United Arab Republic, comprised of Egypt and Syria; the United Arab States, including both of these countries and the Yemen in a kind of league rather than a federation; and the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan. Despite the continued obscurity surrounding the personal and factional motivations of Syrian leaders, it is apparent that the Syro-Egyptian union may result in far-reaching structural changes in Middle Eastern international relations. The remaining combinations, and probably any that may follow in the near future, merely continue preceding patterns with formal changes calculated to sustain the challenge of a practical move toward Arab political unity.

The basic question to be answered at this point is whether the structural change brought about by the Syro-Egyptian union is of such magnitude as to require the use of the past tense in the preceding analysis. There seems to be little question but what the union itself and the disappointment or surprise which it has occasioned in both Moscow and Washington may be easily explained within the framework of that analysis. But is that analysis *still* valid?

The immediate effect of the Syro-Egyptian union has been to limit the alternatives heretofore available to Middle Eastern leaders. In the first place, there is no longer any possibility (given the success of the union) that Syria will act otherwise than in concert with Egypt. It also seems highly unlikely that any form of Arab political integration short of complete union will receive general approval. Syrian initiative in bringing about the union has been paralleled by President Nasir's decision to play all his cards at once. As a consequence, King Saud has been prevented from pursuing an ambiguous policy of mediating between the union and the federation. While it seems inevitable that the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq will be the dominant aspect of Arab relations, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, and perhaps even Jordan are determined to alter their policies only to the minimum extent deemed necessary. A definite answer to our question must await future events, but for the time being it is possible to come to the limited conclusion that the Middle Eastern system described above has not been greatly altered by recent constitutional changes.

It would, however, be incorrect to assume that this system is fixed and unchangeable. In the first place, the system is of relatively recent vintage, having prevailed only for the last decade or so. In the second

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place, as we have seen, it contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. To the extent that Egyptian policy is successful among the Arab states, President Nasir may more directly challenge the great powers on their own ground. Since the policies of the non-Arab states of the Middle East are already more closely dependent upon great-power preferences, such a development would mean the end of the Middle Eastern system as presently constituted—and further dilution of the bipolar character of the dominant system.

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Review Articles

ELITE COMMUNICATION AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

Samoa and the United States

By ROBERT E. LANE

Felix M. and Marie M. Keesing, *Elite Communication in Samoa: A Study of Leadership* (Stanford Anthropological Series, No. 3), Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1956, 318 pp. $4.75.

U'A tu'u la le va'a tele—"The large canoe has furled its sails." In saying this, the Samoans mean that after the high chief's speech has run its course and is "beached," it is of little use listening to lesser "vessels." But they may, on the other hand, mean that the lesser "vessels" also have a right to be heard. Thus, in a single phrase the twin concepts of authority and rights against authority are confounded, and the central issue of government emerges, couched in terms of communication.

How should this study be "placed"? It is a study of communication but not one that follows the familiar model: "Who says what to whom through what channels with what effects?" It does not answer this question. Nor does it follow Levi-Strauss's suggestion that communication theory offers a framework for studies not only of linguistics (communication of messages), but also of economics (communication of goods and services) and kinship ("communication of women").[1] It tells us *how* the elite communicate, and come to their decisions, but it does not tell us *what* they communicate about, or what they decide. A glance at Schapera's "The Political Annals of a Tswana Tribe" tells more in a few minutes of the content of Tswana deliberations than the Keesings tell us in their entire work.[2] (Mostly, it appears, the Tswana talk about their tax-delinquent members.)

The heart of this book is its account of the processes whereby public opinion is formed by and communicated to a title-holding elite, how

[1] Claude Levi-Strauss, "Social Structure," in A. L. Kroeber, ed., *Anthropology Today*, Chicago, 1953, p. 536.

[2] I. Schapera, "The Political Annals of a Tswana Tribe: Minutes of Ngwaketse Public Assemblies, 1910-1917," University of Cape Town, 1947, mimeographed.

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the elite negotiate their differences and arrive at political decisions, and how the elite deal with the representatives of the foreign powers, New Zealand and the United States, bearing tutelary authority with respect to Samoa. This last-named problem is a combination of domestic and foreign policy; it covers the Samoans' approach to the outside world. Here is a book on governmental processes, decision-making processes, policy-making processes. Where Fortes and Evans-Pritchard dealt only with the structures of government in certain primitive societies,[3] the Keesings turn to the functioning of government, both in its formal and in its informal aspects. This is more in line with a contemporary approach to the study of politics and more satisfying in every way.

The Samoan Islands, with a total land area about the size of Rhode Island, are divided into two groups: Western Samoa, under the Trusteeship of New Zealand, and American Samoa, long under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy but now under the Department of Interior. Western Samoa, with about eleven-twelfths of the land area, contains almost the same proportion of the total population of something over 110,000. The economy of the islands is based on fishing, hunting, some agriculture, and, of course, the income from the American naval base. Trade, although minimal, is increasing in response to Western pressure. About two-thirds of the children of elementary school age go to school; the population is Christian (with several denominations represented); and modern media of communication including radio and movies have been introduced on the islands but do not yet greatly influence the native styles of government.

The molecular social unit is the household, with its extended family. Households are grouped into villages generally numbering between 400 and 500 persons. Groups of villages are then combined into districts, and, for Western and American Samoa, separately, "national" legislative bodies have been created to deal with the over-all problems. Superimposed on this structure is a Western administrative system, functioning largely at the "national" level, which guides and sometimes controls Samoan affairs. Inevitably there is friction between these two systems, but since there is considerable local autonomy we may concentrate (as the Keesings do) on the native Samoan structure.

The elite, whose communication is studied, is composed of a kind of nobility: those who hold "titles," with the wives and eldest sons of the titleholders sharing in the status corresponding to the title. The *matai*, as the titleholders are called, are chiefs of varying status, widely distributed so that about 40 per cent of the male population over thirty

[3] M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, Oxford, 1940.

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have titles of some sort. Although more often than not these are inherited, *matai* status can be taken away, conferred on persons from other families, or divided (and so increased) among competing claimants. There is a hierarchy of titles, leading up to two "royal" chiefly titles with island-wide authority. At the lowest level, about eighteen persons are in the group served by one *matai*. Eliteness, in local eyes, is endowed with *pule* (authority, power, privileges, responsibility) and *mamalu* (dignity, respect, honor). The functions of native government are carried on by councils (*fono*) of these *matai*, at village, district, and "national" levels.

Within recent memory Margaret Mead confronted an ethnocentric world with the picture of how Samoans "come of age," how they handle adolescence.[4] This picture served the useful purpose in the United States of encouraging a re-examination of our own procedures of sex education, puberty "rites," and induction into adulthood. A study of Samoan government is not likely to afford a comparable insight to the West, perhaps because we handle governmental affairs better than sex matters, but the contrast is useful nevertheless. What does it show us?

The Samoan elite is undifferentiated, with one important exception: there are the ceremonial and executive chiefs, on the one hand, and the "talking chiefs" or "orators," on the other. These are on an equal hierarchical level, with many similar duties, but in the upper-status groups the former concentrate on managerial functions while the latter are "brain-trusters" and spokesmen for the other chiefs and for their "constituencies." Contrast the differentiated elite of modern America, whose eliteness is based on industrial, commercial, military, entertainment, political, and, perhaps, scientific activity. Representation through a single (political) element of a differentiated elite creates problems of comparative elite status, "lateral" pressures among elites, inter-elite competition for the outstanding personalities in the system. Representation through a single, more or less undifferentiated, elite corps focuses public attention on responsible authority, concentrates honors so that denigration of the political by competing elites is impossible, and establishes a simple scalar model of authority for the community (with consequent deprivation of alternate leverages of authority by dissatisfied groups). Civilization externalizes and socializes the nature of conflict. Competing social claims which in Samoa must be reconciled in the mind of a single chief become in the United States part of a visible public drama in which every claim has its own cast of actors. Social

[4] Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, New York, 1928.

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"thinking" thus becomes public as it is acted out, and as such it becomes conscious and subject to criticism.[5]

Incidentally, it appears that in one sense the American political elite is less internally differentiated than the political elites of European countries. In these countries a more substantial portion of the members of the national legislatures come from working-class strata in the population, while in the United States there is a strong tendency for working-class constituencies to be represented by persons with more education (lawyers to a large extent) and with independent sources of income.[6] Thus in terms of certain kinds of social status, the American political elite is more like the Samoan elite than are the Europeans.

If the symbolic and ceremonial aspects of elite communication in the United States and in Samoa are compared, it is seen that each has a ceremonial place for deliberation which serves to formalize debate and, because of its associations, to hallow and sanctify what is said there. It should be noted, in this connection, that deliberations taking place in a historic arena of the nature of the Samoan *malaes* (ceremonial open areas) or the American capitols are likely to invoke more responsible attitudes than are invoked by other surroundings. The *matai* elite in Samoa and the political elite in the United States are ranked for certain ceremonial occasions, such as *kava* drinking or the dinner party. (The *kava* party is too formal to be compared to a cocktail party.) There are ceremonial forms of address which serve to smooth over ruffled feelings and feed the egos of the participants: in Samoa, "your mightiness"; in Washington, "the distinguished Senator from. . . ." In Samoa, the principle of "reciprocity" or "equivalence" operates through exchanges of gifts and services, as in American politics it operates through reciprocal favors. In both places, "The binding of groups and individuals in an equivalent network of mutual rights and obligations contributes strongly to social integration and provides a kind of 'insurance' system in terms of economic and political securities" (p. 87). "Log-rolling" and "back-scratching" know no boundaries. The tempo of deliberation is slow and the approach to a problem circuitous in Samoa, partly because of the dramatic satisfactions and the entertainment value in the debate itself, partly because of the need to

[5] To the extent that Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills are right and there is a fusion of elite functions at the "top," the United States is reverting to the Samoan model—but with this difference: the Samoan chiefs are close to their people and immediately sensitive to their needs. See Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1953, and C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, New York, 1956.

[6] Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers*, Garden City, N.Y., 1954, pp. 42-55.

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find formulae which will minimize dissatisfaction. The lack of effective closure in the United States Senate is said to be motivated by the fear of violation of "the right to be heard" as well as the veto it gives to the South on racial matters, but no doubt the love of oratory (one's own, not others') and the drama of the filibuster also contribute to the support for the present Senate rules. The language of Samoa provides terms for derogation of political talk, as indicated in the authors' Annex on "Linguistic Aspects of Communication," but the derogation tends to be directed at deceit, or particularly at showing disrespect to authority. In contrast, there is less of a tendency to ridicule political address than exists in the United States, as suggested by our words "spiel" (from the German "to play") or "ballyhoo" (from the name of an Irish village), or "buncombe" (a North Carolina county). Not all orally transmitted cultures put a high value on talk for its own sake (some value taciturnity) but the Samoan culture does, and in this sense is to be contrasted with the American culture, where speech is instrumental to other purposes; the decisions, not the speeches leading up to them, are more highly valued.

The *matai* of Samoa have collective responsibility for their decisions as they arrive at them in their *fono*, or councils. In part this is a consequence, and in part a cause, of their principle of unanimity—that is, decisions are made in the name of the senior chief present after extended deliberation, but without a vote which would divide the minority from the majority. The principle of group responsibility is so strong that the *matai* are reluctant to express themselves on issues which have not been decided by the appropriate group; they shun "off the cuff" judgments or spontaneous opinions. Contrast this with a member of the American political elite whose reputation for integrity would be shattered if he admitted that he could not express himself until he saw how Congress would decide an issue. However unrealistic the notion, a legislator is supposed to be informed enough to offer sage opinions on all matters of public moment prior to legislative debate. He is thought to be evasive if he does not reveal where he stands, and he is thought to be unreliable if he shifts his position at some future stage of the public controversy.

What is the difference? In one sense, it might be said that the Samoan legislator applies the concept of "due process" to elite opinion formation: society should not be judged except in the appointed place at the appointed time, with all factions appropriately represented by "counsel" and with solemn weighing of the evidence. Or, applying the standards of the scholar instead of the judge, one might say that the

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Samoan *matai* will not arrive at a conclusion until he has consulted the several authorities in the area. As a result, the deliberations and debate are informative (as well as ceremonial) and opinions are formed in the light of the interests of all the parties without a prior crystallization of individual predispositions such as occurs when a public commitment is made in advance. Then, after the decision is made, as with the British Cabinet and the members of Communist organizations, all are "obliged" to uphold the decision of the group, although of course there is always an opposition group which may or may not be successful in repressing its antagonistic sentiments. Such an opposition has a right, in Samoa, to grumble and be "unwilling" and obstinate in prescribed ways, though the pressure toward consensus is very great. In reporting this, we must also note that deference to the views of higher chiefs in *fono* deliberations is a considerable factor making for unanimity and collective responsibility, but for our comparative purposes we may consider this non-essential to the practice of collective responsibility.

The complex of Samoan political practices then includes (1) lack of individualistic expression of opinion prior to group consideration; (2) full opportunity for the expression of all (*matai*) points of view in leisurely deliberation; (3) decisions made unanimously without majority and minority divisions; and (4) commitment on the part of all *matai* to support the decisions of the group. Only the second of these elements is common to the American and Samoan systems. Is there any place for the other elements in the American system? The answer must be a qualified "no"—but it is the qualifications that count. Virtual representation of the Samoan variety does not require that representatives commit themselves in advance to a program so that the electorate can make some broad choice, at the minimum, between those who are for "us" and those who are for "those others." That is, decision-making restraint of this order is possible only in the absence of popular elections. But the thought persists: Could we not encourage some increment of popular tolerance for the candidate who says, "I have not formulated a position because I have not yet heard the arguments on the issue; we have not yet held hearings; I have not studied the matter in sufficient detail"? In some sense, there is or should be a "due process" for opinion formation. The danger of prejudgment is as important in political life as it is on the bench.

The unanimity principle presumes a consensus community, a repression of conflict, in psychological as well as in social terms, and the absence of organized factions—that is, political parties. (The Keesings did not report any such factions. Did they overlook them?) But much

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of the work of the Senate is done by "unanimous consent." (We do not know how much, or on what issues, or with what sense of restraint by those who would like to object but do not dare.) But the principle is an alternative to vesting greater authority in the chair and more restrictive rules. Are there areas where the unanimity principle in the legislatures can be extended, and is it desirable that this should be done?

As for the commitment on the part of the political elite to endorse the decisions of the legislature (*fono*) after these have been made, we must assume that for the political elite, as for the public generally, there is a *fait accompli* effect, an increment of support given to a policy when it has been embodied into law. But, in a plural-party system, there is also, at least over the short range, the reverse effect; the minority party will tend to criticize the enacted legislative program as a means of advancing its political chances in the next election. At the same time, members of all parties will support the law, acknowledge its legitimacy, and oppose violation, even while they refuse to endorse the policy it embodies. Thus the American political culture distinguishes between support of a decision, in the sense of recognizing its legitimacy, and endorsement of a policy as the wise and correct course of action. The idea of a "loyal opposition" seems to have eluded the Samoans, with the result that the Keesings observe, "Where opposition is either culturally repressed or politically suppressed, small incidents are liable to trigger sudden, more or less violent outbreaks" (p. 120).

The material on the relations between the Samoan elite and other elites, particularly the Western governmental authorities, is of less interest for our comparative purposes. But the statement of the goals pursued by the elite in their negotiations with the agents of the outside world raises the question: What would an authoritative list of American goals look like? How can "self-interest" be made a more viable concept in the analysis of international affairs? If God were an anthropologist—I do not say that He isn't—what would He select as the American cultural themes which knowingly or unknowingly are most cherished by Americans?

The Keesings have studded their book with propositions stated in general terms with the idea that ". . . these propositions might be worth testing as working hypotheses for further research even within a range as wide as that of both Samoan and Western communication" (p. 2). For example: "Conventional behavior involving location and space position plays an important part in the context of elite communication, being immediately visible and recognizable" (p. 69). "Elite negotiations are likely to be strongly oriented toward producing a pub-

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lic show of at least immediate unanimity" (p. 114). "Elite decisions tend to be undertaken only after problems have been brought into sharpest possible focus, usually in multiple consultations at a variety of hierarchical levels" (p. 97).

This casting of ideas into propositions is gaining in vogue, following the Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee voting study[7] and Homans' treatment of *The Human Group*;[8] indeed, there is much to be said for it. But as contributions to a theory of elite behavior, or to a theory of communication, the propositions presented here do not carry the weight they are intended to—largely, I think, because they are not interrelated in any systematic way (they "emerged in the course of the study"), there are too many of them to be easily digested, there is no indication of their relative importance, and the cultural base, the Samoan Islands, is very narrow for global propositions. Propositions of this nature are most useful when they are based on at least one cross-cultural comparison. But, if they partially fail in their mission, they do serve as focal points for further discussion—that is, they also partially succeed.

[7] Each chapter in the Elmira study, *Voting*, concludes with a set of propositions and Appendix A lists 209 "findings or generalizations" from this and twelve other studies. See Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting*, Chicago, 1954.

[8] Paul Homans, *The Human Group*, New York, 1950.

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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION

Research and Policy

By LEO LOWENTHAL

Bruce Lannes Smith and Chitra M. Smith, *International Communication and Political Opinion: A Guide to the Literature* (A RAND Corporation Research Study, prepared by the Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C.), Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956, 325 pp. $6.00.

I

THE publication of a new bibliography does not ordinarily create much intellectual excitement. The present volume, however, has stimulated this reviewer on two counts, the first having to do with its general usefulness for researchers and policy-makers, the second with its implications for the relationship between research and policy.

There can be few persons better qualified to be the co-author of a major reference work in the fields of communication and public opinion than Bruce Lannes Smith. He, together with Harold Lasswell and Ralph Casey, wrote the Magna Charta of the public opinion field, *Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion*, published, as was the present volume, by Princeton University Press. The responsibility for the notably careful and restrained annotations, his alone in the now classic collection of 1946, is here shared by his wife and co-author. In the earlier publication, Smith's viewpoint was that of the academician; in the meantime, both he and Mrs. Smith have accumulated that kind of operational experience (and frustration) which vests the seemingly routine format of annotated bibliography with urgency and drama.

As a teacher in the Foreign Service Institute, Mr. Smith, now Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University, has devoted many purposive years to the elucidation of the relationship between modern diplomacy and communication policies. Mrs. Smith has worked with the Bureau of Social Science Research which, since its inception in 1950, has been responsible for a number of government-sponsored research projects. The present volume was prepared at the Bureau, and its director, Robert T. Bower, has contributed the preface. The initial impetus for the work came from The RAND Corporation, whose Social Science Director, Hans Speier, has long encouraged the development of basic social science projects sponsored by the government.

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The scope of the *Guide* is less extensive, and at the same time considerably more intensive, than that of its predecessor. As the title suggests, the emphasis is on international communication and foreign policy; studies of domestic communication are included only when they have clear relevance for the international sphere. British, French, and German, as well as American, sources have been carefully canvassed; the American material is notable for the inclusion of reports on a vast body of unclassified, though unpublished, government documents originating in the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, and the military establishments. The authors have weighted their references in the direction of the political preoccupations and priorities of our foreign policy; hence the majority of the items refer to Iron Curtain countries, the Middle East, and the Far East, in that order.

Both the content of the annotations and the system of indexing are noteworthy. Anyone who has undertaken to prepare even a short *bibliographie raisonnée* will appreciate the massive task of evaluating 2563 items in a few lines each, conveying a clear picture of the content of the item, its substantive and methodological merit, and the professional affiliation and experience of the author. In organizing their material, Mr. and Mrs. Smith have wisely avoided theoretical considerations and have instead applied the principle of usefulness for the researcher and practitioner in the international communication field. The major breakdowns (following a listing of general and theoretical writings) are political propaganda activities, by country; the channels of communication; audience characteristics; and methods of research and intelligence. In addition, a detailed subject and author index provides sufficient cross-references to guide the reader to items or authors of particular interest to him which he might find difficult to identify on the basis of the broader breakdowns.

The earlier bibliographical work included some 120 pages of introduction, covering a number of theoretical and empirical aspects of communication; the present work contains an introductory essay by Bruce Smith of seventeen pages. I believe that there is a sound reason for this change in the strategy of introduction. In 1946, except for the work of Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates, very few studies in the sociology of communication or in communication research proper had been published. The introductory essays on the communication specialist, the propaganda analyst, and on the concepts of communication content and communication effects served the function, in the earlier volume, of orienting the social science community at large to the role and place of mass communication, a noisy and unruly new arrival in

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the family of social institutions. Smith's introduction to the present volume has a virtue which is at a premium among the works of academicians: like a seasoned correspondent, he does not rehash all the familiar paraphernalia of knowledge which we have encountered many times since 1946; instead, he assesses in a few pages what is new, what is still needed, and which of those items of yesterday are still pertinent.

In surveying the bulk of the material, Smith shrewdly applies the concept of "cultural lag" to the relationship between research and policy. He believes that a good deal of international communication research has followed rather conventional lines, both in method and in substance, and has not quite kept in step with the rapid political, technological, and psychological changes which have taken place in the last decade. I share Smith's belief that some of the responsibility for this lag must be charged to the clients, particularly to those government officials who are, reluctantly or not, willing to buy a short-cut solution to a critical situation, but are considerably less sold, if they are sold at all, on research in crisis prevention. Smith correctly endorses Speier's diagnosis that, in the period 1945-1955, "research preoccupations, like foreign policy itself in this period, have been primarily passive and . . . 'reactive'—reactive to Communist initiative" (p. 12). One of Smith's examples of the kind of farsighted approach that has been conspicuous by its absence goes as follows: "Experts in international communication are often heard to say that the world impact of . . . entertainment movies may well outweigh that of all governmental propaganda programs combined; but the writer has not been able to find a single major item of research on this" (p. 14). This reviewer can only confirm the observation. During my period of research administration in a government agency, our staff made repeated efforts to gain the support of government or of foundations for a generously designed study of the impact of the American motion picture abroad, but we were scarcely given a hearing.

Bruce Smith has had a particularly favorable vantage point from which to observe the difficulties under which researchers, whether federal employees or members of academic or commercial research organizations charged with government projects, have worked. He notes the "general social pressures to which researchers have been subject," with the emphasis on "hot" and "cold" war research (p. 13). He is distressed by the shortage of trained personnel to cope with the problems posed by "the rising pressure and increasing sophistication of world Communist propaganda," or to provide the "positive" approaches which Free World diplomatic strategy has yet to develop. Compared with

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the mass exodus of social scientists from government service in 1945, the runoff of the past decade may appear insignificant. Yet the very fact that it is a runoff and not a flowback reflects a dangerous aspect of public policy in regard to intellectual manpower. In this post-Sputnik era, officialdom may quickly come to tolerate the demand for continuity in the natural sciences; there are few signs of any carry-over to the social sciences, however, and it is for this reason that we share Mr. Smith's hope that the international professional organizations may help to establish a sustained career pattern in the field of communication research.

Mr. Smith is not defeatist. Fully aware of the time-lags in the shaky communication between researcher and client, he hopefully reassesses and points up the contributions that the various social science disciplines have made to the theory and rationale of study designs in communication research which could and should be applied to the international arena in the interests of national policy. Particularly valuable is his succinct summary of recent contributions to the development of a theoretical model of communication (including, among others, the works of Hovland, Lewin, Merton, Parsons, Selznick, and Stouffer).

The essay concludes with a recapitulation of those deficiencies which Smith believes warrant the most attention. First, as to training, what is needed is "a rationally developed plan for the training of analysts capable of sustained cross-national and cross-cultural research in conjunction with colleagues abroad. Possibly what specialized students of international communication need most, at the moment, in addition to their *general* social-scientific training, is enough foreign-language and foreign area training to communicate lucidly, and without excessive ethnocentrism, with their opposite numbers in a selected list of foreign countries where good counterpart facilities already exist" (p. 21). On the theoretical side, he believes in the need for an "adequate *general* theoretical model of the *international* communication process," for which the ingredients may be lying about, although "no firm integrative hand has appeared in the past decade to put them together" (p. 17). Finally he is worried about the almost complete lack of "a comparative cross-national and cross-cultural description and analysis of *values*" (p. 20). In a short paragraph which deserves considerable elaboration he indicts the communication researcher for being fascinated, in a very one-sided fashion, with the images of other nations and cultures—images which often remain "virtually inexplicable" if one does not study "the constellations of values in pursuit of which they develop" (*ibid.*). This last admonition is perhaps the only observation of Mr.

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Smith with which I do not quite agree. It seems to me that quite a number of studies, such as those undertaken by Columbia's Bureau of Applied Social Research in regard to the Near and Middle East, or by Harvard's Russian Research Center on the make-up of the Soviet citizen, or by the Center for International Studies at M.I.T. on the formation of political opinion among elites abroad, do not bypass the role of values. He is probably quite right, however, in assuming that a clarification of basic concepts leading to a communication model is probably not just around the corner.

II

Every social scientist and government official who uses this volume to acquire an overview of our areas of knowledge and ignorance in international communication and opinion will undoubtedly find himself speculating about the relationship between research and policy on the basis of his own experience. My own associations come from a five-year period spent as director of the evaluation staff of the Voice of America, first with the Department of State and then with the United States Information Agency. While the problems of communication among researcher, operator, and policy-maker were similar in these two organizations, they were not completely identical.

To begin with the differences: the orientation toward data—that is, the kinds of information considered essential to the development of specific operations and of general policy—differed rather markedly. With some notable exceptions, the State Department official in Washington or in the field views diplomacy as a venerable art whose successful practitioners owe much to inspiration and intuition and little, if anything, to science. The old style of diplomatic reporting by heads of missions and their staffs provides material perfectly adequate for the pursuance of this art, and such officials are only too willing to agree with economy-minded members of Congress that the newfangled methods of attitude and opinion research are a waste of time and the taxpayers' money. Without discrediting the importance of the truly inspired—but rather rare—flashes of insight which we can rightfully expect from our more gifted diplomats, it is obvious that the data offered by this approach constitute an inadequate base for the understanding of our increasingly complex political, technological, and psychological worlds. In an era when public opinion and political decision-making processes have or purport to have "grass roots" sources, information gathered, or gossip evaluated, as it flows from the small circle of

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middle and high-level officialdom of a given government to neighboring embassies and our own mission staff and so on to Washington can represent only a fairly small segment of the political and social realities in any given area.

But the suspicion of the old-timer (young or old) that the toolbox of the researcher could do with some refurbishing before work is undertaken in foreign fields is not unjustified, nor is the accusation that social scientists, with their jargon and their endless qualifications, have a communication problem of their own. Decisions are easier to make on the basis of the usually readable, sometimes perfunctory, and occasionally misleading reports of the missions or of political desk specialists. Whatever their methodological and language skills, or lacks, the academicians and the academically trained researchers often turn up data which sometimes make our diplomatic problems more complex than at first meets the eye.

While those who resist research in the State Department are the inheritors of the philosophy of an aristocratic profession, the United States Information Agency, founded in 1953, has veered toward quite another set of stereotypes. Again, with some outstanding exceptions (among them its present director, George V. Allen), the key personnel of this agency have been prone to an advertising philosophy which views the world as a potential mass market for the "products" of American propaganda. This approach had some very interesting consequences for the role of research. Within the confines of the State Department, the researcher had a kind of nuisance value. The typical Foreign Service officer did not care whether long-, medium-, or short-range research was proposed, since he had little hope for any of it. The relationship, in brief, was one of armed truce. The managers of USIA, on the other hand, were convinced that their research could be run more or less in the time-honored "getting the facts" tradition of American corporate enterprise and the advertising agencies, although simple nose-counting had long since become obsolete in more advanced business circles.

Researchers within the Department of State, generally ignored by policy-makers and disliked by the media operators, sometimes converted their frustration into a kind of futile megalomania, using their research data for the drafting of proposals for political strategy which were largely and quite justifiedly ignored. It is not too difficult to understand why, in the series of more or less erratic shifts to which the managerial bureaucracy in State subjected the research units, a considerable number of talented researchers resigned. Had they stayed on, they would, like their colleagues who did remain, have gone through

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another process of psychological reconditioning. The new agency felt very unsure about its relationship to the political decision-makers in the State Department and the National Security Council, and its second echelon advised the research personnel to limit themselves to the "hard" data which were assumed to be just lying around, waiting to be picked up by routine intelligence methods and run-of-the-mill applied techniques.

But more important than the ephemeral effects of agencies as they come and go are persistent attitudes and trends controlling the fate of the researcher. Impatience is perhaps first among them. It is partly in consequence of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government that managers of operating agencies feel they must have a continual flow of ready-mix results, with particular emphasis on those which allegedly show success. Basic and long-range research, it has been assumed, cannot be "sold" to the legislators because no findings can be promised before the next budget hearings.

The plea for patience and a long-term view which points out that researchers on cancer have not been stoned to death because they have not yet found the way to combat this fatal disease has not found a sympathetic ear, despite the fact that the social researcher has at best only a generation of scientific experimentation behind him. Nor has the argument that building a staff, developing training programs, testing old methods, and experimenting with new ones need a considerable amount of time and, for that matter, money. I am sure that Mr. Smith would agree with me that the government has not seized upon the chance to offer a challenging career in foreign-area research to people well-trained in social science research; or, conversely, to stimulate area specialists to acquire a sound working knowledge of the tools and methods of applied social research, a progressive training which would be comparable to the two-step education of physicians in the basic sciences and clinical application. In fact, looked at from the standpoint of scientific strategy, it would appear that here is an ideal opportunity to institutionalize cross-disciplinary studies—so often exalted and so seldom undertaken—in a way which could not help but benefit our international policies.

The incompatibility between researcher and operating personnel is not in any way alleviated by the fact that sound research often reflects adversely on operations (and on policy, too, for that matter). Top business management does not forego research because the sales department, the advertising department, or the production department dislikes researchers or the findings of research. The managerial level in

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government, however, has been known to avoid research because other divisions are suspicious of it, anxious about it, or make strong pleas for spending the money on an expansion of operations. In short, there has been a tendency to keep the office family happy by killing off the unpopular cousins in research.

Some "communication research" on the respective roles of the administration and Congress would not be irrelevant to the discussion of the role of the sciences in government. The Sputnik trauma demonstrated clearly that the distribution of the Milquetoasts who are afraid of the shadow of the mythical taxpayer and of the "men of broad vision" is not as skewed as some government administrators would like to believe. Not once in the history of the information services, either when they were part of the State Department or since they have become an independent agency, have the administrators permitted a bona fide researcher to go before an appropriations committee and present the research budget on the basis of research evidence and research needs. More than once, well-meaning but poorly informed managerial personnel have presented the findings of the research units in a manner that has done little justice either to the research program itself or to the implications of its data for the operation as a whole. The excuse has been that the social scientist would not know how to talk to the legislator—in which assumption there may, of course, be more than a grain of truth. On the other hand, one of the most rewarding experiences this reviewer had while in government service was testifying before the Hickenlooper Committee in 1953. This committee reviewed the activities of the information services, and did much to offset the scandalous spectacle of the McCarthy Committee, which had dealt with the same problem in a manner more sensational than responsible. It would be difficult to find a more critical, but at the same time a more attentive and constructive, searching party on research and policy than that of Senators Hickenlooper and Green. It may be that the alleged antipathy of legislator for intellectual is a stereotype that has had its day. In any case, these senators seemed to believe that the person best-equipped to interpret and advocate a research program was the one who understood it best and was responsible for it.

My agreement with Mr. Smith about the undue emphasis on "reactive" propaganda research is complete. To which I can only add my disagreement with the "powder keg" theory which, at least in the pre-Sputnik era, had a great deal of influence on information policy and research. Among those circles in government which had a stake in propaganda, persuasion, and information, one often sensed a kind of

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wishful thinking, the substance of which was that large strata of the populations inside and around the Soviet Union were impatiently awaiting the day of liberation, and that their governments sat uneasily in their seats of power, fearing that at any moment their empires might collapse. It was evidently inconceivable that peoples in areas of the world from which we are politically estranged might consider their lives "normal," or at least sufficiently free from tension that they did not find it necessary to devote themselves to conspiring against their governments.

Such convictions about the psychological and ideological predispositions and reactions of peoples behind the Curtain put the researcher in a difficult position. Research into matters of this sort cannot be done in a hurry, and impatient policy-makers have tended to give undue, and sometimes absurd, emphasis to any fragments of data which seemed to bear out the powder-keg concept. Needless to say, this criticism does not apply to the analyses undertaken at the area institutes of Harvard, Columbia, and other academic organizations, or to the balanced and careful research which, to judge by its published material, is carried out by The RAND Corporation.

Mr. Smith recommends a closer relationship between deeds and words in our information program, specifically, for a "succession of extremely well-executed information campaigns, associated with policies of massive economic and social development" (p. 14). There is probably no one in government service who would not eagerly profess that he is a firm believer in the inseparability of propaganda and action; and it would be hard to find a responsible government policy-maker who is not convinced that he does everything within his power to reinforce this unity. But if there is anything on which international researchers, well-traveled academicians, journalists, and businessmen would agree, it is on the appalling evidence that people abroad do not see much connection between what our government says over its far-flung communication network and what it does in the arena of world affairs. No American corporation can maintain a respected or successful enterprise if its sales appeals create expectations which its goods or services cannot meet. There is no advertising genius in the country who can successfully help a manufacturer to sell cars which do not run properly, or soap which does not cleanse, or beer which is stale. It is bad enough that business philosophy has been translated, for United States information program purposes, into the facile phrase "selling America abroad." On top of this, one sometimes gets the impression that some pages have been borrowed from the book of the old peddler who went around in

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his wagon selling with vigorous and tempting slogans the patented cure-all, secure in the knowledge that he would never return to the same corner or the same village again. Unfortunately, in international politics, you cannot just shout and run—your words are not only caught but quoted back.

The organizational split-off of the information agencies from the State Department increased the painful distance between diplomat and information specialist. It may be that in the era of Sputnik this distance will again decrease; Sputnik demonstrated once and for all that action and propaganda must be Siamese twins. With the Sputniks aloft, the Russians do not need propagandists, at least for the time being—all they need is a network of communication and announcers who can state a fact clearly. There was a time—when President Eisenhower announced the "Atoms for Peace" program before the United Nations—when it looked as though we too would establish an effective tie-up between saying and doing. Whatever happened to that opportunity?

This relationship between words and deeds may well turn out to be a vital component of the model for international communication which Mr. Smith believes offers an important challenge to theorists in the field. He does not believe, nor do I, that such a model is likely to be devised in the near future. We have perhaps been somewhat hampered in this respect by a strong tendency to adhere to the classical Lasswellian model which, eminently useful as it is, probably needs some modifications. Among others, Katz's and Lazarsfeld's concept of the two-step flow of communication, and some of the findings of Hovland and his colleagues, point in this direction.

The fashionable term "feedback" (which Mr. Smith mentions only in passing) tends to narrow the conceptual framework needed to describe the extremely complex processes involved in international communication. We should leave such facile terms to the composers of administrative memoranda. A productive model and a constructive theory may never come; they will certainly not come until after a great deal of rather elementary spadework has been undertaken. The territory is so vast and uncharted that one is tempted to say that it does not matter where we begin so long as we do begin.

In spite of the sophisticated and expensive foreign-area inventories, we do not have available the kinds of succinct knowledge of our audiences which are essential to effective communication. We urgently need studies about the specific preoccupations, predispositions, and values of people in foreign nations, and a careful breakdown of such data in terms of their rank order of urgency and importance among dif-

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ferent socio-economic, ecological, and ethnic groups. We not only need such knowledge about the vast regions of Asia and Africa, but would be well advised to reassay what we believe we know about the peoples of Western and Central Europe, who are no less involved in the world-wide shifts of traditional values, predispositions, and major concerns. We must also study the content, the approaches, and the personnel of other political communicators in the international field. These studies must be undertaken in a systematic and continuous fashion and must not be limited, as has been a favorite pastime, to an analysis of "their" reactions to what we have to say.

We are, furthermore, at very loose ends with regard to the objectives of our policy. While it was an enjoyable intellectual exercise to study the assumptions about policy goals that hovered in the heads of people in the USIA on high and not so high levels, no communication policy, and certainly no communication research, will lead us anywhere if decision-makers (inside and outside of the government) do not find better ways to agree in the most articulate fashion on middle- and long-range foreign policy goals. (It must be noted that a number of political scientists, such as Kissinger and Morgenthau, are doing their best to provoke thinking about international policy in the great style which is required.) The problem cannot be brushed aside by referring to the necessity for adaptability to an ever-changing international scene, or by a plea for public confidence in highly classified documents which we are hopefully to assume contain the panaceas for the future of our nation.

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THEORY AND PRACTICE IN RECENT STUDIES OF JAPANESE POLITICS

By ROBERT E. WARD

Nobutaka Ike, *Japanese Politics: An Introductory Survey*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1957, 300 pp. Textbook edition, $4.00; trade edition, $5.00.
Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, *The New Japan: Government and Politics*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1956, 456 pp. $5.00.
Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japanese People and Politics*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1956, 408 pp. $7.50.

THE closely spaced appearance of these three new texts provides an interesting insight into the current status of our research and knowledge in the field of Japanese politics. Since the general level of our scholarly sophistication and accomplishment is probably higher in the case of Japan than in that of any other Asian state, it is perhaps not too much to claim that, by extension, these three studies also illustrate difficulties and suggest possibilities of general concern to all students of Asian and comparative politics. These values emerge most clearly when the works are considered in tandem as representing the views of four able scholars on the vexing problems of how best to portray the whole of a nation's government and politics. Viewed in this light, the three books can be placed on a scale varying, in terms of the authors' approaches, from the most traditional to the most experimental. If this is done, the study by Professors Quigley and Turner is undoubtedly the most orthodox, Dr. Ike's probably the most experimental, while Professor Yanaga's tends on most counts to fall between the others, though in a position closer to Ike than to Quigley and Turner. Let us first consider the books separately.

I

Professor Quigley is the author of the best-known of the prewar texts on Japan.[1] It is particularly appropriate, therefore, that he—together with his colleague and former student, Professor Turner—should undertake a similar task for the postwar period. This is done in organizational terms distinctly reminiscent of the earlier work. The book opens with a brief account of such "residual forces" in Japanese politics —i.e., characteristic political themes—as dynasticism, dualism, bureauc-

[1] *Japanese Government and Politics: An Introductory Survey*, New York, Century, 1932, 442 pp.

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racy, militarism, and group consciousness. It continues with ten essentially historical chapters covering the organization and record of prewar and wartime government and major political developments since 1945. The chapters on the Occupation and the origins of the present constitution are especially noteworthy for their frank and judicious evaluation of developments which in the United States hitherto have been either ignored or discussed only in highly partisan terms.

The remainder and major portion of the work is devoted to a cross-sectional description of the Japanese government as of 1955. It treats this in terms of such elements as the constitution, civil rights, the Emperor and cabinet, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, civil service, elections, parties, and local government. In some sections a systematic attempt is made to counterbalance descriptive legal materials with commentary on the manner in which these institutions operate. The result is on the whole a well-balanced and smoothly flowing text which occasionally achieves notable heights of exposition. The three chapters on elections and the organization, composition, and policies of major political parties, for example, are outstanding. A well-selected documentary appendix concludes the volume.

One cannot help but be greatly impressed by the prolonged, painstaking, and loving scholarship which has gone into the production of this book. It must represent at least six or seven years of planning, data gathering, and writing. The result is a work which, within the limits of the authors' conception of their task, does an admirable job. The qualification, however, is important. How do the authors conceive their function? The question is central, but, unfortunately, as is usually the case with texts in this field, the book itself provides no specific answer. Those curious on this score must, at the risk of some distortion, deduce an answer on the basis of the study's organization, content, and style.

Judged by the canons of *avant-garde* opinion, this is an old-fashioned book. Its comparative content is small; it states or tests no hypotheses; and its major preoccupations are forthrightly historical, descriptive, formal, and legalistic. For the most part its concern is with government in an institutional sense, rather than with politics considered as a process of decision-making or a system of action. The historical sections usually limit themselves to the political record viewed as a product of the interaction of formal governmental institutions with certain major political groups and personalities. Deviations from this viewpoint are few but interesting. The first chapter on "Residual Forces in Japanese Politics" suggests a brief dalliance with the "national character" approach to an interpretation of Japanese politics. Again, sections of the

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chapters on elections and the composition, policies, and organization of political parties reveal in some depth the practical workings of the political process in Japan. These are exceptions, however, and their variant emphases neither are linked with nor affect the treatment in the balance of the book. Aside from a number of wise but isolated reflections on such matters as Occupation policy and the "democratization" of Japan, no specific attempt is made to sum up or speculate about the pace, major configurations, or directions of political change in Japan. Indeed, the conception of the book is probably such as to rule out any such dynamic evaluations. The greater part of the content is simply not geared to substantiate or evoke them.

It is considerations such as these which lead to the characterization of the book as "old-fashioned." Unfortunately, in the lexicon of academic gamesmanship, this—together with such useful terms as "descriptive," "legalistic," and "static"—has come to have an opprobrious connotation. In the present case nothing could be further from the writer's intent. It is quite true that Professors Quigley and Turner do not supply answers to a great many important questions which are currently being posed about the government and politics of non-Western states. What they set out to do, however, they do with a precision, fullness, and scholarship which can only command respect.

II

Professor Yanaga's work, like Dr. Quigley's, is also a sequel to an earlier effort—in this case, his compendious *Japan Since Perry*.[2] The present volume represents a species of political capstone, contemporary in emphasis, to the historically oriented record of the last hundred years set forth in the former book. It also represents a sort of uneasy compromise between older and newer views of the professional responsibilities of a scholar setting forth to portray and explain the politics of a foreign state. The nature of this compromise can best be made clear by a brief examination of the organization and contents of the book.

The study opens with a résumé of twentieth-century Japanese political history and the major forces affecting it. This is followed by a brief but pithy introduction to the Japanese people in terms of their environment, derivation, socio-cultural foundations, political literacy and interest, and so forth. Thereafter come three chapters devoted to the construction of a sort of profile of Japanese political attitudes and behavior patterns in terms of their origins, current characteristics,

[2] Chitoshi Yanaga, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1949, 723 pp.

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causes, and modes of expression. The underlying assumptions are of the "national character" type. The results, while stimulating, seem sometimes to be of dubious validity or value. In general, it might be said that the treatment is best in its explanations of the historical background and institutionalized expression of the "national character," but considerably weaker in its attempts to define and analyze this in terms of salient socio-political traits, modes of thought and expression, or group behavior patterns.

These last areas are discussed in such categories as activism, assimilativeness, authoritarianism, traditionalism, pragmatism, kinship feeling, personalization, status consciousness, inexactitude, indirection, and the like. The list is long and not particularly flattering. As in the case of the late Miss Benedict's oft-quoted study,[8] all of the traits enumerated do characterize some areas and periods of Japanese conduct. A sensitivity to their existence and possible effects is politically valuable. But serious difficulties arise when they are posited as true or normative for all or most of present-day Japanese society. For example, the Japanese are, to be sure, a notably status-conscious people with respect to certain areas of social relationship; yet in other major areas the prevalence of equal-level relationships is marked and persistent. Everyday patterns of social and economic intercourse within the villages of much of rural Japan offer a case in point. Again, it is very easy to overdraw the extent to which such qualities as traditionalism and personalization are possessed in any peculiar degree by Japanese society. Similar reservations of significant scale are necessary with respect to many of the other traits enumerated in these chapters. In general, it would seem that the profile of national political characteristics here sketched is considerably more valid for particular elements of traditional Japanese society than for the changing and less integrated contemporary scene.

With Chapter V Professor Yanaga shifts his attention to more tangible aspects of Japanese government and politics—constitutional development, the Emperor, cabinet, and parliament, the structure and operations of parties, elections, the bureaucracy, and the citizen, law, and the courts. In most instances major developments are covered to the end of 1955. In this reviewer's opinion, these chapters—which form a distinct unit—constitute the heart of the book and set very high standards of accomplishment. The treatment differs from that in the Quigley and Turner volume in terms of the generally greater variety and depth of its data about major political institutions, their back-

[8] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1946, 324 pp.

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grounds and settings, and in its more frequent and concrete concern with the actual functioning of these institutions. A judicious blending of history with description and evaluation of present circumstances is achieved throughout these sections. The author is particularly to be commended for his inclusion of chapters on "National Economy and General Welfare" and "Relations with the Outside World." Both are necessarily brief accounts of very expansive subjects, but they are so frequently ignored or regarded as inappropriate to texts on government and politics that it is a pleasure to see some attempt at their treatment made here. One wishes that more space could have been given to them, thus making possible, for example, a somewhat more factual and realistic account of such important subjects as governmental activities in the regulatory and social welfare fields. Some insights, however summary, into actual conditions and levels of performance in these areas would be most helpful.

Professor Yanaga's book is the most ambitious and, on the whole, the most satisfactory of the several postwar attempts to deal with Japanese politics *in toto*. This is so despite several significant lapses. There is, for example, a fairly conspicuous lack of integration between the first four chapters and the rest of the book; the author's views of Japanese national political traits are not systematically exploited as a means of clarifying the structure and operations of Japan's political system. In this sense the work lacks any unifying theses or principles as to why the Japanese act as they do politically; but then the writer shares this problem with the profession as a whole. Only the Marxists seem to have solved it, to their own satisfaction at least. Again, it occasionally seemed to the present reviewer that some of the book's attempts at political interpretation suffered from an unwarranted and rather moralistic assumption that Japanese standards of appropriate political conduct should coincide more closely with our own. Some might also consider unfortunate the author's exclusive preoccupation with the national scene; no attention is given to local government or politics. Despite such qualifications, however, Professor Yanaga has in general presented the richest, the most detailed, and the most broadly useful account of contemporary Japanese government and politics which we have. The profession is deeply in his debt.

III

Dr. Ike's study is substantially different from either of the two preceding volumes. It constitutes one of the excellent Knopf series on Japan and is aimed, one would judge, at a somewhat broader and more popu-

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lar audience than is the usual text. The author conscientiously tries to view his subject matter along different lines. This entails a more or less systematic attempt to treat and analyze Japanese politics in categories and terms derived from some of the more recent theorizing about the discipline of comparative politics. Substantively considered, the results in general, while interesting and commendable, do not seem to be notably productive of new information or insights. The attempt at a different approach, however, is stimulating and most welcome.

Dr. Ike sets out to present "an overall view of Japanese politics in terms of its setting, the dominant political forces, and basic political processes" (p. vii). His emphasis, it should be noted, is consistently on politics rather than government, on process and behavior rather than structure and legal relationships. He conceives of this subject matter as divisible into three broad categories—the setting of politics, political forces, and the political process. Under the first of these rubrics he sketches briefly but well some aspects of Japanese social structure and their relationship to politics, discusses what he holds to be the nation's major political doctrines and myths, and describes in a very few paragraphs the structure of formal government and, as an example of the significance of informal government, the nature of *yūryokusha* (men of influence).

Part Two is given over to three chapters analyzing the structure, political interests, and activities of business, labor, and agriculture. These are considered as the nation's major "political forces," by which the author seems to mean constellations of major and active interest groups situated outside the framework of government proper. Such "political forces" are distinguished in terms of the book's organization from social elements and institutions active in the "political process," which are discussed in Part Three. The dichotomy is not too persuasive in some ways. It is difficult to understand, for example, why the intellectuals should be treated as an aspect of the political process rather than as an extra-governmental "political force," or how, for that matter, one can avoid considering the bureaucracy as of major importance in both categories.

Considered substantively, one's reaction to the author's treatment of business, labor, and agriculture is apt to be compounded of admiration for the conception and arrangement of the material and annoyance at its essential slightness. For example, the device of illustrating the political role of business and agricultural pressure groups by the inclusion of brief case histories of the Coal Mine Bill of 1947, and the Rice Control Bill of 1935, is excellent and serves to add flesh and blood

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to the preceding generalizations. Again, the account of the position of agriculture in prewar Japan and of the development of agricultural groups is well done and useful. Beyond this, however, the section is disappointing. Economic and business pressure groups are treated in three brief pages; in fact, they are little more than identified. The extremely important political role of middle and small business is scarcely noted. The chapter on labor does not even mention *Zenrō*, the major opponent of the great *Sōhyō* Federation. The discussion of the political affiliations and activities of the major unions and federations is grossly inadequate. Again, in the chapter on agriculture, one must certainly question the writer's assertion of the current validity of Sir George Sansom's famous dictum on the condition of the Tokugawa peasantry: "Statesmen thought highly of agriculture, but not of agriculturists." It is very doubtful that an examination of relative tax status or of the distribution of national public works and allied funds would substantiate such a view. In general, throughout these three chapters it is also difficult to understand why, in a book published in 1957, the treatment should stop with 1954 and a majority of the statistics even earlier.

Part Three discusses the political process under such headings as the bureaucracy, political parties, the electorate, mass media, the intellectuals, political violence, and the decision-making process. In general, these chapters constitute the most successful and rewarding part of the book. The first four of those enumerated above are particularly outstanding—so good, in fact, that they leave one fervently wishing for more. Dr. Ike has an excellent grasp of the actual, as distinguished from the legal and formal, operations of the political process in Japan. This reviewer knows of no more succinct or satisfactory introduction to the country's practical politics. The chapters on the intellectuals and violence in politics, while interesting, are considerably less successful. Their subject matter is hard to categorize, and in the present case the analysis is confined largely to rather vague and tentative generalities. The same is unfortunately true of the chapter on the decision-making process. The book ends with a brief but thoughtful attempt to pull together and explain several major themes which run through Japanese politics.

Dr. Ike's study is hard to evaluate from the professional standpoint. One suspects that it may have been written with a broader and less exacting audience at least partially in mind; the volume is subtitled "An Introductory Survey." This would seem the most probable explanation of the extremely brief and generalized terms in which a

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variety of highly complex institutions and processes are characterized. It seems a shame also that both the text and tables could not have been brought more up to date before publication. Despite such shortcomings, however, one cannot but react with pleasure and approval to the author's attempt to conceive of and treat his subject in primarily operational terms. Theorizing along these lines has been plentiful, but concrete efforts to apply the results on a whole-country basis have been distressingly few. The present book, while very modest in its theoretical commitments, does offer some specific introduction to the possibilities and problems of organizing and presenting this sort of material along somewhat different lines. While no new or more profound insights seem to emerge automatically from the approach itself, the total impression is favorable and promising. It leaves one hoping for further and more far-reaching efforts along similar lines.

IV

A perusal in fairly close sequence of these three studies of Japan is apt to provoke in the reader certain speculations about the status of research and writing in the field of comparative politics viewed in somewhat larger perspective. The comments which follow are of this nature and are intended to apply mainly to the Japanese field, although the writer suspects that they may have broader applicability. They are not directed at the preceding studies, which in fact the writer regards as establishing new and superior standards in these respects.

One wonders first about the necessity of texts, or perhaps, more precisely, about how many of such over-all treatments are needed and how frequently they must be revised or replaced. They are, of course, useful —some would say indispensable—for the average introductory course. But we now have at least four such total and specifically political treatments of Japan published within the last three years. All are workmanlike jobs, representing long and painstaking application upon the part of their authors. Barring major changes in Japan's political circumstances or the development of some radically new approach to the study of these, it seems fair to ask how soon another text will be needed. The economics of publishing in this field are happily such as to preclude the development of a situation such as that presently prevailing in the American government field, but this is not really the point. The problem is that the writing of textbooks beyond a useful minimum number tends to direct scarce talent into lines of activity which are considerably less than optimal in terms of the needs of scholarship in the area as a whole.

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Texts in this field are too seldom based on any very extensive first-hand acquaintance with or observation of the actual course of politics. They represent essentially literary undertakings supplemented by occasional attendance at parliamentary sessions and a scattering of interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, or academic figures. As such, it is difficult for them to transcend the limitations of their sources. Where Japanese politics are concerned, these are many and serious. One must take into consideration, for example, the professional orientation of Japanese scholars. The dominant trend is still heavily legal and analytic. A great deal of outstanding work is being done along these traditional lines, but as a consequence of such commitments relatively little is being done in the area of practical politics. Again, much of this little is partisan, slight, or highly topical and transitory in interest.

There remains, to be sure, a happy residue of systematic and scholarly contributions by a small group of academic men in Japan who are seriously interested in political institutions and the political process in terms similar to our own. But, relative to our needs for precise knowledge in this field, how pitifully few and circumscribed these are! One might add, how overexploited they are by foreign students of Japanese politics! It is virtually impossible, for example, to find a serious discussion of class stratification and Japanese politics which does not rest heavily on Professor Maruyama's 1947 dictum that there exists in Japan a "pseudo- or quasi-intelligentsia" which "creates the so-called voice of the people" and which constituted the principal popular support of Japanese "fascism."[4] The present writer does not dissent from this finding; in fact, he considers it a brilliant and useful perception by one of Japan's outstanding scholars. At the same time, it must be pointed out that this is only a hypothesis derived primarily from its originator's personal insights into the dynamics of Japanese culture. It is not based upon empirical studies; it is but partially and differentially applicable to the lower strata of Japanese society, and requires considerable further elaboration and refinement. A similar caution is appropriate in the case of the equally widely quoted studies of voting behavior by Professor Royama Masamichi and a group of colleagues. While stimulating and very useful, they are based upon small samples of distinctly localized validity.

It is a matter for serious professional concern, then, to find materials of these sorts somewhat uncritically generalized at the national level. There seems to be an emerging tendency—based upon the paucity of

[4] Maruyama Masao, "The Ideology and Movement of Japanese Fascism," *Japan Annual of Law and Politics*, 1 (1952), pp. 95-128.

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Japanese political studies couched in terms amenable to our more practical or behavioristic interests—seriously to overplay and overextend the few, tentative formulations which are available. What the field needs is not more speculation based on such pioneering Japanese efforts, but a lengthy series of intensive field studies aimed at amassing the basic data about Japanese politics necessary to substantiate and refine existing hypotheses and establish new ones. We do not at present have such information, and it seems improbable—owing to considerations of professional orientation, economic status, and research cost—that Japanese scholarship will soon be in a position to make up this deficit. Such a situation would seem to argue the need for a particularly careful marshaling of resources in terms of foreign students of Japanese politics. Conditions are such that they must carry out a significant proportion of the primary field research needed, particularly in areas requiring the extensive use of observational and interview techniques. It is submitted, therefore, that a good deal of more basic and specialized research of this type should be a condition precedent to the production of additional texts on Japanese politics.

Certain other aspects of recent writing about Japanese politics also merit brief comment. One has to do with what might be described as changing fads in theories of motivation and political change. Explanations couched in terms of the relative power of major personalities and groups acting within a set constitutional framework have long been familiar in the field. They provide an interesting contrast to the economic determinism of a large proportion of the Japanese commentators on such subjects. Most recently, however, it would seem that sociological and occasionally psychological explanations have gained the ascendancy. The Japanese think and act as they do politically because of childhood training, the family system or its simulative ramifications, class structure, feudal survivals, hierarchical social predispositions, or an exaggerated sense of obligation. The writer—who cherishes a fondness for such constructs himself—would be the last to reject these attempts to broaden and deepen our understanding of the complex ranges of political causality. It does seem a shame though that so much of the recent writing tends to be rather exclusive in its dedication to one or another combination of such socio-psychological elements. In particular any adequate amount of attention to the economic bases of Japanese political conduct seems no longer to be fashionable. We have not to the present writer's knowledge a single satisfactory article in English on the political background and implications of the present Japanese tax system, no significant case study

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of a major economic pressure group, and no systematic analysis of national or local public budgets which might provide a partial answer to the vital questions posed by Mr. Lasswell's famous title: *Politics—Who Gets What, When, How.* Certainly the economic determinants of Japanese politics merit more attention than this. It is readily possible to accord such recognition without going all the way with the Marxist interpreters.

Again, one is moved to plead for a somewhat more equable balance in the literature between Tokyo and the rest of Japan. The position and importance of Tokyo as the capital and political, administrative, and cultural center of Japan are often—and not ineptly—compared to those of Paris in France. They are in fact so regarded by most Japanese. The vast majority of foreign scholars have also tended to accept this postulate and it is reflected to an unfortunate degree in their writings. Without denying the centrality of Tokyo in Japanese politics, it is still true that Japan is by European, if not American, standards a large and complex country with far more regional variation than is generally appreciated. The political structure centering in Tokyo is to a significant and increasing extent based on and influenced by its local constituencies throughout Japan; the administrative apparatus operates and comes into contact with its several publics throughout the forty-six prefectures. There is a rich variety of other fascinating and fruitful, albeit secondary, political arenas to be explored in the country. If an adequate understanding of Japanese political attitudes, behavior, and institutions is our goal, these cannot continue to be ignored or neglected. There is a one-dimensionality about much recent writing on Japan, which is at least partially due to excessive concentration on the national level viewed from Tokyo. A modest exposure to politics elsewhere in the country would add depth and verisimilitude to such work.

One further matter requires notice. This concerns the degree to which qualities of uniqueness and exoticism are attributed to the Japanese political system. There seems to be an almost irresistible tendency when we pass from an analysis of our own politics to those of non-Western societies to regard the latter as qualitatively different. This is professionally convenient in the sense that it leaves one free to tailor a new and perhaps more theoretically or aesthetically satisfying set of explanations for the item under examination; it emancipates one to some degree from the more rigorous styles of exposition and proof which would be demanded were a corresponding question of domestic politics involved. This is the process which not infrequently culminates in spacious speculations on the Asian mind, Japanese national character,

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unique Oriental sets of perception and reasoning, and so forth. Such studies have come to constitute a genre of Asian political mythology, fascinating, superficially persuasive, and occasionally insightful and useful. But is it not notable that in recent times this type of "high-level" analysis and explanation seems to flourish and even gain some measure of scholarly acceptance particularly with respect to Asian societies and institutions? Similar theories, if advanced with respect to domestic political phenomena, would receive short shrift. We are not very tolerant of such simplistic explanations in areas we understand better. Contemplating such a phenomenon, the eminent author of "Parkinson's Law" would doubtless conclude that, within a given field, facility of generalization is inversely proportional to the magnitude of available information multiplied by its coefficient of exoticism.

This is not to deny the validity or value of the search for either generalizations or political differences, but only to complain that, in the process, the common foundations of politics are so often overlooked or neglected. The basic problems of government are the same, East or West. Although attitudes, behavior patterns, and institutional forms widely vary, the political scientist is, or should be, striving to answer the same fundamental questions regardless of whether his area of concern is Japan, France or, for that matter, the United States. The acceptance of such a premise should prove of practical utility in research on non-Western politics in several respects. It discourages the academic version of the "My, aren't the natives quaint (lovable, unspoiled)?" type of approach to the study of political problems. It is hostile to political analyses and explanations cast in unique or nationally self-contained terms. And it may do something to persuade a fair share of both the popular and the scholarly worlds that simplistic explanations are no more admissible with respect to Asian political phenomena than they are with respect to the results of our last presidential election. The politics of Japan are fully as "complex," as "mature," as those of the United States. We are no closer to the discovery of some master principle informing and explaining all political phenomena in the former than in the latter case. What we need actually is a far more extensive effort to narrow the methodological gap existing between research standards and practices in the domestic and the Japanese fields. Such an effort should do much to exorcise the above-noted tendencies toward theorizing about Japanese politics in unique and exotic terms.

Finally, with respect to this practice of distinguishing sharply between politics East and politics West, it might be noted that the dichotomy seems most compelling when we oppose American or British at-

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titudes and conduct to those of any Asian state. The impression conveyed to the reader or student by such juxtapositions tends to be polarized. The emphasis is placed upon maximal social and political differences, in superstructure at least. In this sense it might well be claimed that the most familiar analogy is the most misleading. So much depends upon what the writer selects as an exemplar of "Western" characteristics. Where the illumination of Asian society and politics by means of comparative data drawn from Western experience is concerned, much is to be said for the use of a broader geographic scatter of "Western" referents. For example, a quite different—and, the present writer would claim, more realistic and useful—picture of popular political attitudes in Japan emerges if the discussion can be geared to illustrations drawn from southeastern or central Europe, Italy, or Germany, as well as from the more familiar but more variant American and British patterns. For that matter, the same is true on the Asian side, where a similar internal grading occurs in many cases. Viewed in this manner, it becomes apparent that usually one is dealing with several graded series of social and political attitudes and institutions rather than with sharp and discontinuous contrasts. This leaves one wondering to what extent East is East and West is West, a subversive sort of speculation apt to find scant favor among Mr. Kipling's latter-day disciples.

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SOME LIGHT ON THE FAR EAST

By MARION J. LEVY, JR.

Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1957, 556 pp. $7.50.

Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. I: *Introductory Orientations*, Cambridge, England, and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1954, 318 pp. $10.00; Vol. II: *History of Scientific Thought*, Cambridge, England, and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1956, 696 pp. $14.50.

I

IT is altogether fitting that these two works on the Far East should be highly controversial despite their obvious merits. On the surface, the work of Professor Wittfogel and that of Professor Needham seem to be a world apart: the one concerned with despotic bureaucracy, the other with the history of science and technology in China. The men who wrote them no doubt regard the gulf that separates them as enormous. It is on many points. Yet they draw curiously near together as products of our time. On strictly intellectual grounds, each derives directly from a Marxist background, and the major shortcomings of each man's work flow so directly from his strength that each might seem to illustrate a theorem of tragedy.

Each author makes clear his intellectual indebtedness to Karl Marx, and each, for very different reasons, is extremely proud of this indebtedness. Many of the differences between them flow from aspects of Marxism with which it is not necessary to deal here. For general purposes, I am concerned solely with Marxism as an intellectual theory of historical development—more specifically, with "vulgar Marxism." In using the term "vulgar Marxism," I have in mind the theory of economic determinism. Regardless of where this may have originated, it is widely attributed to Marx; at least, he gave a powerful formulation to something closely resembling it. This theory holds all change to be a function of the economic variable. As such, it is a monistic theory. It is correspondingly not a scientific theory. In this form it is either true but meaningless, or meaningful but false.

Vulgar Marxism has had wide intellectual currency. It has been proclaimed in one form or another by an enormous number of people who regard themselves, quite properly, as in complete opposition to all that Marx is said to have fathered politically and socially. It is, for example, the essence of all the "carrot and stick" discussions of

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human motivation. This simplification is radically unfair to Marx, but it has a certain strength. As soon as one makes the position of Marx less "vulgar," it is exceedingly difficult to tell what, if anything, he said.

The popular spread of economic determinism took place in this "vulgar" form along with many subsidiary theories of class, the class struggle, etc. It is not difficult to guess at some of the factors that made such analysis appealing. Marx presented his work just at the time that the greatest one-way case of cultural transformation in the history of the world was becoming obvious. What we now call the modern industrial societies were in the process of industrializing. As they were transformed and came into contact peaceably or otherwise with other societies in the world, the social fabric of the other societies began to crumble or change—usually in the direction of the patterns of the more "modern" societies. Of course, the most striking features of the "new" societies to the observers of that period were generally those aspects which were considered to be "purely economic." Indeed, in both the intellectual and the lay worlds, history gives us no larger instance of the mass commission of the fallacy of reification. The "economic" interpretation caught on, and throughout the world today an enormous number of objective analyses and most discussions of social good and evil, both domestic and international, continue in these terms.

II

Professor Wittfogel seems to me a much clearer intellectual descendant of Marx than Professor Needham, who almost seems a Marxist *malgré lui* in the purely intellectual aspects of his work. Professor Wittfogel traces his work most importantly to the discussions of "oriental society" in Marx, though one of the dazzling aspects of his scholarship is the general tracing of these ideas down through intellectual history.[1] There is neither the time nor the space here to make a précis of so complicated a work. I must vulgarize it.

Professor Wittfogel concerns himself with societies which have faced the problems of handling large quantities of water, primarily for irrigation purposes. Usually these societies have involved very sizable populations. Their technology has frequently been very highly advanced by any standards applicable prior to the seventeenth century, but it has explicitly not been modern industrial technology. The need to organize

[1] On the other hand, one of the least rewarding aspects of *Oriental Despotism* in the intellectual sense is the pursuit and punishment of those intellectual and political figures whom Professor Wittfogel regards as having perverted the true lesson of Marx either ignorantly or meretriciously or both. Marx himself is not immune to the lash. Such hot pursuit may, of course, be of the greatest importance for other purposes.

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relatively unskilled labor on a very large scale has been one of its most important aspects. Relative to other non-modernized societies, such oriental societies are characterized by large-scale bureaucracies. The bureaucracies form the arms of the chief executive. Judicial and legislative functions are not on the whole clearly differentiated from these administrators, who are subordinated to a chief executive. Attention is focused on the monopolization of power as such. Goods and services when needed in extra amounts can always be levied if power is properly maintained. Life for the non-bureaucrat is seldom solitary, but is perennially poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Any particular member of the bureaucracy is also vulnerable. For Professor Wittfogel, these have been the most despotic social organizations in history, and he might perhaps be forgiven for feeling that all others, including modern dictatorships, are far inferior on the axis of despotism, save for the fact that, as he points out, the largest remaining one is an oriental type in essence. On this score, the work occasionally reads like a political tract, but the analysis as a whole is certainly a major contribution.

Professor Wittfogel is most interested in two things: water and power. Property, as such, he shows to be much less relevant. To analyze the implications of the one for the other, he brings to bear a literally overwhelming reference to different social contexts. Unless I am mistaken, only Australia and Antarctica are untouched as continental settings. The matter is further complicated by the fact that Professor Wittfogel's scholarship with regard to many different stages of history within the individual examples chosen is no less impressive than the breadth of the examples themselves. The problem raised by this erudition is the first example of the "tragedy" involved in the intrinsic strength of these authors. With the exception of a few individuals like Professor Toynbee, probably no reader of *Oriental Despotism* will be competent to criticize the data as a whole, or even to follow a great deal of it intelligently. For most of the data I must rely on the author's intellectual integrity, erudition, and judgment. The first does not worry me, for he is above all a dedicated man in this field. For the latter two, the volume will have to await the testimony of experts. Nevertheless, it appears to me that much of the material might have been relegated to appendices, for in its present form it interrupts the main flow of the work for both the general reader and the expert.

The chief burden of the work is one to make scholars rejoice for many reasons. First and least important, perhaps, is the fact that we are now in possession of a work that has long been tantalizingly promised by the author. Secondly, it develops the implications of water and power

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for societies on a broad comparative basis. Thirdly, the analysis proceeds rather rigorously in terms of the requisites for systems of particular types. It is one of the most systematic examples we have of such analysis. Fourthly, it should end forever the loose application of the term "feudalism" to such societies as Imperial China from at least the Han period on.[2] Last, but by no means least, the work contains an enormous number of fascinating subsidiary hypotheses about bureaucracies, social change, applications of force and threats of force as social means, property, leadership, etc. Beyond question, whatever one may think of the author, who has long rejoiced in controversy, it is a work in the grand manner. It defies simple summary, and it will give a great variety of scholars something to chew on for many years.

In many respects, this book is a notable advance in both breadth and sophistication over Professor Wittfogel's previous work on the subject. This is not an unmixed blessing. Some years ago Professor Wittfogel appeared to scholars as a rather special form of determinist, directly in the Marxist intellectual tradition. For him there seemed to be a general over-all economic determinism and, within that overarching form, a special geographic-hydraulic determinism. In the present work he is much more cautious. Again and again, he explicitly disavows determinism (e.g., pp. 16-18) and speaks of "genuine choice." However, the abandonment of monistic determinism does not constitute a major gain, since the author fails to advance any hypothesis as to why the choices fell as they did. Hence the mention of choice seems a reluctant concession to criticism of deterministic theories as such and, on this one score, the work is left in an almost mystical state.

The author does leave the purely theoretical level, however, and adjourns to a purely empirical one. He says, "Manifestly, no irresistible necessity compelled man to utilize the new opportunities. The situation was open, and the hydro-agricultural course was only one of several possible choices. Nevertheless, man took this course so frequently and in so many separate areas that we may assume regularity in evaluation as well as procedure" (p. 16). Once this proposition is made, the argument proceeds strongly, though not monistically. What is alleged is almost always clear—e.g., "Terror is the inevitable consequence of the rulers' resolve to uphold their own and not the people's rationality optimum" (p. 137). Indeed, it is for such strong statements that the volume is important. Most of these propositions are such that either their proof or their disproof leads to other interesting hypotheses. Furthermore, they are propositions about extremely general problems with

[2] It is a pity that Professor Needham lacked the advantage of consulting this work.

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extremely general implications. It is this sort of thinking rather than a narrow concern for accuracy that has been the essence of other scientific progress. In science generally, it has been more important to be fruitful than to be "right." The pursuit of precision itself in science is primarily justified by the fact that in the absence of precision the question of fruitfulness can frequently not be answered at all.

The main theoretical weakness of this volume is in some respects a function of the fascination that motivated it all along. All things considered, Professor Wittfogel's value judgments are not difficult to separate from his analysis. But the reader is never for a moment in any doubt that the author is horrified by oriental despotism. For him it *is* social evil. He sketches the requisites for such a system in a highly interesting fashion, but for him it is literally a system of total power concentration. *All* power falls to the ruler. The details of this analysis are often brilliant, as in the discussions of why members of the bureaucracy as such are not the loci of power, but the argument as a whole goes much too far. The author knows perfectly well that history is replete with such rulers who have died (and worms have eaten them) and such regimes which have fallen apart at the seams. In essence, however, he fails to account for this, save in terms of individual idiosyncrasies. The inept are no doubt a powerful explanatory element in history, but they are not a wholly sufficient one, especially in the face of the fact that many of these regimes have been maintained despite spectacular ineptitude (as the author also points out). Professor Wittfogel tends to undervalue two cardinal problems that focus on power. One is the classical question of *quis custodiet ipsos custodes*, and the other has to do with allocations of power which are not balanced by allocations of responsibility.

As far as the guards are concerned, the author has a great deal to say about the extreme efficiency of limited applications of force, especially in the face of apparent willingness and ability to use unlimited applications of force. But none of these regimes approached pure coercion. As the author notes, not only did the people conceive themselves to get many benefits from these regimes, but there were structural limits on the freedom of the absolute rulers. In one way or another, the underlying population could be pushed to either rebellion or apathy, and either could be fatal for such regimes. In China at least, the dynastic cycle was not a simple matter of palace revolutions. The speed with which a new dynasty (whether foreign or domestic) renovated rather than revolutionized most of the old system from Han times on argues against any concept of total power without regard to extremely general

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social reactions. Able but capricious men could not have continued those systems unrenovated.

Here we run into a major contrast between the large-scale engineering works of these societies and those of modern industrial ones. As Professor Wittfogel points out, large-scale planning, great ingenuity, and highly co-ordinated administration were necessary to execute these works. In general, however, their rate of obsolescence was extremely low and, just as important, their rate of depreciation was also frequently low; at least, both rates were low by contrast with modern industrial technology. A well-engineered oriental despotism might take a considerable time to run down; a well-engineered modern industrial society does not. In any case, given the role of hydraulic works in these societies, if the wielders of power ignored them or other elements in the social organization, they were doomed. In China at least, there were always certain danger signs—most notably, a rising rate of tenancy as opposed to peasant land-ownership.

At one time it was fashionable to speak of authoritarian regimes in general as though there were no problem of *quis custodiet*. . . . This is no longer fashionable, but now it is frequently assumed that they can only be brought down in a blood bath. But even here we have an exception—modern Turkey—in which a dictator's party permitted itself to be voted out of power. One gets from Professor Wittfogel's work the distinct impression that, once these regimes are erected, there is no way out save to cut through the ruin and debris of their disintegration. This has certainly been so in a large number of historical cases, and in some the road cut through the debris led the survivors back to the same system. Surely, however, both for policy and for scientific purposes, we foreclose the field if we confuse the empirically frequent with the possible.

Closely related to the one-way aspect of total power is the lack of balance of that power by responsibility. Professor Wittfogel starts his discussion of this on page 106 and in one form or another continues it through most of the volume. No one can doubt that there can be power without balancing responsibility, and the author presents many instances of this. But in the absence of such balances, systems tend to be unstable. Power in the absence of responsibility tends always to lead to capricious acts. Gaps in human knowledge, let alone the alleged corrosive effects of power on human character, can account for this. I cannot speak for most of the systems to which Professor Wittfogel refers, but China, it may be argued, had more structural checks and balances (such as the delegation of power to subordinates) than he admits. The

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doctrine of the Will of Heaven and the simple fact that any successful revolt was prima facie evidence that the previous sovereign had lost that Will do not seem to me to have been negligible social patterns, particularly since any other social malfunctioning (as judged by the members of that society) also had its implications for the locus of the Will of Heaven.

This sort of comment does not destroy the main fabric of Professor Wittfogel's remarks. He notes in passing many elements of the above sort. For example, beginning on page 112 he discusses some degrees of freedom from total social control. Nevertheless, the general tenor is to regard these as subtleties of the possibilities and not as the essence of them. I suspect that in the cases of oriental despotism which have shown great stability, such as that in China, some of these subtleties are of the essence, if the stability of the system is to be understood at all. However, it may well have been that preoccupation with such qualifications would have denied us the largest systematic treatment of non-modernized, bureaucratic governmental organization which has yet been presented.

There remains a further general step for which no scholar is better qualified than Professor Wittfogel. What of the relationship of all this to "despotism" in general? Although the author is careful to note that there have been other types of "despotism" (e.g., that Japan was never a *full-blown* case of oriental despotism), this reader at least comes away with the feeling that the oriental societies with which he deals reached the zenith of massive applications of coercion, cruelty, etc. One wonders, though. Other historical instances are so notable in their achievements on this score that one may be forgiven for discounting their differences and asking what they have in common—especially since we have now learned so much about what certain special cases of man's inhumanity to man have in common.

III

In turning to Professor Needham's two volumes, the problem of review is no less complicated. Although confined to a single country and, in essence, to a single aspect there, this work would be far more than a life's work for most people. It, too, is prodigiously learned, whatever its faults. It presents special difficulties to a reviewer because it is incomplete; we have as yet only the first two of seven volumes, and they bring us only to the beginning of the main aim of the work, which is to present a history of science in China carried to the point at which

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the streams of Chinese thought and Western thought merged inextricably. There can be no doubt that these two volumes constitute the longest and most important preface that we have to any work in the Far Eastern field.

The first volume states the aim and aspirations of the study. They are on the whole both moving and laudable. Professor Needham addresses his work specifically to "all educated people, whether themselves scientists or not, who are interested in the history of science, scientific thought and technology, in relation to the general history of civilization, and especially the comparative development of Asia and Europe." This is a large order in more ways than one, and the author hopes that his work will aid the cause of international understanding as well as that of learning. On an *ad hominem* basis relevant to this work, one may allege that Professor Needham has three great intellectual love affairs: one with science, one with China, and a third with Marxism. The absence of any one of these experiences would have denied us these volumes.

Aimed at a general audience and not at professional sinologists alone, the first volume represents an extensive introduction to China as a whole. Professor Needham discusses bibliography, language, geography, history, ancient Western contacts, and many other matters. In evaluating it, one must reckon with the fact that the extant records on China in the periods dealt with are unmatched in number, variety, and quality by those on any other large-scale society. The scholarship devoted to them is immense, complicated, and devoted, but it is still slight in terms of the available material to be exploited. Even so, for any single scholar to attempt to range over these materials as Professor Needham does would appear outrageously arrogant, were he not so obviously and humbly dedicated to so great a goal and did he not possess a keen perception of the difficulties involved. The first volume alone, if taken merely as a summary background discussion of many problems on which something must be known if the subject of China is to be pursued at all, is a major contribution; and one should pay tribute to the prose style of the author, who has the gift of writing about abstruse questions so as to be understood, without contemptuously writing down.

Volume II continues to be introductory, but it comes to closer grips with the main aim of the work. It seeks to present the chief intellectual influences brought to bear on the development of Chinese scientific ideas—to explain why they developed as they did and not otherwise. This volume, too, is prodigiously learned. The author discusses many, if not all, variants of Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, Buddhism, etc.

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He discusses the development of Western science. He even throws in, with obvious relish, some fascinating speculation on the impact of Chu Hsi and others on Leibnitz, with who can say what implications for even our present and future science.

Now to the problems raised: No one possesses a better awareness than Professor Needham of the difficulties of dealing with original Chinese materials. It is not a matter of accident that the work of most of our sinologists so far has been tied very closely to linguistic matters. The author discusses his linguistic limitations quite frankly, but he leaves us with a mystery: he is either the most modest sinologist in history in regard to his own grasp of the Chinese language, or one is at a complete loss to explain his enormously detailed references to an enormously varied range of Chinese sources. This question is important. As Professor Needham is the first to point out, his interpretation of many of these texts is a radical one. It is also a uniform one.

Professor Needham feels impelled to support certain theses which I find highly questionable. What is more relevant, perhaps, is that each of these is essentially beside the point so far as the main burden of the whole work is concerned. The first two volumes serve legitimately as introduction to what is to come, but they are also preoccupied with a by-product of the work as a whole—an explanation of why scientific development in China was not like that in the West. Here the love affairs with Marxism and China come to the fore. Professor Needham is at great pains to show that Chinese thought was in no simple sense inferior, and the explanations of difference that he offers are Marxist ones. Unlike Professor Wittfogel, Professor Needham seems to have learned the lessons of Marxism by rote, as he learned Chinese characters. His basic intellectual discipline came out of a previous career in biochemistry, which is quite another matter indeed. The resultant overlay is amateurish.

What are some of his theses? (1) The Taoists were *the* great intellectual force in Chinese history so far as the development of science is concerned. (2) The Taoists essentially prefigured what Professor Needham considers to be the "world view" basis of the most modern and sophisticated science. Indeed, one may almost say that they had such notions as relativity. (3) The villains of the intellectual piece were "feudalism" and its spokesmen, the Confucianists. (The role might have fallen to the Legalists, but they were cast into the dustbin of history for being prematurely over-reactionary.) China never really escaped their villainy during the period discussed, having merely gone from "feudalism" to "feudal bureaucratism" (both undefined). (4) One

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of the reasons why the Taoists were the heroes of the piece is that they were, presumably, faithfully preoccupied with the virtues of "pre-feudal" Chinese society. This state seems to have approximated either Rousseau's beatific state of nature or the virtues of the classless society after the political state has withered away—or some combination of the two. In any case, life in those halcyon days was presumably co-operative, good, pleasing, civic, and long. (5) Not only did the Taoists form the true essence of the Chinese spirit and maintain a reservoir from which such scientific interests as escaped the Confucian crushing could dip inspiration, but these delightful folk-Marxists (why they are not explicitly perceived to have anticipated Marx, I cannot understand) also preserved and perpetuated the perfect basis on which the new China can skip Newtonianism in science as it may skip the heavy-metal or coal-energetic phases of technology. (6) Belief in a stern, orderly, monotheistic, juridical divinity probably made the major difference in the development of modern science in the West. One could go on.

Perhaps the basic problem of this whole approach is the apparent underlying feeling that the seeds of development of modern science, if not implicit in all societies, are certainly present in all admirable, highly sophisticated ones. Therefore the lack of modern scientific development in China must be accounted for in terms of rather specific blocks. Intuitively, this implicit position recommends itself for good reason. It can be maintained quite easily that no society can exist without some appreciation of rational action, and this of course involves some interest, no matter how pragmatic, in the combination of inductive and deductive thinking. Science certainly involves this. Modern science, however, involves a great deal more. Paramount is the realization of the part played by a highly generalized system of theory, with all of its subsidiary propositions interrelated explicitly or, with gaps in those explicit interrelations, furnishing the basis for further explorations. There is no obvious reason to expect this realization to catch on even with men of genius in any society. What we regard as the flowering of modern science may well be the most exotic cultural blossom in all history. The problem may be not what stunted the plant elsewhere but rather why such a mutation took place in the West. Perhaps because forced reliance on Aristotelian logic to handle many empirical problems continued for so long, the revolt, when it did come, did not throw the baby of deduction and generalization out with the bath which had foreclosed observation, experiment, and verification.

Specifically, Professor Needham's interpretations of the Taoists and of the society preceding the feudal one are going to cause much contro-

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versy which should be irrelevant to this work. These interpretations require sinologists who are expert, and highly expert, in these texts. I am not such an expert, and if Professor Needham has not been overly modest about his linguistic ability, he is not either. In reviews by scholars such as A. Wright[3] and L. S. Yang,[4] these assaults have already begun. Even Professor D. Bodde, who hails the work as a classic,[5] quite properly raises a large number of questions. It is ironic at least that all the author's reinterpretations seem to support an ideologically apt revision. If the future history of sinology proves him correct, we shall have the minor mystery of explaining the basis for such diverse error in the face of so obvious and consistent a correct understanding.

Now what of the prefiguring of the position of modern science, even of the theory of relativity itself? There is a sense in which no theory is easier to interpret as prefigured than one of the relativity type. All one needs apparently is any passage in which one's perception of X is not absolute but a function of one or more other factors. Any unwary man who can be translated as having said, "That depends on how you look at it," has, I suppose, in some sense prefigured Einstein.[6] One may question the meaningfulness of this as a pastime. One may better ask whether such a view can become the basis of further development for latecomers to modern science unless it finds a place for the very important remnants of Newtonianism. In a general theoretical sense we now know Newton to be disproved, but this has no more eliminated the relevance of much of Newton than the discoveries of non-Aristotelian logic constituted refutations of all Aristotelian logic.

One should be careful to distinguish between even the "most authentic" authentic pedigree and actual anticipation of an idea or concept. Without touching on the complexities of interpreting the Taoists, this crops up again and again in discussions of the history of atomic and nuclear physics. The term "atom" comes to us from the Greeks. But the atomism of Democritus is not a rudimentary form of atomic or nuclear physics. To say so takes no credit from Democritus and the rest. It only distinguishes between brilliant bare beginnings and indefinitely different fruit. Even if there were no problems of interpretation, the same should be said of Professor Needham's Taoists.

[3] In the *American Historical Review*, LXII, No. 4 (July 1957), pp. 918-20.

[4] Review of Vol. I in the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XVIII, Nos. 1 and 2 (June 1955), pp. 270-83; review of Vol. II pending.

[5] In the *Journal of Asian Studies*, XVI, No. 2 (February 1957), pp. 261-71.

[6] There is some question as to whether Professor Needham's illustrative quotation (Vol. II, p. 82) is not a much better example of Taoist sensitivity to perspective than of a prefigured relativity. Indeed, it may actually contradict relativity theory.

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Now what of the obstacles to scientific development? Confucianists and "feudalism" are the villains. Confucianists have been so highly and sentimentally regarded for so long that I suppose one need not feel compassion for what modern thinkers are surely going to do to them. I suppose they can look forward to a subsequent period of rehabilitation. In any precise sense of the term "feudal," referring to the sort of social arrangements which we associate with "feudal" Europe, China was not "feudal" from the beginning of the Han Dynasty on, let alone during the dynasty which preceded it. Fortunately one may be spared going into the details of this here. The term "feudal" is part of the Marxist veneer on Professor Needham's work. It may mislead the lay reader, but not if he is wary. For most of Chinese history is described by Professor Needham as "feudal bureaucratic," and the term "feudal" is at no time defined. In accordance with popular usage of the term in recent years, its meaning to Professor Needham would seem to be a society somehow regarded as out of date, one in which there is a great deal of suffering from the point of view of the author and great discrepancies in wealth and, above all, one which is regarded as "bad." If one reads the term "feudal" in a more precise historical sense, the propositions involving the concept are wrong. If one takes it in the other sense suggested above, it tells us much of the author's affect but little of history.

Another reviewer has already challenged Professor Needham strongly on his views on the history of Western science.[7] The worst part about Professor Needham's vulnerability is that it is all so unnecessary. The great benefit that this work promises is an encyclopedic treatment of the Chinese contributions to science and technology. Even a first essay of this sort, with all the revisions that time will require, cannot avoid importance. But except for background purposes, which are brilliantly served in some respects and highly suspect in others, these first two volumes are beside the point of that major promise. In view of the author's scientific background and his zeal, it is unlikely that his Marxist veneer and sentimentalism about China will prevent a major delivery on that promise. The first two volumes do, however, call for caution in regard to those to follow whenever they leave description and attempt analysis and judgment.

The major problem raised by Professor Wittfogel's and Professor Needham's works is their impact on the future. Both are undertaken

[7] Charles C. Gillispie, "Perspectives," *American Scientist*, XLV, No. 2 (March 1957), pp. 169-76.

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on such a grand scale that they are likely to foreclose for our time any comparable effort. Uncritical acceptance of them will stagnate much work and thought on the Far East; both are sufficiently powerful and impressive to have this effect. For this to happen would, of course, horrify either Professor Wittfogel or Professor Needham. As the hard-working authors of what are often brilliant bases for future work, both leave scholars much in their debt.

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ON NATO POOLING

By MALCOLM W. HOAG

Ronald S. Ritchie, *NATO: The Economics of an Alliance*, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1956, 147 pp. $3.00.
Anne M. Warburton and John B. Wood, *Paying for NATO*, London, Friends of Atlantic Union, 1956, 46 pp. 2/6d.

I

THOSE who have participated in international ventures requiring a pooling of resources often emphasize the need for a dramatic sense of urgency about realizing mutual gain that subordinates the troublesome problem of precisely how the gain ought to be distributed among the participants. For NATO, of course, fear supplies the urgency. And—let us admit it—the vexations of its trying early days were greatly eased by the untiring and sincere moralizing of the first SHAPE Commander. This moralizing was and is hardly a substitute for incisive strategic planning, but it is a cohesive force, while a rigorous analysis of military alternatives may not be. In stressing the unprocurability of assured security these days, such an analysis, on the one hand, underscores the desirability of getting more defense from limited resources by taking advantage of an international division of military labor. Hence the new popularity of "interdependence." On the other hand, such an analysis may breed defeatism and a desire to seek protection through neutralism rather than through arms. Or, short of this, it may breed apathy about making a military effort which at best can contribute only marginally to the total armed strength of the alliance. Because of a growing appreciation of the unappealing nature of the military alternatives, a diminution in the fear of Soviet intentions, and a flagging of missionary zeal, the drive toward a real pooling of effort in NATO weakened after the 1950-1952 burst. The noble efforts of Messrs. Pearson, Lange, and Martino to supply a new motivation seem to have accomplished little. But now comes Sputnik to do perhaps what reasoned analysis and exhortation both failed to do—galvanize the allies into new co-operative efforts.

The books under review urge greater pooling of effort in NATO, especially of the military research and development efforts that are most likely to be affected by Sputnik. This review concentrates upon this theme and, more briefly, upon burden-sharing. The general nature of the two volumes can be characterized only in passing.

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Ritchie's short book supplies a general critical account of NATO's history and current problems. As such it will be useful, for example, in international relations survey courses. For other purposes, Ritchie's treatment exemplifies the familiar dilemma of such a survey: neither colloquial nor brief enough to make a wide impression as journalism, it lacks the depth and penetration required to make a special contribution to NATO scholarship. The treatment is untheoretical and impressionistic, hence qualifying fully neither as political or economic science nor as systematic history. For one thing, it lacks documentation. Consequently the serious student will not find this book a substitute for the analytical articles and source materials available elsewhere. But it will provide less specialized readers with a lucid and compact inspection of the field.

The pamphlet by Warburton and Wood makes no pretense of being a complete survey of NATO. Taking a general political knowledge on the part of their readers for granted, the authors address themselves immediately to current policy. They seek first to jolt us from complacency: "The 'co-ordinated defence production programme' has achieved virtually nothing (p. 5). . . . the Strategic Air Forces of both Britain and America are beyond the control of the N.A.T.O. Commands. . . . that work would soon *begin* on the unified radar warning system for Europe, must have come as a shock to all those who had assumed that such a system had been in operation for some years (p. 6). . . . But our defence is not adequate" (p. 7). They propose, second, some immediate steps toward a greater internationalization of defense programs and associated cost-sharing. They say a great deal clearly in but 39 pages of text, making it a pleasant duty to check their opinions against those of other NATO specialists.

II

When it comes to recommending immediate steps, the proposals of Warburton and Wood are modest: "We suggest that N.A.T.O. should have at its disposal, say, not less than £25 m. and not more than £50 m. per year, primarily for use in encouraging military research and development. This money should be subscribed by each country in the same proportions used for the infrastructure [fixed installations in Europe] programme, but the fund would be separately administered" (pp. 24-25). Ritchie's proposals are not comparably specific, but, if anything, they imply more sweeping integration, especially in the area of research and development (R & D).

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There is much to be said in favor of initiating formal pooling arrangements in a modest way, concentrating upon matériel and, more narrowly, upon R & D efforts aimed at new matériel. Modest beginnings have the obvious merit of enhanced practicality. Dependence upon allies for matériel involves considerably less political risk than dependence upon them for military forces. For example, one ally may insist upon retaining a sizable army, despite high manpower costs that make it an inefficient supplier of this type of force for collective purposes compared with another ally, because the army can be used for unilateral purposes as well. But for both purposes the army can use weapons obtained wherever they can be most efficiently produced. If all-out wars must be fought quickly with existing stocks of arms, and if peripheral national wars can be fought with but small drains upon such stocks, the risk of relying upon foreign supply becomes small for these, the most likely kinds of wars.[1] Finally, in the R & D field, a pooling of knowledge alone may often produce extremely useful results otherwise obtainable only by lengthy and expensive independent research programs.

These are obviously strong arguments, and they are compelling either when there are no associated disadvantages of pooling R & D efforts and the production of new weapons, or when the question of offsetting disadvantages has been made irrelevant by prior commitment. The prominent current example is supplied by plans to develop and produce Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) in the United States, although they are to be based in the territory of and largely supported by our allies. It would be economic folly for each ally to develop an IRBM of its own, while, on the other hand, it is much cheaper for Europeans to man the missile installations than for Americans to do so. And there are great economies of scale in actual production that can be realized by concentrating upon one source of supply. As compared with a mass-produced civilian product like an automobile, an IRBM is extremely complex and expensive, and far fewer of any one model are to be produced. Consequently producers have to learn a lot about manu-

[1] Grant military aid by the United States, however, stipulates that the equipment supplied must be used only for self- or collective defense. If this stipulation is rigidly enforced, it is risky for our allies to depend upon these supplies, inasmuch as they could not use the supplies in military ventures like the recent Anglo-French conflict in Egypt. But it appears that the stipulation is not rigidly enforced, and probably could not be. In this case the stipulation merely creates inefficiency in our military aid programs because U.S. officials (1) are constrained to look to the equipment "deficiencies" of the forces formally assigned to collective defense ("NATO-committed") to the neglect of more important deficiencies elsewhere in allied forces that are equally relevant for emergency collective action; and (2) become involved in tediously keeping track of the equipment supplied to no special purpose.

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facturing such an item, they learn mostly by doing, and they are still learning when production ceases. Unit costs can be expected to decline appreciably as the volume of production concentrated at one place increases.

Incidentally, this simple point that the economies of pooling are to be realized by concentrating production, not by spreading it, is sometimes overlooked. Ritchie, for example, cites approvingly the fact that the Netherlands has produced aircraft of British design fitted with Belgian-manufactured engines, and that Italy has assembled U.S. Sabres (p. 66). These were examples of international co-operation, to be sure, but they represented an uneconomic diversion of aircraft production from the United Kingdom and United States, respectively, in order that someone else could start at the expensive end of the "learning curve" to produce aircraft soon to be obsolete. This is not the way to reduce waste. And will the as yet unspecified proposals of the United States for a new pooling of production in NATO move toward concentration or dispersal?

The major danger in stressing gains from matériel pooling, however, is that greater if more elusive gains from forces specialization may be overlooked. Worse, what looks like mutual gain from matériel pooling may disappear when broader political-strategic repercussions are taken into account. The IRBM's in particular must be analyzed in a far broader context than one that considers production economies alone. They can be so installed and controlled that their military utility is negative. Suppose expenditures on their physical installations and associated defenses are skimped as an "economy" measure. This makes sense only if there is a reasonable possibility that the IRBM's might be fired before their sites are attacked. In that case, they need not be elaborately protected while the weight of deterring Soviet all-out attack rests with other elements of our Strategic Air Command that are securely protected elsewhere. But there is not a reasonable possibility that the United States and the host nation can agree quickly on the most fateful of all decisions—the decision to initiate all-out war by firing unrecallable missiles when the Soviets have not yet launched a comparable assault. The remaining role for IRBM's is to retaliate against precisely such a Soviet attack, which means against an attack in which our IRBM's have been prime targets. Because our IRBM's will be within range of even Soviet medium bombers, and with radar warning times of their approach little greater than what the United States might receive for ICBM attacks, our IRBM sites can be hit with very heavy attacks quickly. Protecting them adequately against so vast a threat is

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obviously a very formidable task. Yet if it is shirked or if it turns out to be infeasible, the retaliatory capability vanishes. With this capability non-existent, and with a pre-emptive attack capability denied us in all probability by unavoidable political constraints, we could end with virtually no military utility from our IRBM's. Yet their sizable expense will detract from our military capabilities elsewhere, so their net utility could be negative.

It is reasonable to hope that we will be sensible enough to avoid this negation of our missile efforts. But the true efficiency goal of minimizing the cost of maintaining a real military capability can easily be perverted, given our necessarily complex administrative procedures and limited vision, to minimizing the cost of maintaining a military force of stated size. When the big bill for IRBM's is totaled, measures to reduce their vulnerability to enemy attack may themselves be vulnerable to the budget-cutters who, in their zeal to eliminate "fringe items," may blindly strip our installations of their most important features. *How* we pool our missile efforts will determine whether and how much mutual gain is realized. In a field where incantations in the loaded terms of "nuclear sharing" and "equality in modern weapons" all too often substitute for analysis, sober planning is urgently required.

Other examples of matériel pooling in NATO are unlikely to raise comparably important strategic problems. Some may raise none. Most, however, are likely to raise perplexing problems of technological uncertainty. The more we focus upon the Research end of the continuum Research—Development—Production, the more such problems dominate and the less we can predict the outcomes of particular programs. The problem of planning sensible R & D programs becomes enormously difficult. How shall we appraise the comparative usefulness of weapons that will be available only a decade from now, if they become available at all? How gauge the probabilities of technical successes? In particular, how hedge against R & D failure by a strategy of multiple attacks upon technological obstacles that only with the advantage of hindsight will be seen to have involved "wasteful" duplication of effort? Answering these questions is so hard that one group of military administrators may be forgiven the overstatement that "every time R & D is confused with Planning, it dies."

Proposals to "integrate" NATO R & D efforts must therefore be examined skeptically. If modest funds are to be pooled to support research projects that have been overlooked or insufficiently supported by national programs, little can be lost and much may be gained. When one adds the assured low cost of exchanging scientific information, with

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its great possibilities of gain, the prospect is very promising. With, however, overly ambitious aspirations of co-ordinating entire R & D programs, the prospect changes. Zeal to eliminate duplication of research efforts can be terribly dangerous. One shudders at the thought of technical committees with representatives from fifteen nations meeting, in an atmosphere beclouded by strategic and technological uncertainties, to select from the enormous list of possible alternatives the R & D projects to be supported and to determine how they should be pursued. Even within one service in this country we find the management of R & D a perplexing business, with scientists and industrialists arguing that progress would be quicker if they were given ample money and a free hand. Such anarchy, of course, is a very poor solution to the management problem. But the solution of a completely centralized control, driving for an "optimal" program and insisting upon concurrence of all interested parties in any change in technical specifications or budgets, is equally untenable. It presupposes far too much foresight and leads to intolerable delay and administrative cost. Amusingly enough, this solution is most often advocated by academicians who are themselves foremost in defending *laissez faire* in the apportionment of their own research skills.

These points are relevant because our authors want modest pooling in R & D to be the beginning step toward much more ambitious integration. As later steps are taken, it is important, as they say, that these not be confined to the Research area. The big money is spent elsewhere at the later stages of weapons development and production, and upon forces themselves. Here therefore are the opportunities for truly big economies, and the analytical problem of identifying wasteful duplication is far easier. We need peer less far into the future to appraise military utility, and some of the uncertainties, particularly the technological ones, will have been resolved. On the other hand, the political problems of removing duplication will then become harder because national policy lines have hardened and service and production vested interests have been created. If only we had the vision to determine with confidence a sensible strategy for the distant future for forces and R & D alike, so that waste could be tactfully nipped in the bud before political resistance has become strong! Lacking such vision, we must try to minimize waste, some of which is inevitable, by simultaneous attacks upon inefficient forces, manifestly uneconomic development and production, and overlooked research opportunities. Assuming that we want truly collective defense, a prominent obstacle is supplied by the aspirations of some NATO countries to emulate Britain in having strategic air forces

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of their own. Let us try first to discourage such a further splintering of our strategic forces. Failing this, let us avoid the high cost of each nation developing and producing on its own the missile or aircraft equivalent of no less than three British V-type bombers with their own bombs. If we fail in this, would there be any collective defense to talk about?

III

The virtues of Warburton's and Wood's immediate proposals for burden-sharing resemble those for R & D pooling in being most apparent because the proposals are modest. The great merit of turning to an infrastructure cost-sharing formula is that the acrimonious and time-consuming bargaining involved in deriving it is past. When determining cost-shares is divorced from other negotiations, as is partly the case for infrastructure contributions, the bargaining is isolated from the military aspects that promise mutual gain and from the possibility of imputing roughly the gain to each ally. In analytic terms, all that is left of the intricate alliance game is its zero-sum component, wherein the gain of one member in reducing his cost-share is measured precisely by the loss of another. The bargaining situation is then characterized by direct opposition of interest, great difficulty in finding any objective ground for agreement, and an accrual of bargaining strength to a participant in direct proportion to his seeming disinterest in achieving agreement and his consequent stubbornness. That we reached agreements in this field at all is a major accomplishment. For new programs an old formula is bound to be arbitrary, but some arbitrariness is inevitable anyway. Of overriding importance when the new programs are not extremely expensive, the old formula may be acceptable because no realizable alternative is readily discernible, and all the allies are appalled by the prospect of new bargaining from scratch.

Also, applying an old infrastructure formula to new areas of pooling is less anomalous than it first appears to be because the old negotiations paid more attention to members' total resources than was probably appropriate, given their restricted scope. Much of the bargaining turned on comparisons of national products and standards of life, which is appropriate when total military contributions are at issue. But when only a small part of total contributions represented by infrastructure shares is at issue, bargaining in this way means that a country will get little credit or discredit for contributing much or little to other than infrastructure. In principle this is ridiculous. Two countries in similar economic circumstances will probably find themselves contributing about the same infrastructure shares. Yet one may be outstripping the other

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greatly in sacrificing for common defense by supplying troops or equipment. If the only opportunity for redressing the balance of sacrifice arises in negotiations about infrastructure, then it is appropriate not only that the two contribute very different infrastructure shares, but probably that, instead of contributing, one should receive subsidies from the other. This is hard for politicians to comprehend and harder to sell to electorates. Hence the fundamental weakness in principle of infrastructure sharing, which becomes less of a weakness as more of the total contributions of members are covered by the formula.

On the other hand, the gross arbitrariness of the formula becomes less acceptable as the total contributions rise. The basic issues of principle and of measurement involved in burden-sharing come more and more to the fore, and vexing issues they are. How can we deflate national military expenditures to the figures that would represent solely efficient contributions to collective defense, i.e., purge them not only of waste but of extra expenses incurred, however efficiently, for purely unilateral purposes? How measure the national resources of allies to compare with these deflated military expenditures? What should be the relationship between these military expenditures and total resources for each ally in the light of different standards of living? These are some of the fundamental burden-sharing questions. It is no wonder that early efforts to get a burden-sharing agreement in NATO failed.

It is greatly to the credit of our authors that they recognize most of the key difficulties, and acknowledge that any formula solution will necessarily be crude. They have been especially impressed by the problems of measuring national resources and comparing standards of living, following the Gilbert-Kravis study[2] that demonstrated so forcefully the pitfalls of using official rates of foreign exchange to express these magnitudes in terms of any single currency. And they are aware that there is no magic answer to the question of by how much, if at all, members should contribute higher percentages of their resources if they have higher incomes per capita. Given the brevity of their discussion, some aspects are naturally slighted. They fail, for example, to exploit that part of public finance theory dealing with intra-area transfers to the limited but still significant extent to which it is applicable to the international burden-sharing problem.[3] And a more complete and sophisticated treatment of cost-sharing problems is available elsewhere.[4]

[2] M. Gilbert and J. B. Kravis, *An International Comparison of National Products*, Paris, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 1954.

[3] M. W. Hoag, "Economic Problems of Alliance," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXV (December 1957), pp. 522-34.

[4] T. C. Schelling, *International Cost-Sharing Arrangements* (Essays in International Finance, No. 24), Princeton, N.J., 1955.

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There is one aspect, however, which, underemphasized in these books, must be put in the forefront of any policy discussion of burden-sharing. Discussing the impressive obstacles alone breeds a defeatism that no interest in equity for equity's sake can possibly overcome. It is the incentive aspect of a formal burden-sharing scheme that must be stressed. The central dilemma of an alliance is that the more interdependent members become, the more the military efforts of allies are substitutable for effort of one's own. Hence the perverse incentive to slacken one's effort becomes greater. This effect is especially prominent for small powers. If doubling one's own military budget looks terribly costly, but can at best add only a little to the deterrent power of the alliance, why do it? Apathy has been a grievous problem in NATO. It might be attacked by threats of withdrawing alliance protection if greater effort is not forthcoming—e.g., "We would no longer propose to risk Chicago for Copenhagen." Obviously, so drastic a device is likely to drive those at whom it is directed from a state of apathy to one of angry despair. A far more subtle, although still forceful and politically troublesome, means of attack can be envisaged in the form of a burden-sharing scheme that provides for monetary transfers among members. To the extent that a member then lags in its military program, it loses in claims for transfers from its allies or incurs increased transfer obligations to them. A Finance Minister may find himself far more favorably inclined toward military programs in view of their new impact upon the balance of payments. This is strong medicine, and in the nature of the case neither the type of medicine nor its dosage would be perfectly appropriate. But it meets the incentive problem forcefully, if imperfectly, and this great promise of a burden-sharing scheme must be balanced against its formidable technical and political difficulties.

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THE ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

By MARTIN L. KILSON, JR.

Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, New York, New York University Press, 1957, 216 pp. $3.75.

I

A PROCESS of profound social, economic, and political change is rapidly unfolding in contemporary Africa. This process—which may be defined as "modernization" or "Westernization"—contains the seeds of a new Africa, whose ultimate form and character can now be perceived in barest outline, but whose nature and total orientation are still far from predictable. Be this as it may, the crucial and foremost fact is that Africa is rapidly changing in all spheres of life, and the meaning of this change for Africa in particular, and for the world in general, is bound to be of utmost significance.

One important signpost toward the changes in contemporary Africa has been the emergence of nationalism on that continent. In the book under review, Mr. Thomas Hodgkin (who was formerly Secretary to the Oxford University Delegacy for Extra-Mural Studies and Fellow of Balliol, 1945-1952) undertakes the first fairly substantial effort to analyze the forces that have generated nationalism in the colonial territories of Africa south of the Sahara. As one might expect, the initial problem confronted by Mr. Hodgkin in attempting this analysis is the attainment of a sensible and meaningful definition of the term "nationalism" when applied to African situations. To those who are familiar with Africa's socio-cultural complex, the nature of this problem is immediately apparent.

As traditionally defined (assuming, for the moment, that there is a single, traditional definition of the term upon which general agreement can be had), "nationalism" may be said to be "a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state."[1] Such a sense of loyalty is rather new to most Africans—if

[1] Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, New York, 1955, p. 9. Cf. E. H. Carr, *Nationalism*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939, p. xviii: "[Nationalism] is a consciousness, on the part of individuals or groups, of membership in a nation, or of a desire to forward the strength, liberty or prosperity of a nation. . . ." Cf. also C. J. Hayes, "Nationalism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. II, New York, 1933.

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it exists, in a substantial and lasting sense, at all. To most Africans, the only socio-political unit that provides any conscious sense of belonging has been, in its widest extent, the clan or tribe, and, in its smallest extent, the family or kinship group. Furthermore, African societies have possessed—at least in more recent times—no indigenous unit of social and political organization comparable to the nation-state.[2] Rather, they have comprised a galaxy of tribal groups, normally small in numbers (though some, like the Yoruba, Ibo, Kikuyu, etc., number in the millions), each of which has for centuries adhered to its own pattern of custom, belief, religion, and has in most cases possessed its own language or distinct dialect. Such a tribal complex has prevailed in every African colonial territory, and one is hard put to discover any appreciable degree of cultural homogeneity among the total population in any given territory. Accordingly, one is unable to refrain from asking: what is meant by the term "nationalism" when it is applied to African situations?

II

In arriving at his definition of the term Mr. Hodgkin employs (though he does not expressly say so) Professor Georges Balandier's concept of the "colonial situation."[3] According to this concept, the essential element constituting a colonial society, in terms of the dynamics of social change, is the superior power of the European authorities (or, more particularly, what Sir Ivor Jennings has called the European "imported oligarchy" of governors, civil servants, business administrators, entrepreneurs, and the like[4]) in relation to the indigenous peoples in colonial territories. This relationship may be said to determine the pattern of social, economic, and political advancement in a colonial society; it determines the extent to which such advancement is gradual or rapid, peaceful or revolutionary. In short, this relationship of dependence is the fulcrum around which the whole colonial system revolves, and as the relationship is modified and altered in the course of time, so is the total colonial system.

[2] African societies (particularly in West Africa) have experienced indigenous political units that have taken the form of empires. For a brief survey, see J. C. de Graft-Johnson, "African Empires of the Past," *Présence Africaine* (April-May 1957), pp. 58-64.

[3] Georges Balandier, "La Situation coloniale: Approche théorique," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XI (1951), pp. 44-79. See also Balandier, "Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance," *ibid.*, XII (1952), pp. 47-69.

[4] Sir Ivor Jennings, "Approach to Self-government," *Corona: The Journal of Her Majesty's Oversea Service* (February 1956), p. 62.

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Now Mr. Hodgkin employs the term "nationalism" to define, and thus to comprehend, African responses (particularly *organized responses*) which seek, in a variety of ways, to modify or alter the colonial situation, or which seek to adjust and adapt African societies to the complex and profound changes stemming from this situation. It is significant to note Hodgkin's firm departure from certain aspects of the traditional definition of the term. For him, African responses to the colonial situation do not necessarily have to emanate from, or originate among, a people who can be said to possess a marked degree of national consciousness and national culture—as we generally understand these phenomena—before one can employ the term "nationalism" with respect to them. The crucial and overriding fact is that these responses stem from general and specific circumstances found in, and created by, the colonial situation. As such, they tend to be democratic expressions—expressions, that is, of a more egalitarian and libertarian, of a more secure and fruitful, situation than that which characterizes the colonial situation and the circumstances produced by it. Thus, Mr. Hodgkin records that his "own inclination is to use the term 'nationalist' in a broad sense, to describe any organisation or group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims and aspirations of a given African society (from the level of the language-group to that of 'Pan-Africa') in opposition to the European authority, whatever its institutional form and objectives" (p. 23).

With this usage of the term "nationalism" as applied to African situations, Mr. Hodgkin remains satisfied, and endeavors to demonstrate that it is more effective than others that have been employed. Dr. James S. Coleman, for instance, has used a threefold schema for analyzing nationalism in Africa which tends to be more limited in its application of the term "nationalism" to any given African organized response to colonialism.[5] Dr. Coleman speaks of "traditionalist movements," "syncretistic movements," and "modernist movements," reserving the term "nationalism" for a particular type of response falling within the third category—namely, trade unions, political parties, etc. These he calls "nationalist" on the grounds that they are "organized and led by the Westernized elite which is activated by the Western ideas of democracy, progress, the welfare state, and national self-determination, and which aspires *either*: (a) to create modern independent African nation-states . . . ; *or* (b) to achieve absolute social and political equality and local

[5] See James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, XLVIII, No. 2 (June 1954), pp. 404-26. Cf. Georges Balandier, "Contribution à l'étude des nationalismes en Afrique noire," *Zaire* (April 1954), pp. 379-89.

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autonomy within a broader Eur-African grouping . . . or within what is manifestly a plural society."[6]

Another view on this matter has recently been offered by the venerable Lord Hailey.[7] Unlike Dr. Coleman, who *does* find the term "nationalism" applicable to Western-type African organized responses to colonial circumstances, Lord Hailey holds the term to have little, if any, meaning at all in African situations, and feels that it should be replaced by the term "Africanism." Lord Hailey argues his case as follows: "It seems advisable on this occasion to give prominence to the use of the term 'Africanism' rather than 'nationalism.' In Europe nationalism is a readily recognisable force, even though it may not be easily definable, but as a concept it has associations which make it difficult of application in the conditions of Africa. As has so often been emphasized in the literature on the subject, the population of most of the countries of Africa south of the Sahara consists of peoples who have been brought together under one form of government by the accidents of history; they have for the most part no tradition of a common origin nor common outlook on their political future. It is true to say, in general terms, that whatever may have been the other influences that have shaped the destinies of these countries, the majority have in the past missed the dynamic influence of the concept of territorial nationalism. . . . Taking the African peoples at large, the term 'Africanism' seems to describe most nearly the movement which is now so much in evidence in many of the countries dealt with in this *Survey*. It is indeed the manifestation of the spirit of Africanism which is one of the most distinctive features in the picture of post-war Africa."[8]

For his view of the inapplicability of the term "nationalism" to contemporary African developments, Lord Hailey can claim the support of a number of eminent Africanists. For instance, Mrs. Elspeth Huxley, in a review of Hailey's study, firmly endorses his position.[9] Professor Diedrich Westermann has reflected on this question in terms very similar to Hailey's: "Nationalism has in its application to Africa not the same meaning as when applied to European countries. In Europe it is the desire of a nation to be united and to control all its members. In Africa it simply means independence from European domination. In Africa there are no nations, but only tribal groups. . . ."[10]

[6] Coleman, *op.cit.*, pp. 406-7.
[7] Lord Hailey, *An African Survey: Revised 1956*, London, 1957.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 251-52.
[9] Elspeth Huxley, "Africa: A Giant Task," *Sunday Times*, November 24, 1957, p. 7.
[10] Diedrich Westermann, "Cultural History of Negro Africa," *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, No. 4 (1957), p. 1003.

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Hodgkin, however, is clearly in opposition to those who hesitate or refuse to apply the term "nationalism" to African developments. For him, elements of the preconditions of "nationalism" (viewed, in the words of Professor Morgenthau, as a historical process which represents "the aspiration of a collectivity to be free"[11]) do prevail in Africa. To be sure, the peculiarities, or what Hodgkin terms the "particularisms," of African situations complicate our definition and comprehension of "nationalism" in Africa (as well as complicating the actual process of attaining the goals of "nationalism" in Africa along classical lines), but they do not negate its existence (pp. 20ff.). As will be noted shortly, colonial rule has generated thoroughgoing changes in African societies, and these changes have brought in their wake a mode of life and a pattern of ideas that have given birth to an African nationalism. Even though the paradoxical situation occurs in Africa of "nationalism" emerging before the appearance of clearly definable and coherent *nations*, the crucial fact is that the creation of such *nations* is one of the prime purposes of African nationalism. By this fact alone, the applicability of the term "nationalism" to contemporary Africa may be justified.

As for Dr. Coleman's limited employment of the term, Mr. Hodgkin is inclined to reject it on the ground that it gives rise to two analytical difficulties:

> First, it tends to conceal the 'mixed-up' character of African political movements. In a single African territory it is possible to find coexisting a diversity of organisations, of different types, with different objectives, operating at different levels, each in its own way expressing opposition to European control and a demand for new liberties; and to discover a network of relationships between these organisations. . . .
>
> Second, the restricted definition of 'nationalism' seems to imply that nationalism is non-existent in such territories as the Belgian Congo, where no African political organisations aiming at self-government exist, or would be permitted to exist, and where the sense of Congolese nationhood is rudimentary. Yet movements opposing European rule and asserting African rights are at work in the Congo, and have been working for the past generation. The sentiments and beliefs of politically-minded members of the Congolese elite differ very little from those of politically-minded Africans across the frontiers, in Northern Rhodesia or French Equatorial Africa. It would be more accurate therefore to say that the Congo is still in the phase of 'incipient nationalism', as contrasted with the 'mature' or 'developed nationalism', of, say, the Gold Coast . . . (pp. 24-25).[12]

[11] Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Paradoxes of Nationalism," *Yale Review*, XLVI, No. 4 (Summer 1957), pp. 481-82.

[12] Cf. Basil Davidson, *The African Awakening*, London, 1955, pp. 248ff.: "Nothing is easier than to prove the African awakening in West Africa. It speaks from every

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For one to decide between Hodgkin's usage of the term "nationalism" and others that have been offered, the crucial test would seem to be (1) the extent to which his usage better enables us to comprehend the total nature and meaning of the variety of specific African responses to the colonial situation, and (2) the extent to which it provides us with sensible and useful insights into the ultimate structure or system in which these responses will be synthesized. On both these scores, Hodgkin's usage is superior, as the remainder of this article will endeavor to demonstrate.

III

The analysis of the nature and meaning of African responses to the colonial situation (particularly those organized responses which, with Hodgkin, may rightly be called nationalist) must have as its point of departure the general system of colonialism, viewed particularly as an instrument of social change. Whatever the reasons for the establishment of colonial rule in Africa may have been, it is clear that the colonial social system has been a stimulator and organizer of social and economic change in African societies. When it is remembered that the traditional African society was a tightly knit and rather conservative socio-cultural system, in which emphasis was placed upon security and status, on the one hand, and on loyalty to one's kinship group, clan, or tribe, on the other hand, the far-reaching consequences of the changes wrought in Africa under the aegis of colonialism appear most striking. Colonial rule introduced a money or exchange economy in Africa—what Hodgkin terms a "rudimentary capitalist economy"—which has gradually commercialized and, more recently, industrialized much of the economic activity of African peoples, and has also individualized or decommunalized it. With the rise of agricultural production for the market, the growth of trade, mineral production, and other industries such as transport, and the growth of government administration and social and professional services, the traditional African society has been shaken to its roots.[13] Thousands of Africans have been uprooted from

street corner. . . . Awakening does not speak from every street corner in the Belgian Congo and Angola. Here there are no parties, no trade unions, no national movements, no groups of organised intellectuals, who may stand up clearly in the light of day and declare their thoughts. Here, as we have seen, there is prison for the protesting nationalist. Yet, for all that, the awakening is here. The laconic item in the Belgian Congo's official returns, '3,818 political prisoners', attests its presence, not to speak in neighbouring Angola of Senhor Pereira's 'average of five a month sent to Sao Thome'. And in the Belgian Congo, on the brighter side, there is the powerful emergence of an industrial working class, setting a standard of technical achievement equalled in no other part of Black Africa."

[13] See Dayrll Forde, ed., *Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara*, Paris, 1956.

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tribal communities and subsistence economies. Some have become wage-laborers in European-owned mines and trading concerns, on African-owned or European-owned farms and plantations, or in government-controlled transport industries. Others have participated directly in the new economic system, as cocoa, coffee, cotton, or sisal farmers, as money-lenders, cocoa brokers, lorry-owners, and so forth. Still others have entered professional occupations as bankers, lawyers, doctors, teachers, journalists, administrators, civil servants, statesmen, and politicians.

Closely associated with this commercialization, proletarianization, and professionalization of African economic activity and behavior has been the rise of modern towns and urban centers, and a rapid increase in town-dwelling and urban-dwelling populations. A glance at the population figures of the Belgian Congo, where industrialization is quite advanced, reveals this trend clearly. In 1938, 8.33 per cent of the total population were urban-dwellers; in 1946, 15 per cent; and in 1954, about 21.5 per cent.[14] Figures given by Hodgkin show a similar trend for other areas: the urban population in Dakar, French Senegal, stood at 24,914 in 1910 and 300,000 in 1955; Lagos, in Nigeria, had 74,000 urban-dwellers in 1910 and 270,000 in 1955; and similar figures are cited for other urban centers in colonial Africa (p. 67).

Thus uprooted from their tribal communities by modern socio-economic forces and relocated in new towns where the closely knit and secure life of the tribal communities no longer prevails, Africans have been confronted with the urgent problem of re-establishing and reordering their lives in totally new situations. As Hodgkin reminds us with references to the writings of the Hammonds, this problem and the situations that created it are not very much unlike those confronted by the uprooted peasants and country-folk in England during the Industrial Revolution. And yet there is a crucial and fundamental difference. For, as Professor Balandier has pointed out, the new towns and urban centers in Africa, and the situations surrounding their emergence, are "a colonial creation."[15] Or, as another observer has put it, these towns and centers have been "built by whites and occupied by blacks."[16] Mr. Hodgkin is eminently cognizant of this important fact, and accordingly analyzes the efforts of Africans to reorder their lives in the towns as adaptive responses to circumstances generated by

[14] Hailey, *op.cit.*, p. 345.

[15] Georges Balandier, "Urbanism in West and Central Africa," in Forde, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 497.

[16] Jean Dresch, "Villes congolaises: Etude de géographie urbaine et sociale," *Revue de Géographie Humaine et d'Ethnologie* (July-September 1948), p. 5.

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colonialism. His analysis of this phenomenon goes far toward validating Professor Balandier's view that "any psychological and sociological survey of the groups and individuals which compose urban society [in Africa] must allow for the existence of colonization."[17]

African efforts at building new lives in the towns and urban centers have taken, in large measure, the form of founding associations and organizations of many types, all of which endeavor "to serve the modern needs of their members as well as to fulfill purposes not realizable under the older order."[18] Thus has emerged a complex of what Hodgkin terms "new associations," such as friendly societies, burial clubs, boys' clubs, tribal unions, improvement unions, welfare leagues, cultural societies, trade unions, professional associations, separatist churches,[19] and so forth. Although the significance of these new associations is largely functional—in the sense of serving the needs and desires of newly urbanized Africans—it is also something more than this. As Hodgkin records it, their significance ". . . lies partly in their rich variety, reflecting the range of interests and aspirations of the Africans who created them; partly in the evidence they provide that African vitality—far from being crushed by the squalid surroundings and crude discipline of these colonial towns—has been stirred to new forms of expression. The associations of contemporary Africa are democratic, not in the sense that they can serve as models of democratic organisation; but in the older sense, that they have been constructed by a *demos* which is slowly discovering, by trial and error, the institutions which it requires in order to live humanly and sociably in the urban world into which it has been thrust" (p. 91).[20]

Particularly noteworthy is Mr. Hodgkin's suggestion regarding the influence of different colonial regimes in determining the types of associations that have arisen in African territories. If the colonial regime permits a fair amount of freedom of movement and organization, and provides a fair quantity of primary, secondary, and higher education,

[17] Balandier, "Urbanism in West and Central Africa," *loc.cit.*

[18] Kenneth Little, "The African Elite in British West Africa," in Andrew W. Lind, ed., *Race Relations in World Perspective*, Honolulu, 1955, p. 284.

[19] Hodgkin does not discuss separatist churches in his chapter on "New Associations," but does so in his interesting chapter on "Prophets and Priests." Separatist churches tend to be less distinctly "new" in character than the other associations, to the extent that they are syncretistic "in the sense that they carry over into their doctrines and worship values and rituals derived from traditional religion." Yet their emergence represents a response to situations created by colonialism no less than that of the more modernly oriented associations. (See pp. 99ff.)

[20] For more recent material on the new associations in African urban centers, see Kenneth Little, "The Role of Voluntary Associations in West African Urbanization," *American Anthropologist*, XLIX, No. 4 (August 1957), pp. 579-96. See also Michael Banton, *West African City*, London, 1957, pp. 162-95.

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these associations tend to be largely functional in purpose and orientation—for example, improvement unions, tribal unions, trade unions and, on a higher level of organizational formation, political movements and parties. On the other hand, if these factors are few or nearly nonexistent within a colonial regime, these associations tend to be rather escapist in orientation (though, in their own way, no less functional)—for example, separatist churches and nativistic or messianic movements. Thus, the former have tended to predominate in British and French West African territories, while the latter have been found largely in British East and Central Africa, the Belgian Congo, and the Union of South Africa.

It is essential to mention that, for Hodgkin, such associations as separatist churches and messianic movements, no less than full-fledged political parties, are manifestations of African nationalism. All are responses, though of different types and operating on different levels, to circumstances created by European colonialism. All are forms of expressions of a desire for emancipation from difficulties and frustrations imposed by the dominant European minority within the colonial system. Thus Hodgkin notes that the essential purpose of separatist churches is ". . . to transfer to the spiritual and ecclesiastical plane opposition to European authority in general, and to make possible, on this plane, the reconstruction of African communities under African leadership: *a process which is particularly liable to occur under an authoritarian colonial system*, where religion is 'the only field within which emancipation is possible'. Hence the proliferation of independent Churches of all types (over 800, with more than three-quarters of a million adherents) in the Union of South Africa, where a highly authoritarian regime increasingly blocks all other roads by which Africans might seek their emancipation" (pp. 104-5; italics added).[21]

IV

Turning to what may be called the "highest" form of African responses to colonial situations, we find Mr. Hodgkin in agreement with Dr. Coleman's thesis that "modernist movements" represent the most developed or mature form of African nationalism. Such movements have been the core of nationalism in Africa. They operate within

[21] Cf. Kenneth Little, "African Culture and the Western Intrusion," *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, No. 4 (1957), pp. 956ff.: "Nationalism in West Africa is recognizable as a political phenomenon; but in a number of other places opposition to Europeans has been expressed in a nativistic guise. It usually takes the form of independent churches and messianic movements which combine evangelical Christianity with tribal rites and practices. The Mau Mau movement in Kenya is an example of this."

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the confines of a specific territorial entity—Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, etc.—and endeavor to transform it from a colonial dependency to a self-governing or independent nation-state. They are led by highly educated and middle-class Africans who, owing to their education in Western institutions (at home or overseas), have become thoroughly imbued with ideas of democratic government. The realization of such ideas of government by the nationalist-oriented African middle-class has been facilitated, interestingly enough, by colonial rule. Although within any given territory in which an African nationalist organization or party functions there prevails a heterogeneous complex of ethnic and tribal groups, the colonial policy of ruling these groups as integral parts of a distinct territorial entity under a single government, rather than as distinct tribes, has laid the administrative and institutional basis for the emergence of governmental units far beyond the confines of tribal groupings. Moreover, the colonial system has brought a common language (e.g., English, French) to the diverse ethnic and tribal groups within any given African territory, and has thereby enabled them to communicate with each other and to lay the basis for political and social action along national rather than tribal lines. Still more, the advances in transportation networks and in communications generally, like the advance of a common language, have contributed to the increasing contact between tribal groups, thereby breaking down much of the parochialism characteristic of tribal communities. All of these factors—among others[22]—in the process referred to by Professor Deutsch as "social mobilization,"[23] have contributed to the rise of African political movements and parties which are national or nationalist in purpose, character, and scope. The more prominent of African nationalist political parties have been the Convention People's Party in Ghana, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, and the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africaine* in French West and Equatorial Africa.

In his chapter on "Parties and Congresses," Mr. Hodgkin analyzes the organizational development of African nationalist parties. The role of the process of social mobilization in the rise of nationalist parties

[22] Mention should also be made of the role of organs of central government—known in British territories as Legislative and Executive Councils—in the rise of African parties. These proto-parliamentary organs have provided the institutional framework for the emergence of full-fledged political parties. See, especially, James S. Coleman, "The Emergence of African Political Parties," in C. Groves Haines, ed., *Africa Today*, Baltimore, Md., 1956, pp. 225-56.

[23] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York, 1953, pp. 81ff.; Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations," *World Politics*, v, No. 2 (January 1953), pp. 168-96. Deutsch defines a nation as the "result of the transformation of people, or several ethnic elements, in the process of social mobilization."

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is fully appreciated, and he presents useful material on the predominantly extra-parliamentary origin of African parties. We also find here evidence of the fruitfulness of Mr. Hodgkin's analysis of African nationalism—which is our major concern in this review article. By not limiting the term "nationalism" to Western-type political organizations and parties, Hodgkin provides useful insight into the complex or mixed-up character of African nationalism. Although recognizing nationalist political parties as the most developed form of African nationalism, Hodgkin points out the significance to the formation of those parties of a whole network of lesser associations (which, in many instances, are "semi-political associations"[24]) which can be drawn upon for moral, financial, and organizational support. The tribal unions, boys' clubs, cultural societies, welfare leagues, trade unions, etc., all have their own small organizational structures and leaders of varying qualities. Once the nationalist movements and parties began to form, they had this necessary and useful reservoir of lesser associations to draw upon for their organizational needs. In fact, some of these associations have functioned as the organizational basis of several African political parties. For instance, the Yoruba cultural society known as the *Egba Omo Oduduwa* was the springboard of Chief Awolowo's Action Group; and the Ibo Union was the foundation stone of Dr. Azikiwe's N.C.N.C.

It may also be said that nationalist movements and parties have, in turn, contributed to the aims and purposes of the lesser associations. At its inception, this particular African response to colonialism (i.e., the formation of lesser associations) does not advocate total national emancipation from colonial rule. Rather, it is largely concerned with emancipating Africans from the day-to-day frustrations, insecurities, and general difficulties arising from changes stimulated by colonialism. This type of response has, of course, given rise to riots and protest movements—most of which, however, have been rather spontaneous, sporadic, and particularly lacking in nationalist ideology and orientation. Dr. Banton has correctly observed that such riots and protestations "are not to be attributed dogmatically to political agitation against colonial rule. Many of them have nothing to do with this issue and arise chiefly from the insecure and unsatisfying social life that many of the new inhabitants [in the towns] have perforce to lead." He also observes that "if more attention is paid to what the people themselves do to alleviate their condition, it may often prove possible to build upon their institutions

[24] See Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, Part III, London, 1951, pp. 18-20.

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and turn their energies into the most constructive channels."[25] Now it is precisely this function of providing more "constructive channels" for the "lowest" form of African response to colonial circumstances that the nationalist movements and parties perform—though, perhaps, not always adequately. As Hodgkin puts it, they have "offered more promising techniques for solving the problems of African subordination and poverty" (p. 105). The point is that when this new type of African response occurs in the form of nationalist parties, the former response is readily fused with the latter and accordingly takes on a new conception of its aims and purposes, and of the most effective means for securing them. In short, no longer do the new associations appear as isolated African responses to particular aspects of the colonial situation, but rather become integral parts of a nationalist-oriented African response to the total colonial situation.

V

It is undoubtedly upon the political parties which now function within the institutional framework of parliamentarianism that the future of African nationalism largely depends. This broader and more effective type of African response to colonialism has both symbolized and conveyed the idea of nationalism in Africa. What is more, these political parties represent, in their programs and policies, what seems to be the most fundamental aspect of contemporary African nationalism—namely, an avenue for the entry of hitherto primitive societies, radically altered by Western influences under colonialism, into the modern world. In short, they represent the urgent need and desire to remold and reconstruct African primitive and colonial societies so as to permit them to provide a more fruitful, secure, and abundant life for their peoples.

Mr. Hodgkin, unfortunately, only touches slightly upon the very crucial questions of the possible future patterns of social, economic, and political development to be adopted by African nationalism, and of its future ties and relationships with the conflicting power-blocs and political ideologies on the international scene (pp. 187-90). Admittedly, these are not easy issues to come to grips with (and also, the sensible soul hesitates to venture into the dangerous realm of prophecy), but an endeavor on Mr. Hodgkin's part in this respect would have provided, I am sure, stimulating and provocative food for thought.[26]

[25] Banton, *op.cit.*, p. xvi.

[26] See, e.g., Julius Lewin, "Dilemma of Economic Growth," *Central African Examiner*, November 9, 1957, p. 27; R. B. Davison, "The Challenge of Ghana," *Political Quarterly*, XXVIII, No. 3 (July-September 1957), pp. 282ff.

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Mr. Hodgkin does provide a concluding and interesting chapter on "Theories and Myths," in which he shows, among other things, that one important future trend of African nationalism will certainly be an endeavor to restore the historical, racial, and cultural traditions of Negro Africans to a worthy and noble position among the family of man. To overcome the stigmatic and disabling effect of century-old arguments that Negro peoples have no historical traditions worthy of mention,[27] African nationalists "have been compelled to develop their own counter-attack; to answer the myth of African barbarism and backwardness with the counter-myth of African civilisation and achievement" (p. 173).[28] Significant in this connection is the fact that, as Hodgkin points out, much of the effort at rediscovering the African past has been closely linked with African struggles for national self-determination. The eminent Nigerian historian, Dr. K. Onwuka Dike (who is currently heading a project to study the Benin culture in southern Nigeria),[29] has explained this situation in these terms: "It is my contention that seemingly abstract considerations such as those of culture and history are as important as more material ones in building a nation. They are at the root of the question of self-government. If the African has no past heritage, and no future except by imitation of European ways at a pace which the European thinks safe, then the Gold Coast is destined to fail. But if the instinctive belief of the African in his traditions is justified, the ultimate emergence of West African states as independent modern nations cannot be doubted. Every nation builds its future on its past; so the African must not only instinctively have faith in his own inheritance, but must also satisfy himself by scientific inquiry that it exists."[30]

[27] As late as 1953, a British journalist published a report on Africa that included a chapter entitled "Continent Without History," in which he observed that "Africa bears practically no traces of an indigenous civilization." Vernon Bartlett, *Struggle for Africa*, New York, 1953, p. 3.

[28] Being familiar with Mr. Hodgkin's writings, I am sure he does mean that *all* African efforts to counteract the "myth of African barbarism" have been simply exercises in *counter-myth making*. See Thomas Hodgkin, "The Paris Congress," *West Africa* (September 29, 1956), p. 749; Hodgkin, "African Historians in Conference," *ibid.* (July 27, 1957), p. 702.

[29] See "The Mystery of Benin," *ibid.* (May 5, 1956), p. 243; "Pioneer Historian," *ibid.* (September 28, 1957), p. 917.

[30] K. O. Dike, "History and African Nationalism," *Proceedings*, First Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College, Ibadan, 1952, p. 31. See also Dike, "African History and Self-government," *West Africa* (February 28, 1953), p. 177: "So long as the African is regarded as a man without a culture and without a history, doubts concerning his ability to govern himself will find credence."

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In its efforts to restore the Negro African to his proper status in the family of man, African nationalism has achieved much success to date. There is little doubt that it has set the stage for a totally new evaluation of Negro African history and culture on the part of the Western world.[31] This, however, is only one aspect of the enormous problems confronting African nationalism. To an extent even greater, perhaps, than Asian nationalism, African nationalism has yet to solve the tremendous task of consolidating the highly diverse, and even contradictory, elements that comprise it. It must also solve—so as to ensure its security and durability—the immense problems of social, economic, and political advancement in countries that are far from favorably blessed with the preconditions (science, technology, education, capital, skilled labor, etc.) for such advancement. Nevertheless, as Hodgkin tells us, these immense problems have not deterred African nationalism from forging onward to its goal of self-government or independence for African peoples. In his words, African nationalists "are no more prepared than other nationalists in history to accept the conventional colonial argument that economic and social improvement . . . must be regarded as a precondition for the transfer of power" (p. 189). In short, the anti-colonial aspect of African nationalism still predominates, and most African nationalists consider the undoing of colonialism as "a necessary precondition for the solution of [the foregoing] problems" (*ibid.*).

For the understanding of African nationalism up to this stage, Mr. Hodgkin has rendered great service in providing us with an invaluably thoughtful, insightful, and illuminating study. One may eagerly await a more comprehensive account of African nationalism from his pen in the near future. But until then—and perhaps even in the event of the appearance of a larger work—students in this field will be indebted to this study for quite a while to come.

[31]Basil Davidson, "A Note on 'Pre-European' Africa," *Présence Africaine* (April-May 1957), pp. 146-50; "The Fact of African History" (A Symposium), *Africa South* (January-March 1958), pp. 44-67; R. A. Hamilton, ed., *History and Archaeology in Africa*, Report of a Conference Held in July 1953 at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1955.

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